scholarly journals La influencia de la teoría de las pasiones de Hume en el juicio moral de Adam Smith

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 268-276
Author(s):  
Maria A. Carrasco

The analysis of the irregular moral sentiments that Smith describes in TMS II.iii evidences the enormous influence of David Hume’s theory of passions in the moral theory of his successor, as well as the critical differences between these Scottish philosophers’ moral proposals. Moreover, these atypical situations also allow us to grasp the different parts of Smithian moral judgment, and to exclude – despite Smith’s assertion – the influence of moral luck on these judgments.Keywords: Adam Smith, David Hume, moral judgment, passions, moral luck.

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 208-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord

AbstractDavid Hume and Adam Smith are usually, and understandably, seen as developing very similar sentimentalist accounts of moral thought and practice. As similar as Hume's and Smith's accounts of moral thought are, they differ in telling ways. This essay is an attempt primarily to get clear on the important differences. They are worth identifying and exploring, in part, because of the great extent to which Hume and Smith share not just an overall approach to moral theory but also a conception of what the key components of an adequate account of moral thought will be. In the process, I hope to bring out the extent to which they both worked to make sense of the fact that we do not merely have affective reactions but also, importantly, make moral judgments.


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Christel Fricke ◽  
Maria Alejandra Carrasco

We read Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments as a critical response to David Hume's moral theory. While both share a commitment to moral sentimentalism, they propose different ways of meeting its main challenge, that is, explaining how judgments informed by (partial) sentiments can nevertheless have a justified claim to general authority. This difference is particularly manifest in their respective accounts of ‘moral optics’, or the way they rely on the analogy between perceptual and moral judgments. According to Hume, making perceptual and moral judgments requires focusing on frequently co-occurring impressions (perceptions of objects or reactive sentiments) for tracking an existing object with its perceptual properties or an agent's character traits. Smith uses visual perception for the purpose of illustrating one source of the partiality of the sentiments people feel in response to actions. Before making a moral judgment, people have to disregard this partiality and accept that they are all equally important. Smith and Hume's different ways of relying on the same analogy reveals the still-overlooked and yet profound differences between their moral theories.


Author(s):  
Christopher J. Berry

Adam Smith published The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759. What the book sets out to do is investigate or analyse how, in practice, judgments and decisions about what is right or wrong are made. ‘Sympathetic spectators’ first discusses empiricism, a particular tradition of moral philosophy that was especially strong in Scotland. It goes on to consider the views of Francis Hutcheson and David Hume on moral sense and sympathy. It then examines Smith’s thoughts on sociality, morality, negotiated discord, self-interest, the impartial spectator and conscience (an internalized standard or benchmark of what is right or wrong), relativism, and moral judgment.


Utilitas ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. L. Van Holthoon

Why did Hume drop sympathy as a key concept of his moral philosophy, and why—on the other hand—did Smith make it into the ‘didactic principle’ of his Theory of Moral Sentiments? These questions confront us with the basic issue of ethical theory concerning human nature. My point in dealing with these questions is to show what views of human nature their respective choices involved. And my procedure will be to take a close look at the revisions they made to their ethical theories to bring out the contrasting aspects of their views of human nature.


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-37
Author(s):  
John McHugh

Here is an appealing position: one reason to pursue interaction with people from backgrounds that differ from our own is that doing so can improve our moral judgment. As some scholars have noticed, this position seems pedigreed by support from the famed philosophers of human sociability, David Hume and Adam Smith. But regardless of whether Hume or Smith personally held anything like the appealing position, neither might have had theoretically grounded reason to do so. In fact, both philosophers explain moral judgment in ways that seem to present obstacles to the acceptance of the appealing position. This paper entertains the possibility that either of their moral theories contains resources to overcome these obstacles and implies the appealing position. I argue that Smith's theory does so more straightforwardly than Hume's does. This difference, I also argue, reveals something important about the Hume-Smith philosophical relationship. I close by sketching a way to fit the source of the appealing position in Smith's moral psychology with his focus on the desire for mutual sympathy.


Author(s):  
Eric Schliesser

This chapter is devoted to explaining the moral significance of what Adam Smith calls the “natural sentiments.” The significance of the natural sentiments is illustrated by their role in extended case studies. They help us understand Smith’s criticism of David Hume’s account of the origin and morality of justice. It turns that Smith’s criticism of Hume is Humean in spirit, and solves conceptual problems left by Hume. This chapter also explains the difference between natural sentiments and moral sentiments. Despite the undeniable significance of feelings in his moral theory, Smith should not be considered a moral-sense theorist.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik W. Matson ◽  
Colin Doran

In this paper we seek to draw attention to some striking and heretofore unnoticed textual connections between Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments and David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature. We find significant textual parallels between the parable of the poor man's son of TMS 4.1 (TMS 4.1.8-4.1.10) and the famous conclusion to Book 1 of Hume's Treatise. These passages are often regarded as especially intense and moving parts of their respective works. We explore the nature and substance of these connections and comment on their larger significance. The nature of the connections suggests that Smith consciously engaged Hume in his work through philosophical conversation. We suggest that these related passages show both Hume and Smith exploring and developing a particular dialectic between contemplation and action in human life. Both move to invert the classical relationship between contemplation and action through what we call the elevated imagination.


Author(s):  
Craig Smith

Adam Ferguson was a Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh and a leading member of the Scottish Enlightenment. A friend of David Hume and Adam Smith, Ferguson was among the leading exponents of the Scottish Enlightenment’s attempts to develop a science of man and was among the first in the English speaking world to make use of the terms civilization, civil society, and political science. This book challenges many of the prevailing assumptions about Ferguson’s thinking. It explores how Ferguson sought to create a methodology for moral science that combined empirically based social theory with normative moralising with a view to supporting the virtuous education of the British elite. The Ferguson that emerges is far from the stereotyped image of a nostalgic republican sceptical about modernity, and instead is one much closer to the mainstream Scottish Enlightenment’s defence of eighteenth century British commercial society.


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