Hume's General Point of View, Smith's Impartial Spectator, and the Moral Value of Interacting with Outsiders

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-37
Author(s):  
John McHugh
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Psychology ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
General Point ◽  
Moral Value ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Do So

Here is an appealing position: one reason to pursue interaction with people from backgrounds that differ from our own is that doing so can improve our moral judgment. As some scholars have noticed, this position seems pedigreed by support from the famed philosophers of human sociability, David Hume and Adam Smith. But regardless of whether Hume or Smith personally held anything like the appealing position, neither might have had theoretically grounded reason to do so. In fact, both philosophers explain moral judgment in ways that seem to present obstacles to the acceptance of the appealing position. This paper entertains the possibility that either of their moral theories contains resources to overcome these obstacles and implies the appealing position. I argue that Smith's theory does so more straightforwardly than Hume's does. This difference, I also argue, reveals something important about the Hume-Smith philosophical relationship. I close by sketching a way to fit the source of the appealing position in Smith's moral psychology with his focus on the desire for mutual sympathy.

Hume's and Smith's Partial Sympathies and Impartial Stances

2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Rick
Keyword(s):  
Critical Analysis ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Critical Discussion ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
General Point ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Point Of View

The moral psychology of sympathy is the linchpin of the sentimentalist moral theories of both David Hume and Adam Smith. In this paper, I attempt to diagnose the critical differences between Hume's and Smith's respective accounts of sympathy in order to argue that Smithian sympathy is more properly suited to serve as a basis for impartial moral evaluations and judgments than is Humean sympathy. By way of arguing this claim, I take up the problem of overcoming sympathetic partiality in the construction of a moral point of view, acknowledged by both writers, as my primary platform. My contention is that Humean sympathy is too mechanistic to actually deliver an impartial adjudicatory perspective, and that Smithian sympathy, with its evaluative, imaginative components, succeeds where Hume's account falls short. The paper is comprised of six sections: (i) introductory remarks, (ii) a discussion of Humean sympathy, (iii) a discussion of Smithian sympathy and its distinctness, (iv) a critical analysis of Hume's attempt to correct for sympathetic partiality in the construction of the judicial spectator's general point of view, (v) a critical discussion of sympathetic partiality in Smithian sympathy & (vi) a critical analysis of Smith's construction of the impartial spectator perspective as a moral point of view.

3. Sympathetic spectators

2018 ◽  
pp. 28-45
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Berry
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Sense ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Francis Hutcheson ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Theory Of Moral Sentiments

Adam Smith published The Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759. What the book sets out to do is investigate or analyse how, in practice, judgments and decisions about what is right or wrong are made. ‘Sympathetic spectators’ first discusses empiricism, a particular tradition of moral philosophy that was especially strong in Scotland. It goes on to consider the views of Francis Hutcheson and David Hume on moral sense and sympathy. It then examines Smith’s thoughts on sociality, morality, negotiated discord, self-interest, the impartial spectator and conscience (an internalized standard or benchmark of what is right or wrong), relativism, and moral judgment.

scholarly journals El papel de la educación en la filosofía moral de David Hume / The role of education in Hume's moral philosophy

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (30) ◽  
pp. 17-37
Author(s):  
Santiago Álvarez García
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
General Point

El presente artículo muestra cómo la crítica humeana a los fundamentos del racionalismo moral y a sus consecuencias en el terreno de las ideas educativas propició un cambio significativo en la comprensión de los objetivos de la educación moral que pasaron de buscar el perfeccionamiento de la agencia, a perseguir la perfección y el refinamiento de las capacidades del individuo como espectador y evaluador moral imparcial. Esta trasformación de la finalidad y del currículo de la educación moral será la solución que Hume ofrezca a los problemas de parcialidad derivados de la historicidad y la caducidad del general point of view como criterio último para el juicio moral. La exposición constante del educando a todas las formas históricas de la belleza, junto con la poesía, la literatura, el estudio de la historia y la filosofía, constituirán para Hume la base de esta revolución pedagógica.

SYMPATHY, DIFFERENCE, AND EDUCATION: SOCIAL UNITY IN THE WORK OF ADAM SMITH

2006 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
JACK RUSSELL WEINSTEIN
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Psychological Distance ◽  
History Of Philosophy ◽  
Biological Difference ◽  
Race And Class ◽  
Social Unity ◽  
History Of ◽  
Do So

In this article, I examine Adam Smith's theory of the ways individuals in society bridge social and biological difference. In doing so, I emphasize the divisive effects of gender, race, and class to see if Smith's account of social unity can overcome such fractious forces. My discussion uses the metaphor of “proximity” to mean both physical and psychological distance between moral actors and spectators. I suggest that education – both formal and informal in means – can assist moral judgment by helping agents minimize the effects of proximity, and, ultimately, learn commonality where difference may otherwise seem overwhelming. This article uses the methods of the history of philosophy in order to examine an issue within contemporary discourse. While I seek to offer an authentic reading of Smith representative of his eighteenth-century perspective, I do so with an eye towards determining the extent to which Smith anticipated central issues in modern multiculturalism.

HUME AND SMITH ON SYMPATHY, APPROBATION, AND MORAL JUDGMENT

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 208-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Affective Reactions ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
Moral Thought

AbstractDavid Hume and Adam Smith are usually, and understandably, seen as developing very similar sentimentalist accounts of moral thought and practice. As similar as Hume's and Smith's accounts of moral thought are, they differ in telling ways. This essay is an attempt primarily to get clear on the important differences. They are worth identifying and exploring, in part, because of the great extent to which Hume and Smith share not just an overall approach to moral theory but also a conception of what the key components of an adequate account of moral thought will be. In the process, I hope to bring out the extent to which they both worked to make sense of the fact that we do not merely have affective reactions but also, importantly, make moral judgments.

scholarly journals Impartiality through ‘Moral Optics’: Why Adam Smith revised David Hume's Moral Sentimentalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Christel Fricke ◽  
Maria Alejandra Carrasco
Keyword(s):  
Visual Perception ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Moral Sentimentalism ◽  
Critical Response ◽  
Main Challenge ◽  
Moral Theories

We read Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments as a critical response to David Hume's moral theory. While both share a commitment to moral sentimentalism, they propose different ways of meeting its main challenge, that is, explaining how judgments informed by (partial) sentiments can nevertheless have a justified claim to general authority. This difference is particularly manifest in their respective accounts of ‘moral optics’, or the way they rely on the analogy between perceptual and moral judgments. According to Hume, making perceptual and moral judgments requires focusing on frequently co-occurring impressions (perceptions of objects or reactive sentiments) for tracking an existing object with its perceptual properties or an agent's character traits. Smith uses visual perception for the purpose of illustrating one source of the partiality of the sentiments people feel in response to actions. Before making a moral judgment, people have to disregard this partiality and accept that they are all equally important. Smith and Hume's different ways of relying on the same analogy reveals the still-overlooked and yet profound differences between their moral theories.

scholarly journals La influencia de la teoría de las pasiones de Hume en el juicio moral de Adam Smith

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 268-276
Author(s):  
Maria A. Carrasco
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Luck ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Different Parts

The analysis of the irregular moral sentiments that Smith describes in TMS II.iii evidences the enormous influence of David Hume’s theory of passions in the moral theory of his successor, as well as the critical differences between these Scottish philosophers’ moral proposals. Moreover, these atypical situations also allow us to grasp the different parts of Smithian moral judgment, and to exclude – despite Smith’s assertion – the influence of moral luck on these judgments.Keywords: Adam Smith, David Hume, moral judgment, passions, moral luck.

Smith

2019 ◽  
pp. 158-169
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Scottish Enlightenment ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Divine Retribution ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Human Ethics ◽  
The Spectator

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Smith (1723–90). Smith’s theory of sympathy is explained. The notion of the impartial spectator is discussed, in connection with both propriety and utility, and it is shown how the view of the spectator itself incorporates certain aspects of the human point of view. Smith is claimed to be a deontologist, at least concerning human ethics. His version of the dualism of practical reason is outlined, and the difficulties of combining a utilitarian conception of God with the notion of divine retribution are noted.

The Logic of Electoral Preference: Response to Saraydar and Hudelson

1987 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Brennan ◽  
Loren E. Lomasky
Keyword(s):  
Moral Psychology ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Electoral Behavior ◽  
Standard Theory ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Impartial Spectator ◽  
Motivational Structure ◽  
Wealth Of Nations ◽  
Theory Of Moral Sentiments

How may we best understand the motivational structure that stands behind individuals' acts of voting? In “The Impartial Spectator Goes to Washington” we suggested that expressive concerns swamp narrowly consequential motivations, in contradistinction to normal market transactions in which the priority is reversed. A striking consequence of this fact is that individuals will be led to vote for outcomes that they would reject were they in a position to act decisively. In this regard we found the moral psychology Adam Smith develops in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) (and, to a lesser extent, in The Wealth of Nations) remarkably fecund in suggesting alternatives to what we call the standard theory of electoral behavior.

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