E-Voting Risk Assessment

Author(s):  
Harold Pardue ◽  
Jeffrey P. Landry ◽  
Alec Yasinsac

Approximately 25% (according to http://verifiedvoting.com/) of voting jurisdictions use direct recording electronic systems to record votes. Accurate tabulation of voter intent is critical to safeguard this fundamental act of democracy: voting. Electronic voting systems are known to be vulnerable to attack. Assessing risk to these systems requires a systematic treatment and cataloging of threats, vulnerabilities, technologies, controls, and operational environments. This paper presents a threat tree for direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems. The threat tree is organized as a hierarchy of threat actions, the goal of which is to exploit a system vulnerability in the context of specific technologies, controls, and operational environment. As an abstraction, the threat tree allows the analyst to reason comparatively about threats. A panel of elections officials, security experts, academics, election law attorneys, representatives from governmental agencies, voting equipment vendors, and voting equipment testing labs vetted the DRE threat tree. The authors submit that the DRE threat tree supports both individual and group risk assessment processes and techniques.

2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 19-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold Pardue ◽  
Jeffrey P. Landry ◽  
Alec Yasinsac

Approximately 25% (according to http://verifiedvoting.com/) of voting jurisdictions use direct recording electronic systems to record votes. Accurate tabulation of voter intent is critical to safeguard this fundamental act of democracy: voting. Electronic voting systems are known to be vulnerable to attack. Assessing risk to these systems requires a systematic treatment and cataloging of threats, vulnerabilities, technologies, controls, and operational environments. This paper presents a threat tree for direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems. The threat tree is organized as a hierarchy of threat actions, the goal of which is to exploit a system vulnerability in the context of specific technologies, controls, and operational environment. As an abstraction, the threat tree allows the analyst to reason comparatively about threats. A panel of elections officials, security experts, academics, election law attorneys, representatives from governmental agencies, voting equipment vendors, and voting equipment testing labs vetted the DRE threat tree. The authors submit that the DRE threat tree supports both individual and group risk assessment processes and techniques.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Mesbahuddin Sarker ◽  
M Nazrul Islam

Abstract In this modern age countries worldwide evince a growing interest in electronic voting (e-Voting), which brings the idea of modernizing elections through electronic systems and provides many advantages such as efficiency, disseminating results more quickly, and in a cost-effective way. The paper gives a brief overview on recent developments of electronic voting systems in Bangladesh by using electronic voting machine (EVM) and addresses some strategies and principles in order to improve accessibility, easiness, accuracy, and security of election for better democratic process.


Author(s):  
Greg Vonnahme

In 2001, Wand and colleagues published a paper titled “The Butterfly Did It” (see Wand, et al. 2001, cited under Voting System Neutrality) in which they argue that Palm Beach County’s butterfly ballot caused enough errors to decide the 2000 election for George W. Bush. The butterfly ballot also helped launch significant new research initiatives into voting systems and prompted new federal legislation through the Help America Vote Act of 2002, which served to modernize American voting systems. Along with Internet voting, these developments account for most contemporary research on electronic voting systems. Research on electronic voting systems is now at a crossroads. Much of the research following the 2000 election evaluated technology including lever and punch-card machines that are now largely obsolete (Stewart 2011, cited under History and Development of Voting Systems). Current and future research is moving in the direction of issues of security, Internet voting, ballot design, usability, efficiency, and cost of electronic voting systems. All voting systems in the United States today are electronic to a degree. Ansolabehere and Persily 2010 (cited under Empirical and Legal Evaluation of Voting Systems) identifies three discrete parts to voting systems: voter authentication, vote preparation, and vote management. Electronic voting technology can facilitate any of these steps. The term “electronic voting” is polysemous. Electronic voting (or e-voting) variously describes direct-recording electronic voting, electronic vote tabulation, or Internet voting among others. This document defines electronic voting as any voting system that uses electronic technology at any step in the voting process. Fully electronic voting systems use DREs (direct-recording electronic machines), in which ballots are electronically generated, prepared, and counted. Hybrid types of electronic voting are optically scanned ballots (precinct or centrally counted) or ballot mark devices (BMDs), which the voter completes manually and submits but is electronically counted. Electronic voting systems can also include Internet voting in which voters receive, prepare, and submit ballots online. The 2000 presidential election precipitated the most sweeping changes to voting systems, and we continue to see officials adopt new voting systems and Internet voting pilot programs, such as those in Estonia, Canada, Brazil, and Switzerland. Voting systems, particularly Internet voting, are a source of controversy in the United States and abroad. Debates over security and ease of use involve complex technologies and core democratic principles about the rights and responsibilities of citizens. Elections are also, at least in a narrow sense and especially in the United States, zero-sum. Only one person can hold an office, and any change in voting systems that helps one candidate or party necessarily harms the electoral prospects of others. At best, this leads officials to closely scrutinize new voting systems. At worst, it can lead to irreconcilable and unprincipled polarization over questions of voting technology. E-voting involves issues of technology, democratic participation, and electoral politics. This creates a rich environment for research on voting systems.


2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 194-206
Author(s):  
Juan Gilbert ◽  
Jerone Dunbar ◽  
Alvitta Ottley ◽  
John Mark Smotherman

Voting is important for any democratic country. It can be considered as one of the major factors that make a government for the people and by the people. The most common methods of voting that currently exist are ballot-based voting, purely electronic methods, and Electronic Voting Machines, among others. Over the years, it has been a challenge to build a secure E-voting program that provides the privacy of current voting systems while offering a means of accountability and versatility. Using blockchain technology and cryptography we can make the process of elections as open and cost-effective as possible. In this review paper we discuss a new, blockchain-based electronic voting system that addresses some of the limitations in existing systems and evaluates some of the popular systems designed to create a blockchain-based e-voting system.


2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodrigo Schneider ◽  
Kelly N. Senters

AbstractScholars concur that free and fair elections are essential for proper democratic functioning, but our understanding of the political effects of democratic voting systems is incomplete. This article mitigates the gap by exploiting the gradual transformation of voting systems and ballot structures in Brazil’s 1998 executive elections to study the relationship between voting systems and viable and nonviable candidates’ vote shares, using regression discontinuity design. It finds that the introduction of electronic voting concentrated vote shares among viable candidates and thus exhibited electoral bias. We posit that this result occurred because viable candidates were better able to communicate the information that electronic voters needed to cast valid ballots than were their nonviable counterparts. The article uses survey data to demonstrate that electronic voters responded to changes in ballot design and internalized the information viable candidates made available to them.


Author(s):  
Hector Alaiz-Moreton ◽  
Luis Panizo-Alonso ◽  
Ramón A. Fernandez-Diaz ◽  
Javier Alfonso-Cendon

This paper shows the lack of standard procedures to audit e-voting systems and also describes a practical process of auditing an e-voting experience based on a Direct-recording Electronic system (D.R.E). This system has been tested in a real situation, in the city council of Coahuila, Mexico, in November 2008. During the auditing, several things were kept in mind, in particular those critical in complex contexts, as democratic election processes are. The auditing process is divided into three main complementary stages: analysis of voting protocol, analysis of polling station hardware elements, and analysis of the software involved. Each stage contains several items which have to be analyzed at low level with the aim to detect and resolve possible security problems.


Author(s):  
Ali Fawzi Najm Al-Shammari ◽  
Adolfo Villafiorita

A large amount of research has been conducted to improve public verifiability of e-voting systems. One of the challenges is ensuring that different and apparently contradicting requirements are met: anonymity and representation, vote secrecy and verifiability. System robustness from attacks adds further complexity. This chapter summarizes some of the known vote verification techniques and highlights the pros and cons of each technique. Also, it reviews how different verification technologies cover different phases of the voting process and evaluates how these techniques satisfy the e-voting requirements.


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