Mitigating the Impact of Extreme Events

Author(s):  
Doaa Taha

Years have gone by since 9/11/2001. Still, it seems as though it were only yesterday: the shock, the tragedy, the heartbreak. Of all the questions, one keeps coming back, “Have we learned what we need to know to mitigate the impact of such events in the future?” The answer is a hesitant “Perhaps.” Today, still dealing with an economic disaster the magnitude of which has not been experienced in decades, there is great concern that any gains made from lessons learned by 9/11 will be further eroded. In this chapter, original research considering four corporations directly involved in the September 11 attacks is revisited in view of today's emphasis on public private partnerships and economic environment. In reexamining the original research, this chapter considers the value of public private partnerships as part of the emergency management community, and as part of an effective response to future incidents.

mBio ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Imperiale ◽  
Arturo Casadevall

ABSTRACT In the fall of 2001, Bacillus anthracis spores were spread through letters mailed in the United States. Twenty-two people are known to have been infected, and five of these individuals died. Together with the  September 11 attacks, this resulted in a reevaluation of the risks and benefits of life science research with the potential for misuse. In this editorial, we review some of the results of these discussions and their implications for the future.


Author(s):  
Michael R. Mabe

According to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (2006), emergency management professionals realized first-hand that preplanning and coordination is essential when mounting an effective reaction to natural disasters. This chapter describes how leaders in Chesterfield County, VA learned similar lessons in 2001 during Hurricane Irene. In comparison to Katrina the amount of damage caused by Irene was minimal but the impact on county leaders was severe. Based on lessons learned during Irene and an unexpected wind storm nine months later, Chesterfield County leaders now include the Chesterfield County Public (CCPL) in their official disaster relief plans. When activated, CCPL will serve as an information hub, double as a daytime relief shelter and participate in mass feeding if necessary. Selected library branches are available to be used as overnight relief shelters for mass care when the activation of a standard sized shelter facility is not warranted. These changes have made a notable difference.


2010 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 565-576 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo-Yao Lee ◽  

New Zealanders are exposed to multiple natural hazards. The country has experienced major disasters in the past, but recent decades have been relatively uneventful.1This paper reviews the New Zealand approach to civil defence emergency management (CDEM), as introduced by the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 (the CDEM Act). The approach promotes co-operative planning and sustainable management of hazard risks through the “4Rs” - reduction (of risks), readiness, response and recovery. It recognises the central government’s roles of national coordination, and emphasises the responsibilities of regional CDEM Groups, local government and communities for managing local hazard risks. The paper reviews various initiatives to illustrate that capacity building is a collective effort requiring active involvement across central and local government, nongovernmental agencies, communities and all individuals. New Zealand’s preparedness is examined from several perspectives, including: the level of public preparedness, lessons learned from real emergencies, a national exercise programme, and a monitoring and evaluation programme. The paper concludes that New Zealanders are making progress but difficulties remain in persuading all parties to work towards the vision of a “Resilient New Zealand.” 1. This paper was submitted before the magnitude 7.1 earthquake that struck the Canterbury region of the South Island of New Zealand (where the second largest city Christchurch is located) on 4 September 2010. Fortunately, no deaths and only a few serious injuries were reported as a result of the earthquake. The impact on buildings, infrastructure and economy, and psychosocial effects are being assessed as the paper is being finalised. However, the event is set to become the most costly disaster so far in New Zealand history. It will also be the most significant real test for many years of New Zealand’s emergency management arrangements, but it is too soon for an assessment in this paper of their effectiveness.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1513-1535
Author(s):  
Michael R. Mabe

According to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (2006), emergency management professionals realized first-hand that preplanning and coordination is essential when mounting an effective reaction to natural disasters. This chapter describes how leaders in Chesterfield County, VA learned similar lessons in 2001 during Hurricane Irene. In comparison to Katrina the amount of damage caused by Irene was minimal but the impact on county leaders was severe. Based on lessons learned during Irene and an unexpected wind storm nine months later, Chesterfield County leaders now include the Chesterfield County Public (CCPL) in their official disaster relief plans. When activated, CCPL will serve as an information hub, double as a daytime relief shelter and participate in mass feeding if necessary. Selected library branches are available to be used as overnight relief shelters for mass care when the activation of a standard sized shelter facility is not warranted. These changes have made a notable difference.


2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (5) ◽  
pp. 291 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean Hildebrand, PhD

This article examines local emergency manager's beliefs regarding control over tasks during various stages of the hazard cycle since federal policies went into effect following the September 11 attacks. The study considers whether a disparity exists between the actions of local officials during each phase of the “hazard cycle” and the policy expectations of the federal government, which call for greater federal control over activities in emergency management and homeland security. To do so, hypothesis testing investigates the jurisdiction's use of comprehensive emergency management (CEM) practices, the perceived “clarity” of the federal policy demands, and if the local actors feel coerced to comply with federal policy demands so that grant funding is not compromised. Using a model developed from “third-generation” policy implementation research, the results show that the odds of local officials citing federal control over these actions have very limited statistical significance. This signals that the perceived lack of local input into the development of these federal policies and the policies’ limited use of traditional CEM measures may not be in concert with what local actors perform in the field. Simply put, the respondents claim to understand the federal policy demands, support the concept of federal control as the policies describe, yet follow their own plans or traditional CEM principles, even if such actions do not support the federal policy demands. These results align with pre-existing research in the emergency management field that show issues with efforts to centralize policies under the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Emergency Management Agency.


2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (5) ◽  
pp. e300-e300
Author(s):  
Salah T. Al Awaidy1*, ◽  
Faryal Khamis ◽  
Fatma Al Attar ◽  
Najiba Abdul Razzaq ◽  
Laila Al Dabal ◽  
...  

Objectives: The World Health Organization (WHO) published a global strategic response plan in February 2020 aiming to mitigate the impact of the novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak. It identified immediate activities required for global preparedness and response to the outbreak and set eight priority areas (pillars) essential for scaling up countries’ operational readiness and response. Despite a semi-annual progress report on implementing the Global Strategic Plan in June 2020, there is limited granular information available on the extent of the national plan’s content and implementation, particularly in the Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Therefore, we sought to review the preparedness and responsiveness towards the COVID-19 outbreak in the GCC in the first phase of the pandemic and to document lessons learned for improving the ongoing response efforts and preparedness for future pandemics. Methods: A rapid appraisal was conducted in June 2020 according to the WHO Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan and the accompanying Operational Planning Guidelines. The survey was administered to public health professionals or/and infectious disease experts in the states. The findings were cross-triangulated with secondary data that was publicly available for each country. Results: The preparedness and response efforts of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE were fully compliant with all 11 (100%) pillars of the modified strategic response measures. Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar complied with eight of the pillars. The component on conducting COVID-19 related research was the lowest-performing across all the six states. Conclusions: All GCC states demonstrated an effective response to the pandemic, enhanced existing infrastructures, and accelerated reforms that would have otherwise taken longer. The lessons learned through the early phase of the pandemic continue to steer the states in realigning their strategies and resetting their goals of controlling the outbreak, particularly in the current context of vaccine introduction and increasing preparedness capacities for future pandemics.


2018 ◽  
Vol 43 (5) ◽  
pp. 834-863
Author(s):  
Kathleen M. Vogel ◽  
Michael A. Dennis

With the noted intelligence failures prior to the September 11 attacks and the 2003 Iraq War, the US intelligence community has recognized the need to acquire new, outside expertise to mitigate against future intelligence breakdowns. This recent attention on intelligence outreach provides Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars with an opportunity to consider the role they might play in these efforts, as well as the various opportunities and difficulties that can shape these relationships, and the types of knowledge that can be produced and known from engagements with these secret communities. This paper provides a reflection on how two STS scholars have attempted to intervene into intelligence and the lessons learned.


2005 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl A. Boger ◽  
Nigi Varghese ◽  
Somruethai Dew Rittapirom

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