Artificial Mind

2011 ◽  
pp. 83-93
Author(s):  
Rita M.R. Pizzi
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Biological Cells ◽  
Philosophical Debate ◽  
Artificial Brain ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Brain

The advances of artificial intelligence (AI) have renewed the interest in the mind-body problem, the ancient philosophical debate on the nature of mind and its relationship with the brain. The new version of the mind-body problem concerns the relationship between computational complexity and self-aware thought. The traditional controversy between strong and weak AI will not be settled until we are able in the future to build a robot so evolved to give us the possibility to verify its perceptions, its qualitative sensations, and its introspective thoughts. However, an alternative way can be followed: The progresses of micro-, nano-, and biotechnologies allow us to create the first bionic creatures, composed of biological cells connected to electronic devices. Creating an artificial brain with a biological structure could allow verifying if it possesses peculiar properties with respect to an electronic one, comparing them at the same level of complexity.

Zombies and Dolls

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcello Massimini ◽  
Giulio Tononi
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Turing Test ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.

Conclusion

2017 ◽  
pp. 279-292
Author(s):  
Thomas Fuchs
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Short Circuit ◽  
Living Organism ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Mind And Brain ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

The ‘Conclusion’ summarizes fundamental concepts and insights of the book. The brain is presented as an organ of mediation, transformation, and resonance. Its functions are integrated by the living organism as a whole, or by the embodied person, respectively: persons have brains, they are not brains. The deadlocks of the mind–body problem result from a short circuit between mind and brain which follows as a consequence from the systematic exclusion of life. A combination of phenomenological, embodied, and enactive approaches seems best suited to overcome this deficit. In contrast to naturalistic reductionism, this leads to a personalistic concept of the human being which has its basis in intercorporeality: it is in the concrete bodily encounter that we primarily recognize each other as embodied subjects or persons.

Neurophenomenology and the Spontaneity of Consciousness

2003 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 133-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Hanna ◽  
Evan Thompson
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Spatiotemporal Pattern ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
Dynamic Patterns ◽  
To Come ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable (Nagel1980, p. 150). My reading of the situation is that our inability to come up with an intelligible conception of the relation between mind and body is a sign of the inadequacy of our present concepts, and that some development is needed (Nagel1998, p. 338). Mind itself is a spatiotemporal pattern that molds the metastable dynamic patterns of the brain (Kelso 1995, p. 288).

The Mother

2018 ◽  
pp. 55-89
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Cognitive Functions ◽  
Personal Experience ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
The Self ◽  
Strong Sense ◽  
True Self ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

This chapter turns to philosophers and artists, seeking their views on the dilemma of consciousness and the self, as well as the related mind/body problem. Does consciousness – and personal experience – arise from the neurological functions of the brain (and if so, how), or is it but a shard of the flow of universal consciousness – and if so, is the mind only a channel of energy and should we forget about our cognitive functions, or train to use them in a different way? What does it mean to have a strong sense of personal identity – where does the ‘true self' lie? Having learnt from neuroscientists and most psychologists that our self seems to exceed the scope and depth of both body and mind, we hope that philosophy and art might guide us towards this ‘other' realm where our sense of identity emerges from.

Conclusion: Copernican Revolution—Is the Brain’s Spontaneous Activity an Empirical, Epistemic, and Ontological Game Changer in Neuroscience and Philosophy?

2018 ◽  
pp. 435-438
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Spontaneous Activity ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Copernican Revolution ◽  
The World ◽  
World Brain ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Game Changer

Are the brain and its spontaneous activity a “game changer” in our pursuit of the question of the existence and reality of mental features? A game changer is something that allows to take something into view that hitherto remained invisible and was not yet discovered. That, for instance, makes it possible to raise a novel question or problem replacing the previous one. I argue that the brain’s spontaneous activity is indeed a game changer in this sense, an “empirical and ontological game changer” in that it allows us to replace the mind–body problem with the world–brain problem....

The neurology and psychiatry of humor, smiling, and laughter: a tribute to Paul McGhee Part II. neurological studies and brain imaging

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 373-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank A. Rodden
Keyword(s):  
Brain Imaging ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
The Body ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Brain

AbstractThis is a continuation of Part I. Section 2 of that part (“Humor and the Body”) should be read before reading reports of the studies described below. Understanding the methods and experiments in this part is, perhaps, easier than making sense of them. As mentioned at the outset of Part 1, the relationship of the brain to humor, smiling, and laugher is but one tiny aspect of the vastly larger mind-body problem that has yet to be fruitfully addressed. What follows is a listing of technical findings that are probably mostly true, but the deeper sense of which remains largely mysterious.

Computational Complexity and Philosophical Dualism

1998 ◽  
pp. 61-66
Author(s):  
Joao Teixeira
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Computational Complexity ◽  
Complexity Theory ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Mathematical Intuition ◽  
The Third ◽  
Fundamental Limit ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Computing Machines

I examine some recent controversies involving the possibility of mechanical simulation of mathematical intuition. The first part is concerned with a presentation of the Lucas-Penrose position and recapitulates some basic logical conceptual machinery (Gödel's proof, Hilbert's Tenth Problem and Turing's Halting Problem). The second part is devoted to a presentation of the main outlines of Complexity Theory as well as to the introduction of Bremermann's notion of transcomputability and fundamental limit. The third part attempts to draw a connection/relationship between Complexity Theory and undecidability focusing on a new revised version of the Lucas-Penrose position in light of physical a priori limitations of computing machines. Finally, the last part derives some epistemological/philosophical implications of the relationship between Gödel's incompleteness theorem and Complexity Theory for the mind/brain problem in Artificial Intelligence and discusses the compatibility of functionalism with a materialist theory of the mind.

scholarly journals The dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience: what does philosophy of mind say?

2014 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 186-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elie Cheniaux ◽  
Carlos Eduardo de Sousa Lyra
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Current Knowledge ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Subjective Experiences ◽  
Eliminative Materialism ◽  
Brain States ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

Objective: To briefly review how the main monist and dualist currents of philosophy of mind approach the mind-body problem and to describe their association with arguments for and against a closer dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience.Methods: The literature was reviewed for studies in the fields of psychology, psychoanalysis, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind.Results: Some currents are incompatible with a closer dialog between psychoanalysis and neurosciences: interactionism and psychophysical parallelism, because they do not account for current knowledge about the brain; epiphenomenalism, which claims that the mind is a mere byproduct of the brain; and analytical behaviorism, eliminative materialism, reductive materialism and functionalism, because they ignore subjective experiences. In contrast, emergentism claims that mental states are dependent on brain states, but have properties that go beyond the field of neurobiology.Conclusions: Only emergentism is compatible with a closer dialog between psychoanalysis and neuroscience.

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