Conclusion

The ‘Conclusion’ summarizes fundamental concepts and insights of the book. The brain is presented as an organ of mediation, transformation, and resonance. Its functions are integrated by the living organism as a whole, or by the embodied person, respectively: persons have brains, they are not brains. The deadlocks of the mind–body problem result from a short circuit between mind and brain which follows as a consequence from the systematic exclusion of life. A combination of phenomenological, embodied, and enactive approaches seems best suited to overcome this deficit. In contrast to naturalistic reductionism, this leads to a personalistic concept of the human being which has its basis in intercorporeality: it is in the concrete bodily encounter that we primarily recognize each other as embodied subjects or persons.

Implications for psychiatry and psychological medicine

‘Implications for psychiatry and psychological medicine’ examines the ecological conception with regard to its consequences for mental disorders and their treatment. After an introduction on current neuroreductionist trends in psychiatry, the chapter develops a concept of mental illness as a fundamentally circular process with a pivotal impact on a person’s self-experience and interpersonal relationships. This dimension is traced as far as aetiology. Psychotherapy and somatic therapy and are then contrasted from the standpoint of dual aspectivity. In summary, an orientation towards embodied subjectivity is shown to be indispensable for psychopathology and psychological medicine.

The brain as an organ of the person

‘The brain as an organ of the person’ examines the socially and culturally scaffolded development of the human brain, especially in early childhood. Beginning with early intersubjectivity and intercorporeality in the mother–child relationship, it first focuses on interactive forms of implicit memory. As a neurological basis of this development, the attachment system and the social resonance system (‘mirror neurons’) are discussed. Secondary intersubjectivity manifests itself towards the end of the first year of life, among others, in the development of joint attention. Understanding others as intentional agents lays the foundation for later perspective-taking and thus for the ‘eccentric position’ of human beings. On this basis, language acquisition is examined as the anchoring of an embodied interpersonal practice, connected with the biological resonance system of mirror neurons.

Cosmos in the head?

‘Cosmos in the head’ contains a criticism of the neuroconstructivist epistemology, according to which phenomenal reality is to be understood as an internal modelling of the outer world in the brain. As it turns out, the idealistic theory of representation is still the basis of this conception. The criticism emphasizes, in contrast, the enactive character of perception which is always connected with the engagement of the body in the world. In order to show that the subjective space of the lived body is not only virtual, its coextension with the space of the objective body or the entire organism is demonstrated. On this basis, the objectifying achievement of perception, which brings us into direct connection with the world by means of circular interactions, can be recognized. Finally, taking the example of colours, the claim of a mere virtuality of perceived qualities is rejected.

The brain as an organ of the living being

‘The brain as an organ of the living being’ first presents the brain as the organ of vital regulation, which is connected to the organism through various feedback loops. This constant resonance between brainstem and organism is the basis of a background ‘feeling of being alive’ as the foundation of all conscious experience. Second, the relations of brain, organism, and environment are portrayed by means of the functional cycle of perception and movement. As a consequence of this ecological model, consciousness is regarded as the integral of the functional loops between the organism and the environment. In a third step, the development of capacities is traced back to neuroplasticity and implicit memory. This serves as a basis for the investigation into the higher cognitive functions of the brain, in particular, gestalt perception. The focus lies on the principle of resonance between activated neuronal patterns and configurations of stimuli in the environment.

Foundations: Subjectivity and life

‘Foundations: subjectivity and life’ develops the concept of embodied subjectivity, initially grounded in the phenomenology of bodily existence. A central concept for the investigation is the dual aspect of the living person as a dialectical unity of the subjective body and the physical body. The mind–brain problem is therefore reformulated as the ‘subject body–object body problem’ (Leib–Körper problem). Subsequently, an ecological conception of the living organism is developed. This focuses, on the one hand, on a living being’s self-organization and subjectivity and, on the other hand, on its relationship to the environment with reference to metabolism and the sensorimotor cycle. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the specific, circular causality of living systems. This incorporates the concept of capacity as a living being’s holistic, dispositional property, by means of which it becomes the cause of its own enactments of life.

The brain as the subject’s heir?

‘The brain as the subject’s heir?’ critiques the claims according to which subjectivity is to be regarded as an epiphenomenon of neuronal processes and thus one’s experience of agency and freedom of choice should be seen as an illusion. First it is shown that the subjectivity of ‘experiential facts’ cannot be reduced to objective or physical facts about brain processes. Likewise, the reduction of the intentionality of consciousness to relations of representation is refuted. Moreover, the identification of the subject with the brain leads to fundamental category mistakes which are examined as the ‘mereological fallacy’ and the ‘localization fallacy’. On this basis, a critique of the thesis of the powerlessness of the subject is developed. The summary analyses the basic ‘naturalistic fallacy’ of an objectifying account of consciousness which believes it can remove itself from its rootedness in the lifeworld.

The concept of dual aspectivity

‘The concept of dual aspectivity’ presents a renewed philosophical examination of the fundamental concept presented in Chapter 3. The unity of the living organism and its enactments of life provides an alternative to the separation of the mental and physical in philosophy of mind. A critical consideration of identity theory further develops this conceptual approach. The concept of integral causality is differentiated in the light of emergence theories, emphasizing the primacy of holistic functions over their components, and the reciprocity of downward and upward causation. The role and function of consciousness as the integral of the organism–environment interaction is discussed in detail. This gives rise to several conclusions regarding the intentional determination of neuronal processes, particular an embodied notion of free will, as well as an explanation of psychophysical interrelations.