AI and Neuroeconomics

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-48
Author(s):  
Ernesto D'Avanzo

This article describes how Plato proposed the dualistic solution to the mind-body problem, providing an explanation along the lines of his epistemology. Francis Bacon, in 1600, formulated his vision of the scientific method that will be valid until the 1960's when Karl Popper proposed his version, entering into controversy with the Lord Chancellor. Thanks to recent developments in artificial intelligence and computational neuroscience these problems have new empirical tools to be analyzed. An interesting aspect of this research program, better known as neuroeconomics, is the use it makes of the probability calculation tool for dealing with so-called decisions under uncertainty. The paper is an attempt to tell the birth, development, and some examples of these toolboxes, available to all those who want to apply them to improve knowledge inspired organizations.

Author(s):  
Sandhya Shankar

The question of „how do we come to know‟ has been the search of mankind since time immemorial. Neither has there been a consensus for that question nor there will be. Many a great minds have looked into this, coming up with various perspectives. Two such varying perspectives in this field are empiricism and rationalism. While the former emphasizes that experience (through senses) is the only source of knowledge the latter upholds that there is something beyond the sense experience, the mind that is the source of knowledge. The shift towards a scientific phase from that of the earlier theological and metaphysical phase gained popularity with positivism, where progress of human knowledge was considered in identifying truths through scientific methods. In this scientific journey towards knowing the world emphasis was on empirically observable things. It was believed that there are no ideas which come into our head without being dependent on our perceptions, thereby on our experience. The basis of classical science was considered getting empirical observations. It had to be a systematic way of studying what is out there. Purpose of science was considered to be limited to things which can be observed, thus being connected to a means of being verified. This paper thus looks into the notion of verifiability as an important parameter of scientific methodology and its importance as asserted by logical positivists. But this criteria of scientific method was challenged by another criteria, that of falsifiability. The next section will look into falsifiability as another parameter of scientific methodology. Since these parameters have been discussed widely among philosophers, this paper shall be focusing on the views of A. J. Ayer and Sir Karl Popper regarding the same. Furthermore, its application and relevance to the field of linguistics will also be discussed.


Philosophia ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miklós Márton

AbstractIn this paper I give an overview of the recent developments in the phenomenalism – intentionalism debate and try to show that the proposed solutions of neither sides are satisfying. The claims and arguments of the two parties are rather vague and attribute to intentional and phenomenal properties either a too weak or a too strong relationship: too weak in the sense that they establish only mere coexistence, or too strong in the sense that they attribute some a priori conceptual connection to intentional and phenomenal properties. I also compare these theories to other theories developed for solving the mind–body problem and argue that these former are much less elaborated. In the end of the paper I try to explain that all of this is not just a contingent feature of the topic, but has deep conceptual roots: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness are two quite distinct concepts on two quite distinct levels.


1975 ◽  
Vol 20 (8) ◽  
pp. 660-660
Author(s):  
MADGE SCHEIBEL ◽  
ARNOLD SCHEIBEL

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-113
Author(s):  
Nathalia Gleyce dos Santos Salazar

Resumo:  Apresenta-se uma discussão sobre o conhecimento e a tese dos três mundos no qual a interação entre estes nos aproxima da verdade do problema corpo-mente, tendo em vista, uma nova proposta de solução. O terceiro mundo é uma peça importante neste trabalho; sendo assim, analisaremos o que Popper designa como Mundo 3, em que ele consiste e o papel da linguagem como diferencial do ser humano. Apresentamos as críticas popperianas às correntes monistas e dualistas, ousando fazer uma crítica a Teoria do Conhecimento tradicional. Desta forma, a proposta apresentada por este filósofo da ciência diferencia-se de tudo que estava sendo feito até então, por isso, o interesse de apresentar essa abordagem pouco trabalhada de Popper. Palavras-chave: Conhecimento. Corpo-Mente. Mundo 3.Abstract: In this work, we present a discussion about knowledge and the theory of the three worlds in which the interaction between them approaches to the truth of the mind-body problem, in view of a proposed solution. The third world is an important piece in this work. Therefore, we will analyze what Popper describes as World 3, what it is and the role of language as a differential of human beings. We present Popper’s criticisms to the monistic and dualistic currents, daring to criticize the theory of traditional knowledge. Thus, the proposal of science presented by this philosopher differs from everything that was being done until then. This explains the interest in presenting this unusual approach to Popper.Keywords: Knowledge. Body-Mind.  World 3. REFERÊNCIASLEAL-TOLEDO, Gustavo . Popper e seu Cérebro. Revista da Faculdade de Letras. Série Filosofia, v. XXIII, p. 59-68, 2007.POPPER, Karl Raimund. A Lógica da Pesquisa Científica. Tradução de Leonidas Hegenberg e Octanny Silveira de Mota.  São Paulo: editora Cultrix. 2007.POPPER, Karl Raimund. Conhecimento Objetivo: uma abordagem evolucionária. Tradução de Milton Amado.  Belo Horizonte, Ed. Itatiaia Ilimitada. São Paulo, Ed. Da Universidade São Paulo, 1975._______.  O Conhecimento e o Problema Corpo –Mente. Tradução Joaquim Alberto Ferreira Gomes. Lisboa, Ed. 70. 1996.   _______. Conjecturas e Refutações: o desenvolvimento do conhecimento científico. Trad. Benedita Bettencourt. Ed. Livraria Almedina, 2006._______.  O Eu e Seu Cérebro. Karl Popper, Jonh C. Eccles;Tradução Silvio Meneses Garcia, Helena Cristina F. Arantes e Aurélio Osmar C. de Oliveira. – Campinas, SP: Papirus; Brasília, DF: Editora Universidade de Brasília. 1991.   _______. O Racionalismo Crítico na Política. Tradução de Maria da Conceição Côrte – Real. Brasília, Editora Universidade de Brasília, 2ª edição, 1994, 74p.SEARLE, John R. La construcción de la realidad social. Trad. Antoni Domènech. Barcelona: Paidós Ibérico, 1995.  


Author(s):  
Marcello Massimini ◽  
Giulio Tononi

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.


Author(s):  
James Van Cleve

In a growing number of papers one encounters arguments to the effect that certain philosophical views are objectionable because they would imply that there are necessary truths for whose necessity there is no explanation. For short, they imply that there are brute necessities. Therefore, the arguments conclude, the views in question should be rejected in favor of rival views under which the necessities would be explained. This style of argument raises a number of questions. Do necessary truths really require explanation? Are they not paradigms of truths that either need no explanation or automatically have one, being in some sense self-explanatory? If necessary truths do admit of explanation or even require it, what types of explanation are available? Are there any necessary truths that are truly brute? This chapter surveys various answers to these questions, noting their bearing on arguments from brute necessity and arguments concerning the mind–body problem.


Author(s):  
Victor Nuovo

Although the vocation of Christian virtuoso was invented and named by Robert Boyle, Francis Bacon provided the archtype. A Christian virtuoso is an experimental natural philosopher who professes Christianity, who endeavors to unite empiricism and supernatural belief in an intellectual life. In his program for the renewal of the learning Bacon prescribed that the empirical study of nature be the basis of all the sciences, including not only the study of physical things, but of human society, and literature. He insisted that natural causes only be used to explain natural events and proposed not to mix theology with natural philosophy. This became a rule of the Royal Society of London, of which Boyle was a principal founder. Bacon’s rule also had a theological use, to preserve the purity and the divine authority of revelation. In the mind of the Christian virtuoso, nature and divine revelation were separate but complementary sources of truth.


Ethics ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 92 (1) ◽  
pp. 174-176
Author(s):  
Gilbert Harman

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