The Research on Theory and Applications of Evolutionary Game Dynamics

2013 ◽  
Vol 422 ◽  
pp. 309-317
Author(s):  
Yu Lai ◽  
Yong Li
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Dynamics Model ◽  
Game Dynamics ◽  
Replicator Dynamic

This paper mainly introduces the basic dynamics model of evolutionary game theory: asymmetric replicator dynamic model and asymmetric replicator dynamic model and its relative conclusions. In order to facilitate understanding, a few simple examples are cited in the text to illustrate the differences between them. On the basis of the above, it also introduces theorists for random dynamic researches and theoretical achievement. Finally, this paper compares the classic game theory and evolutionary game theory in dynamic conceptual difference.

scholarly journals A System Dynamics Model for Safety Supervision of Online Car-Hailing From an Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective

IEEE Access ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 185045-185058
Author(s):  
Wenke Wang ◽  
Yan Zhang ◽  
Linyun Feng ◽  
Yenchun Jim Wu ◽  
Tseping Dong
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
System Dynamics Model ◽  
Dynamics Model

scholarly journals SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL BASED ON EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY FOR QUALITY SUPERVISION AMONG CONSTRUCTION STAKEHOLDERS

2018 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 318-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shengyu Guo ◽  
Pan Zhang ◽  
Jianying Yang
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
System Dynamics Model ◽  
Dynamics Model ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Impact

To address the gap, that is, few studies have explored the influence of the participants’ interactions with one another during construction quality supervision, this paper proposes a system dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory to describe the complex and dynamic interactions among tripartite stakeholders in China, including the project owner (PO), construction supervising engineer (CSE), and construction contractor (CC). First, the replicated dynamic equation set is established in terms of expense targets. Second, the equilibrium solutions of the equation set are obtained to test strategy options. The trends of system fluctuations caused by penalty and reward changes are also analyzed. Finally, the stability of the proposed model is improved by integrating a dynamic penalty–reward scenario into the evolutionary strategy of the PO. Simulation results show that: 1) the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in initial interactions, 2) the degrees of penalty and reward considerably affect the CC’s rate variable, and 3) the dynamic penalty–reward scenario could effectively improve the stability of the proposed model. The unsteadiness of the quality supervision system and the stability control scenario could help in understanding the impact of interactions among stakeholders and provide suggestions for optimizing quality supervision procedures.

scholarly journals Standardization in Decentralized Economies

2000 ◽  
Vol 90 (3) ◽  
pp. 550-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuelle Auriol ◽  
Michel Benaim
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Path Dependency ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Laissez Faire ◽  
Lock In

This paper presents a dynamic model, inspired by evolutionary game theory, of how standards and norms emerge in decentralized economies. It shows that standardization outcomes depend on adopters' attitudes to problems caused by incompatibility. If individuals display aversion to incompatibility, standardization never fails to happen eventually, but societies sometimes end up picking inferior standards. In this case, official action can be useful to quickly achieve sensible standardization. On the other hand, when individuals display tolerance or neutrality to incompatibility, there is neither path-dependency nor a lock-in problem, and regulation seems a poor alternative to laissez-faire. (JEL C73, D62, L1)

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