The Evolutionary Equilibrium of Block Withholding Attack

Bitcoin is the most famous and the most used cryptocurrency in the world, such that it has received extreme popularity in recent years. However the Bitcoin system is accompanied by different attacks, including the block withholding (BWH) attack. When a miner plays the BWH attack, it will withhold all the blocks newly discovered in the attack pool, damaging the honest miners’ right to obtain the fair reward. In this paper, we consider a setting in which two miners may honestly mine or perform the BWH attack in a mining pool. Different strategy profiles will bring different payoffs, in addition influence the selection of the strategies. Therefore, we establish an evolutionary game model to study the behavior tendency of the miners and the evolutionary stable strategies under different conditions, by formulating the replicator dynamic equations. Through numerical simulations, we further verify the theoretical results on evolutionary stable solutions and discuss the impact of the factors on miners’ strategic choice. Based on these simulation results, we also make some recommendations for the manager and the miners to mitigate the BWH attack and to promote the cooperation between miners in a mining pool.

Cooperative Evolutionary Game and Applications in Construction Supplier Tendency

Major construction projects have a great influence on the national economy and society, wherein cooperative relationship between construction suppliers plays an increasingly significant role in the overall supply chain system. However, the relationships between suppliers are noncontractual, multistage, dynamic, and complicated. To gain a deeper insight into the suppliers’ cooperative relationships, an evolutionary game model is developed to explore the cooperation tendency of multisuppliers. A replicator dynamic system is further formulated to investigate the evolutionary stable strategies of multisuppliers. Then, fourteen “when-then” type scenarios are concluded and classified into six different evolutionary tracks. Meanwhile, the critical influencing factors are identified. The results show that the suppliers’ production capacity, owner-supplier contract, and the owner’s incentive mechanism influence the cooperation tendency of suppliers directly. The managerial implications contribute to insightful references for a more stable cooperative relationship between the owner and suppliers.

The Research on Theory and Applications of Evolutionary Game Dynamics

This paper mainly introduces the basic dynamics model of evolutionary game theory: asymmetric replicator dynamic model and asymmetric replicator dynamic model and its relative conclusions. In order to facilitate understanding, a few simple examples are cited in the text to illustrate the differences between them. On the basis of the above, it also introduces theorists for random dynamic researches and theoretical achievement. Finally, this paper compares the classic game theory and evolutionary game theory in dynamic conceptual difference.

REPLICATOR DYNAMIC LEARNING IN MUTH'S MODEL OF PRICE MOVEMENTS

We investigate the stability properties of Muth's model of price movements when agents choose a production level using replicator dynamic learning. It turns out that when there is a discrete set of possible production levels, possible stable states and stability conditions differ between adaptive learning and replicator dynamic learning.

Study on the E-commerce Trust Based on Evolutionary Game Mechanism

The evolutionary game model of E-commerce trust is established according to the behavior choice character of the online trader and supervisor. The replicator dynamic principle t is put forward and corresponding evolutionary differential equation is established; we put forward the conception of the evolution balance, requiring the evolutionary balance of the differential equation and condition and make an annotation of the evolutionary game mechanism of E-commerce trust.