On Game Behavior of the Inventory Pledge Banks and the Logistical Enterprises

2012 ◽  
Vol 468-471 ◽  
pp. 2223-2226
Author(s):  
Juan He ◽  
Jian Wang ◽  
Li Sun
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Risk Ratio ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Inventory Financing

This paper introduces the mechanism design theory to establish Stacklberg Game Model in which with perfect information, logistical enterprises are leading decision makers, analyzing the game behavior of inventory financing with the method of backward induction. The results indicate that with perfect information, two-sided market of banks and logistical enterprises has more advantages than one-sided market of banks, and logistical enterprises are willing to improve their risk ratio to gain interest reduction from banks, which can lead to demand for financing.

Game Strategy in Multi-User Shared Virtual Environment Based on Internet

2010 ◽  
Vol 26-28 ◽  
pp. 809-812
Author(s):  
Hai Dong Yu ◽  
Bo Tao Zhang ◽  
Yan Chun Wang
Keyword(s):  
Correlation Analysis ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Virtual Environment ◽  
Design Theory ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Correlation Network ◽  
Virtual Agents ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Dynamic Correlation ◽  
Distributed Virtual Environment

This paper proposed a new interests game model with dynamic correlation analysis in distributed virtual environment based on mechanism design theory. The game definitions in correlation network and interest matrix were given and an analysis approach to find out the interest focus of virtual agents and administrator was presented. Thus a prototype virtual environment game system was implemented to demonstrate the effects of our approach in optimizing the visual rendering process and highlighting the collaborative perception according to payoffs under imperfect information condition.

Interpreting Knowledge in the Backward Induction Problem

Episteme ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 248-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Binmore
Keyword(s):  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Finite Games ◽  
Common Knowledge Of Rationality

AbstractRobert Aumann argues that common knowledge of rationality implies backward induction in finite games of perfect information. I have argued that it does not. A literature now exists in which various formal arguments are offered in support of both positions. This paper argues that Aumann's claim can be justified if knowledge is suitably reinterpreted.

scholarly journals Endogena korupcija kao ravnoteza sekvencijalne igre

2003 ◽  
Vol 44 (156) ◽  
pp. 21-43
Author(s):  
Milic Milovanovic
Keyword(s):  
Working Conditions ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Power Struggle ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Sequential Game ◽  
Privatized Firms ◽  
Motivational Structure ◽  
Insider Privatization

In this paper power struggle over the control of an insider privatized firm is modeled as a sequential game with perfect information. The endogenous corruption is a consequence of an insider privatization plan, where employees obtain majority of shares. In the post privatization game three players are dominant: managers, employees, and outside owners. Managers are by far the strongest player, with their key position in privatized firms despite their minority ownership stake. Since managers control working conditions of employees-cum-owners, they exercise an unparalleled power. Motivational structure is given for each player. Their ranked lists of goals and fears are necessary in order to specify parameters for the model. The game is modeled in an extensive form, and backward induction suggests a coalition of insiders (managers and employees) against the interests of outsiders. Under stated conditions, the equilibrium strategy results in an endogenous corruption.

An evolutionary game analysis of user-pay public–private partnership projects

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Danrong Song ◽  
Jinbo Song ◽  
Hehui Yuan ◽  
Yu Fan
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
The Public

PurposeWith the growing demand for infrastructure and public services in recent years, PPP-UP have attracted a great deal of attention. However, while the user focuses on the payment for use and the private sector is concerned with its return on investment, the public sector pays more attention to the efficient utilization of public funds. In order to analyze the willingness of each stakeholder to join PPP-UP, an evolutionary game model involving the three parties is constructed.Design/methodology/approachAn evolutionary game model is established that considers the users and the public and private sectors in user-pay public-private-partnership projects (PPP-UP). Eight scenarios of equilibriums and the game's evolutionary stable strategies are analyzed, and the corresponding stability conditions are then obtained. A situation where all three players are willing to cooperate in theory is also examined. The key influencing parameters that affect cooperation behaviors are further discussed.FindingsFirst, the results illustrate that by properly adjusting the influencing factors, the cooperation status among the three parties can be changed along with certain evolutionary trends. Second, it is hard to modify unsatisfactory evolutionary stability by small changes in both the price compensation of and the construction and operation compensation. Third, it is necessary to involve the users in the decision-making process in PPP-UP and take their demands regarding benefits and payments into account.Originality/valueIn this paper, we focus on PPP-UP to research interactions among the public and private sectors and the users. Based on the analysis of the evolutionary game, to facilitate the successful implementation and development of a project, several conditions are needed to ensure tripartite cooperation. Several recommendations are then proposed for decision-makers in PPP-UP.

Benefit Analysis about Parts Supplier and Bus Factory as Well as Users Based on Game Theory

2012 ◽  
Vol 220-223 ◽  
pp. 202-205
Author(s):  
Liang Han ◽  
Xiang Mei Si
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Current Situation ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
Static Game ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Voluntary Cooperation

This thesis analyzes the benefit produced by the cooperation or non-cooperation of parts supplier and bus factory as well as users by use of the perfect-information static game model of the game theory in connection with the current situation of China's bus market supply chain. Conclusions are drawn from the analysis that good after-sales service not only brings benefits to users but also can efficiently promote the voluntary cooperation between a parts supplier and a bus factory, so that the individual benefit and the overall benefit are both increased, and a win-win situation is finally achieved.

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