scholarly journals Tre Tribunali italiani, la Corte Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo e il diritto del concepito all’unitarietà delle figure genitoriali. In attesa della decisione della Corte Costituzionale sul divieto di fecondazione eterologa

2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Casini

L’articolo esamina criticamente il contenuto di tre recenti ordinanze giudiziarie (Tribunali di Firenze, Catania, Milano) che chiedono alla Corte Costituzionale di annullare il divieto di fecondazione artificiale eterologa sancito dalla legge italiana sulla “procreazione medicalmente assistita” (L. 40 del 2004). Viene presa in esame, sebbene marginalmente, anche la discutibile decisione della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo sul caso S.H. vs. Austria del 1 aprile 2010 che ha influito nelle decisioni dei giudici italiani. Dopo gli interventi volti a introdurre la diagnosi genetica preimpianto, è adesso la volta degli interventi miranti a introdurre la scissione concordata e pianificata della genitorialità. I diritti del concepito si trovano così di fronte a una nuova difficile prova. ---------- The article critically examines the content of three legal decisions (Courts of Florence, Catania and Milan) which ask the Constitutional Court to invalidate the prohibition of heterologous artificial fertilization in the Italian law on medically assisted procreation (Law n. 40 from 2004). The controversial ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of S.H. vs. Austria decided April 1, 2010 is also examined in passing as it influenced the decisions of the Italian judges. After interventions with the intention of introducing pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, now the attempt is to introduce a planned and agreed upon dissociation of parenthood. The rights of the conceived child are thus facing a new, difficult trial.

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paola Delbon ◽  
Adelaide Conti

In Italy, a law on Medically Assisted Procreation was passed in 2004. In 2014 the Constitutional Court declared section 4 para. 3 of this Law to be unconstitutional in the part where it prohibits couples from accessing heterologous medically assisted procreation techniques if a condition which causes complete, irreversible sterility or infertility has been diagnosed. The fast-moving developments in science and law, and the deep implications that the application of <em>new</em> techniques − which involve in the context of procreation a third person − can have in terms of protection of health and not only, makes it appropriate to keep under review this area, taking into account the pronouncements of the European Court of Human Rights and regulations in European countries.


2012 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marina Casini

Il contributo prende in esame la sentenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo emanata dalla Grande Camera il 3 novembre 2011 (caso S.H. et Al.v. Austria n. 57813/00). Essa va ad arricchire positivamente il panorama biogiuridico europeo. La sentenza in oggetto riguarda il giudizio instaurato nei confronti dell’Austria, a proposito della disciplina che pone il divieto di fecondazione artificiale eterologa. Nella sentenza, resa in via definitiva, la Grande Camera ha superato, ribaltandolo, il giudizio espresso dalla Camera semplice il 1° aprile 2011, affermando che il divieto di fecondazione artificiale eterologa, contenuto nella legge austriaca, non contrasta con gli artt. 8 (diritto alla vita privata e familiare) e 14 (principio di non discriminazione) della Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti e delle libertà fondamentali. La Corte non affronta le questioni bioetiche e biogiuridiche sollevate dalla fecondazione artificiale eterologa (si pensi al diritto del figlio all’unitarietà delle figure genitoriali), ma salva la legge austriaca facendo riferimento alla dottrina del c.d. “margine di apprezzamento” degli Stati membri. È auspicabile comunque che la sentenza influisca sul giudizio di costituzionalità in ordine al divieto di eterologa contenuto nella legge italiana. Nella prospettiva di valorizzare la voce degli Stati, merita sostegno iniziativa cittadina europea promossa ai sensi dell’art. 11 del Trattato di Lisbona per riconoscere il diritto alla vita di ogni essere umano fin dal concepimento. ---------- The article considers the decision of the European Court of Human Rights given by the Grand Chamber on November 3rd 2011 (case S.H. et Al. vs. Austria, application n. 57181/00). This ruling, which adds an important contribution to European Biolaw, concerns the Austrian law that prohibits heterologous artificial human reproduction and reversed the previous ruling (April, 1st, 2011) by the lower chamber of the European Court. So, the Grand Chamber affirmed that the ban on heterologous artificial reproduction does not violate article 8 (Right to respect for private and family life) and article 14 (Prohibition of discrimination) of Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Grand Chamber did not address the bioethical questions raised by heterologous artificial reproduction, but confirmed the law by referring to the theory of a “wide margin of appreciation” of member States. It is to be hoped that this decision will carry weight with the Italian Constitutional Court when it considers the Italian law prohibiting heterologous artificial reproduction. With regard to valorizing the beliefs of the member States, it would be good to support the European citizen’s initiative, promoted following article 11 of the Lisbon Treaty, to recognize the right to life of every human being from conception.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-201
Author(s):  
Giulia Angiolini

The purpose of this paper is to try to analyse the Italian regulation of accused persons’ remote participation in criminal proceedings. The interest in this matter arises from the suspected frictions of the provisions at hand with fundamental rights to be guaranteed for a fair trial. These suspicions, aroused right after the introduction of the institute in Italian law, have been increased by the recent reform of the discipline of remote participation, and they become even clearer after a comparison of Italian regulation with those of other European Countries. Hence, an inescapable question occurs: will the European Court of Human Rights and the Italian Constitutional Court save the new regulation as they did with the previous one?


2013 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 155-183
Author(s):  
Ilja Richard Pavone

Since the birth of Louise Brown in 1978, the first human baby resulting from in vitro fertilisation (IVF), developments in reproductive medicine have opened up new opportunities to solve problems related to sterility/infertility and to avoid the transmission of serious genetic diseases to offspring. This article evaluates some challenges to human rights protection arising from medically assisted procreation (MAP), with particular reference to artificial insemination from a donor (AID) and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). It analyses the regulation of MAP at the international, regional and domestic level. Specific attention is paid to two landmark judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on MAP (S.H. v. Austria and Costa and Pavan v. Italy), with a special focus on the interpretation of the concept of family and private life contained therein and on the effects of the ECtHR rulings on the Italian legal order. It concludes that national legislation concerning MAP should be minimal, i.e. should afford substantial freedom and autonomy to the couples in their procreative choices, in accordance with their right to respect for private and family life.


2012 ◽  
Vol 61 (5) ◽  
Author(s):  
Aldo Rocco Vitale

L’articolo esamina la recente decisione della Corte Europea dei Diritti dell’Uomo che ha censurato la legge 40/2004 in tema di procreazione medicalmente assistita per il suo divieto di diagnosi genetica preimpianto. La Corte ha accusato di incoerenza l’ordinamento giuridico italiano perché esso vieta la diagnosi genetica preimpianto, ma ammette l’aborto terapeutico. Il contributo analizza brevemente il caso e la sentenza riguardante una coppia di portatori sani di fibrosi cistica che chiedeva l’accesso alle tecniche previste dalla legge 40/2004 lamentando la violazione del diritto alla vita privata e familiare e il divieto di discriminazione contemplati dagli art. 8 e 14 della Convenzione Europea per i Diritti dell’Uomo. Quindi si passa ad una critica etica, filosofica e giuridica del problema trattato, soffermandosi sulla differenza e sul rapporto tra la legge italiana sull’aborto e quella sulla procreazione medicalmente assistita, sulla diagnosi genetica preimpianto e sul rischio di eugenetica che essa porta con sé. ---------- The article examines the recent decision of the European Court of human rights which has censored the Italian law 40/2004 on assisted reproductive technology for its ban on preimplantation genetic diagnosis. The Court accused of inconsistency the Italian legal system because it prohibits preimplantation genetic diagnosis, but admits the therapeutic abortion. The contribution analyses briefly the case and the ruling concerning a pair of healthy carriers of cystic fibrosis that sought access to techniques foreseen by law 40/2004 complaining of the violation of the right to private and family life and the prohibition of discrimination covered by art. 8 and 14 of the European Convention on human rights. So we then move on to a philosophical, legal and ethics critique of the problem issued, dwelling on the difference and relationship between the Italian law on abortion and on assisted reproductive technology, on preimplantation genetic diagnosis and on the risk of eugenics that it brings.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 282-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianluca Montanari Vergallo

The rise of Medically Assisted Procreation has led to the issue of how to determine who is entitled to parental status and custody rights. In this article, the author comments upon the rationale and legal principles that Italian Courts have applied in order to solve those problems, given the absence of a targeted piece of legislation. The principle of the child’s best interests, the ‘public order’ clause and various rulings from the European Court of Human Rights constitute the foundations on which legal trends have developed, allowing same-sex couples to become parents through ‘stepchild adoption’ or the legal registration of children born through heterologous fertilization practices abroad. Italy has therefore repositioned itself a step closer to the middle ground with respect to the overall European scenario: Italy’s law now acknowledges motherhood for intended mothers, although it continues to stop short of recognizing same-sex marriage.


Author(s):  
Yaroslav Skoromnyy ◽  

The article presents the conceptual foundations of bringing judges to civil and legal liability. It was found that the civil and legal liability of judges is one of the types of legal liability of judges. It is determined that the legislation of Ukraine provides for a clearly delineated list of the main cases (grounds) for which the state is liable for damages for damage caused to a legal entity and an individual by illegal actions of a judge as a result of the administration of justice. It has been proved that bringing judges to civil and legal liability, in particular on the basis of the right of recourse, provides for the payment of just compensation in accordance with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights. It was established that the bringing of judges to civil and legal liability in Ukraine is regulated by such legislative documents as the Constitution of Ukraine, the Civil Code of Ukraine, the Explanatory Note to the European Charter on the Status of Judges (Model Code), the Law of Ukraine «On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges», the Law of Ukraine «On the procedure for compensation for harm caused to a citizen by illegal actions of bodies carrying out operational-search activities, pre-trial investigation bodies, prosecutors and courts», Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine in the case on the constitutional submission of the Supreme Court of Ukraine regarding the compliance of the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) of certain provisions of Article 2, paragraph two of clause II «Final and transitional provisions» of the Law of Ukraine «On measures to legislatively ensure the reform of the pension system», Article 138 of the Law of Ukraine «On the judicial system and the status of judges» (the case on changes in the conditions for the payment of pensions and monthly living known salaries of judges lagging behind in these), the Law of Ukraine «On the implementation of decisions and the application of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights».


Author(s):  
Egidijus Küris

Western legal tradition gave the birth to the concept of the rule of law. Legal theory and constitutional justice significantly contributed to the crystallisation of its standards and to moving into the direction of the common concept of the rule of law. The European Court of Human Rights uses this concept as an interpretative tool, the extension of which is the quality of the law doctrine, which encompasses concrete requirements for the law under examination in this Court, such as prospectivity of law, its foreseeability, clarity etc. The author of the article, former judge of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court and currently the judge of the European Court of Human Rights, examines how the latter court has gradually intensified (not always consistently) its reliance on the rule of law as a general principle, inherent in all the Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, to the extent that in some of its judgments it concentrates not anymore on the factual situation of an individual applicant, but, first and foremost, on the examination of the quality of the law. The trend is that, having found the quality of the applicable law to be insufficient, the Court considers that the mere existence of contested legislation amounts to an unjustifiable interference into a respective right and finds a violation of respective provisions of the Convention. This is an indication of the Court’s progressing self-approximation to constitutional courts, which are called to exercise abstract norm-control.La tradición occidental alumbró la noción del Estado de Derecho. La teoría del Derecho y la Justicia Constitucional han contribuido decisivamente a la cristalización de sus estándares, ayudando a conformar un acervo común en torno al mismo. El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos emplea la noción de Estado de Derecho como una herramienta interpretativa, fundamentalmente centrada en la doctrina de la calidad de la ley, que implica requisitos concretos que exige el Tribunal tales como la claridad, la previsibilidad, y la certeza en la redacción y aplicación de la norma. El autor, en la actualidad Juez del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y anterior Magistrado del Tribunal Constitucional de Lituania, examina cómo el primero ha intensificado gradualmente (no siempre de forma igual de consistente) su confianza en el Estado de Derecho como principio general, inherente a todos los preceptos que forman el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, hasta el punto de que en algunas de sus resoluciones se concentra no tanto en la situación de hecho del demandante individual sino, sobre todo y ante todo, en el examen de esa calidad de la ley. La tendencia del Tribunal es a considerar que, si observa que la ley no goza de calidad suficiente, la mera existencia de la legislación discutida supone una interferencia injustificable dentro del derecho en cuestión y declara la violación del precepto correspondiente del Convenio. Esto implica el acercamiento progresivo del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos a los Tribunales Constitucionales, quienes tienen encargado el control en abstracto de la norma legal.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document