Virtue Epistemology and Virtue Ethics

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 432-446
Author(s):  
Herman Paul

Abstract In response to Anton Froeyman’s paper, “Virtues of Historiography,” this article argues that philosophers of history interested in why historians cherish such virtues as carefulness, impartiality, and intellectual courage would do wise not to classify these virtues unequivocally as either epistemic or moral virtues. Likewise, in trying to grasp the roles that virtues play in the historian’s professional practice, philosophers of history would be best advised to avoid adopting either an epistemological or an ethical perspective. Assuming that the historian’s virtuous behavior has epistemic and moral dimensions (as well as aesthetic, political, and other dimensions), this article advocates a non-reductionist account of historical scholarship, which acknowledges that the virtues cherished by historians usually play a variety of roles, depending on the goals they are supposed to serve. Given that not the least important of these goals are epistemic ones, the articles concludes that virtue ethical approaches, to the extent that they are focused on the acquisition of moral instead of epistemic goods, insufficiently recognize the role of virtue in the pursuit of such epistemic aims as knowledge and understanding.


Author(s):  
Linda Zagzebski

‘Virtue epistemology’ is the name of a class of theories that focus epistemic evaluation on good epistemic properties of persons rather than on properties of beliefs. The former or some interesting subset of the former are called intellectual virtues. Some of these theories propose that the traditional concepts of justification or knowledge can be analysed in terms of intellectual virtue, whereas others maintain that these traditional concepts are defective or uninteresting and it is desirable to replace them with the notion of an intellectual virtue. In all these theories, epistemic evaluation rests on some virtuous quality of persons that enables them to act in a cognitively effective and commendable way. Simple reliabilism may be treated either as a precursor to virtue epistemology or as an early form of it. Later versions add requirements for virtue intended to capture the idea that it is a quality which makes an epistemic agent subjectively responsible as well as objectively reliable. Proponents of virtue epistemology claim a number of advantages. It is said to bypass disputes between foundationalists and coherentists on proper cognitive structure, to avoid sceptical worries, to avoid the impasse between internalism and externalism and to broaden the range of epistemological enquiry to include such neglected epistemic values as understanding and wisdom. Some theorists argue that the real virtue of virtue epistemology is the way it permits us to redefine the central questions of epistemology. In addition, since virtue epistemology can be blended with virtue ethics, it holds out the promise of a unified theory of value.


Philosophia ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-406
Author(s):  
J. S. Blumenthal-Barby

Philosophy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charlie Crerar ◽  
Teresa Allen ◽  
Heather Battaly

Intellectual virtues are qualities that make us excellent thinkers. There are different analyses of exactly which qualities count as intellectual virtues: virtue responsibilists have emphasized praiseworthy character traits, such as open-mindedness and intellectual humility, while virtue reliabilists have emphasized reliable skills and faculties, such as vision, memory, and skills of logic. Importantly, all agree that intellectual virtues are (i) excellences, as opposed to defects; and (ii) distinctively intellectual and not, or not simply, moral. In other words, intellectual virtues are qualities that make us excellent (and not defective) as thinkers, not (or not simply) as people in general. This bibliography provides an overview of philosophical work on the intellectual virtues. It includes articles and books addressing responsibilist and reliabilist analyses of the structure of intellectual virtue; analyses of individual intellectual virtues; the application of intellectual virtue to education and other professional fields; the role of intellectual virtues in epistemology; and, finally, the structure of intellectual vice. It also includes some historical sources on intellectual virtue, though its focus is contemporary. Analyses of intellectual virtue (and of individual intellectual virtues) have developed in tandem with the epistemological subfield of virtue epistemology, which employs the notion of intellectual virtue in an account of knowledge. These analyses also frequently draw on virtue ethics, especially in the Aristotelian tradition. Some of the sources cited touch upon connections between intellectual virtue and these fields, though a fuller treatment of these topics can be found in the corresponding bibliographies on Virtue Epistemology and Virtue Ethics.


Epistemology ◽  
2018 ◽  
pp. 171-190
Author(s):  
Ernest Sosa

This chapter looks at the shocking but robust results obtained by social epistemologists in experiments that prompt a situationist attack on virtue theory. Based on a body of troubling results in social psychology, an intriguing critique has been pressed in recent years against virtue ethics, raising doubts both about its moral psychology and about its normative content. Similar discoveries have been made by social psychologists about belief management so that a similar critique can be pressed against virtue epistemology. The chapter shows how the logical structure of scholars' response to the critique of virtue ethics is closely replicated by a response available to the virtue epistemologist.


Author(s):  
Ted Nannicelli

This chapter sketches the general argument for the production-oriented approach to the ethical criticism of art. It begins by noting that at least some artworks (of performance art, for example) are isomorphic with the actions by which they are created. Such artworks are open to ethical evaluation in the same way that any action of a moral agent is open to ethical appraisal. This clears the conceptual space for the production-oriented approach. The chapter goes on to show that the production-oriented approach has an advantage over the interpretation-oriented approaches advocated by Booth, Devereaux, and Gaut in virtue of its ability to assign praise or blame to real moral agents who are responsible for their artworks. The chapter then bolsters the rationale for the production-oriented approach by appealing to anti-empiricist arguments in the aesthetics literature before drawing upon an analogy to similar arguments in virtue ethics and virtue epistemology.


Author(s):  
Nancy E. Snow

The aim of The Oxford Handbook of Virtue is to provide a representative overview of the state of work on virtue in the field of philosophy. After a brief discussion of the aetiology of the term virtue, the Introduction sketches the history of work on virtue in ethics and epistemology. These ideas are examined and expanded upon in the forty-two essays that comprise the Handbook. The Introduction follows the presentation of the Handbook chapters in discussing different conceptualizations of virtue, offering an overview of work on virtue in the history of philosophy and non-Western traditions, and briefly reviewing contributors’ chapters on topics in contemporary virtue ethics, applied virtue ethics, virtue epistemology, and applied virtue epistemology.


2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anton Froeyman

Abstract In this paper, I take up Herman Paul’s suggestion to analyze the process of writing history in terms of virtues. In contrast to Paul, however, I argue that the concept of virtue used here should not be based on virtue epistemology, but rather on virtue ethics. The reason is that virtue epistemology is discriminative towards non-cognitive virtues and incompatible with the Ankersmitian/Whitean view of historiography as a multivocal path from historical reality to historical representation. Virtue ethics on the other hand, more specifically those forms of virtue ethics which emphasize the uncodifiability thesis, is very capable of providing such an account. In order to make this somewhat more concrete, I distinguish four important traits of virtue ethics, and I try to make clear how these can be interpreted with respect to the writing of history.


2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 22-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROGER CRISP

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