scholarly journals Virtues of Historiography

2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anton Froeyman

Abstract In this paper, I take up Herman Paul’s suggestion to analyze the process of writing history in terms of virtues. In contrast to Paul, however, I argue that the concept of virtue used here should not be based on virtue epistemology, but rather on virtue ethics. The reason is that virtue epistemology is discriminative towards non-cognitive virtues and incompatible with the Ankersmitian/Whitean view of historiography as a multivocal path from historical reality to historical representation. Virtue ethics on the other hand, more specifically those forms of virtue ethics which emphasize the uncodifiability thesis, is very capable of providing such an account. In order to make this somewhat more concrete, I distinguish four important traits of virtue ethics, and I try to make clear how these can be interpreted with respect to the writing of history.

2015 ◽  
pp. 8-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miikka Pyykkönen

This article gives an analysis of Foucault’s studies of civil society and the various liberalist critiques of government. It follows from Foucault’s genealogical approach that “civil society” does not in itself possess any form of transcendental existence; its historical reality must be seen as the result of the productive nature of the power-knowledge-matrices. Foucault emphasizes that modern governmentality—and more specifically the procedures he names “the conduct of conduct”—is not exercised through coercive power and domination, but is dependent on the freedom and activeness of individuals and groups of society. Civil society is thus analyzed as fundamentally ambivalent: on the one hand civil society is a field where different kinds of technologies of governance meet the lives and wills of groups and individuals, but on the other hand it is a potential field of what Foucault called ‘counter-conduct’ – for both collective action and individual political action.


Author(s):  
Rebecca Stangl

Most of us are far from perfect in virtue. Faced with this fact, moral philosophers can respond in two different ways. On the one hand they might insist that the only real virtue is perfect virtue, and the only right actions are perfectly virtuous ones. Any failure to meet the exacting standards of perfect virtue will amount to vice, and any less than perfectly virtuous actions will be wrong. On the other hand, and if they reject such a rigorist picture, they can instead affirm that there are actions that are truly good and right even if they fall short of perfection. This book urges the attractions of a virtue ethics that is committed to the second sort of picture. In doing so, it makes two major innovations. First, it constructs and defends neo-Aristotelian accounts of supererogation and suberogation. But just as important, and far from encouraging a kind of complacency, the recognition that there can be genuine goodness short of perfection is precisely what opens up theoretical space for appreciating the goodness of striving toward ideal virtue. Thus, the second major innovation this book makes is to show that self-improvement itself can be morally excellent, and that the disposition to seek and engage in it, where appropriate, can itself be a virtue.


Author(s):  
Izabela Szyroka ◽  

I shall try to consider comparatively the notion of “historicity” in the sense given to it by Karl Jaspers and Carl Gustaw Jung in their “philosophies of history”, which were an original response to the crisis of modern historical scientificated consciousness. On the basis of Jaspers’ „Vom Ursprung und der Ziel der Geschichte” as well as Jung’s „Über die Entwicklung der Persönli- chkeit” I intend to explore a common point of their philosophical positions, which is: an individual historical existence, belonging as he/she does to the historical world that enters his/her life in a particular form, and, on the other hand, shaping the general historical reality through picking out and revealing the meanings and opportunities waiting to be unearthed in the sphere of his- toricity. Their concept of individual human being that, paradoxically, is just as much a historical existence in history as it remains outside history.


Author(s):  
Rebecca L. Stangl

Descriptive moral relativism is often thought to present a challenge for the justification of any non-skeptical normative theory of ethics. But does it present a special challenge for the justification of virtue ethics, more serious than the challenge it presents for deontological or consequentialist theories of ethics? On the one hand, and especially given its emphasis on concrete forms of life rather than abstract or universal norms, some have argued that it does. On the other hand, important strains of neo-Aristotelianism seek to ground virtue ethics in an objective account of human nature. This might suggest that virtue ethics has special resources for responding to the challenge posed by descriptive moral relativism. This chapter argues that neither of these claims is correct. Virtue ethics faces no special challenge from descriptive moral relativism, but neither does neo-Aristotelian naturalism provide any special resources for answering that challenge.


2016 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Eckert

AbstractThe attribution of responsibility in world society is increasingly a field of contestation. On the one hand, the perceptions of far-reaching causal and moral links between spatially and temporally distant events are ever more explicitly pronounced; on the other hand, the very complexity of these links often engenders a fragmentation of responsibility in law as well as in moral commitment. Identifying three competing conceptualisations of responsibility, namely a turn to virtue ethics, processes of juridification, and processes of moralisation, this article explores their different temporal and social dimensions, and the effects they each have on the relation between those held responsible and those affected by the situation that is to be accounted for.


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-115
Author(s):  
Patrick Bondy ◽  

According to anti-luck approaches to the analysis of knowledge, knowledge is analyzed as unlucky true belief, or unlucky justified true belief. According to virtue epistemology, on the other hand, knowledge is true belief which a subject has acquired or maintained because of the exercise of a relevant cognitive ability. ALE and VE both appear to have difficulty handling some intuitive cases where subjects have or lack knowledge, so Pritchard (2012) proposed that we should take an anti-luck condition and a success-from-ability condition as independent necessary conditions on knowledge. Recently, Carter and Peterson (2017) have argued that Pritchard’s modal notion of luck needs to be broadened. My aim in this paper is to show that, with the modal conception of luck appropriately broadened, it is no longer clear that ALE needs to be supplemented with an independent ability condition in order to handle the problematic Gettier cases.


1999 ◽  
Vol 173 ◽  
pp. 249-254
Author(s):  
A.M. Silva ◽  
R.D. Miró

AbstractWe have developed a model for theH2OandOHevolution in a comet outburst, assuming that together with the gas, a distribution of icy grains is ejected. With an initial mass of icy grains of 108kg released, theH2OandOHproductions are increased up to a factor two, and the growth curves change drastically in the first two days. The model is applied to eruptions detected in theOHradio monitorings and fits well with the slow variations in the flux. On the other hand, several events of short duration appear, consisting of a sudden rise ofOHflux, followed by a sudden decay on the second day. These apparent short bursts are frequently found as precursors of a more durable eruption. We suggest that both of them are part of a unique eruption, and that the sudden decay is due to collisions that de-excite theOHmaser, when it reaches the Cometopause region located at 1.35 × 105kmfrom the nucleus.


Author(s):  
A. V. Crewe

We have become accustomed to differentiating between the scanning microscope and the conventional transmission microscope according to the resolving power which the two instruments offer. The conventional microscope is capable of a point resolution of a few angstroms and line resolutions of periodic objects of about 1Å. On the other hand, the scanning microscope, in its normal form, is not ordinarily capable of a point resolution better than 100Å. Upon examining reasons for the 100Å limitation, it becomes clear that this is based more on tradition than reason, and in particular, it is a condition imposed upon the microscope by adherence to thermal sources of electrons.


Author(s):  
K.H. Westmacott

Life beyond 1MeV – like life after 40 – is not too different unless one takes advantage of past experience and is receptive to new opportunities. At first glance, the returns on performing electron microscopy at voltages greater than 1MeV diminish rather rapidly as the curves which describe the well-known advantages of HVEM often tend towards saturation. However, in a country with a significant HVEM capability, a good case can be made for investing in instruments with a range of maximum accelerating voltages. In this regard, the 1.5MeV KRATOS HVEM being installed in Berkeley will complement the other 650KeV, 1MeV, and 1.2MeV instruments currently operating in the U.S. One other consideration suggests that 1.5MeV is an optimum voltage machine – Its additional advantages may be purchased for not much more than a 1MeV instrument. On the other hand, the 3MeV HVEM's which seem to be operated at 2MeV maximum, are much more expensive.


2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 129-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reimer Kornmann

Summary: My comment is basically restricted to the situation in which less-able students find themselves and refers only to literature in German. From this point of view I am basically able to confirm Marsh's results. It must, however, be said that with less-able pupils the opposite effect can be found: Levels of self-esteem in these pupils are raised, at least temporarily, by separate instruction, academic performance however drops; combined instruction, on the other hand, leads to improved academic performance, while levels of self-esteem drop. Apparently, the positive self-image of less-able pupils who receive separate instruction does not bring about the potential enhancement of academic performance one might expect from high-ability pupils receiving separate instruction. To resolve the dilemma, it is proposed that individual progress in learning be accentuated, and that comparisons with others be dispensed with. This fosters a self-image that can in equal measure be realistic and optimistic.


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