3. The intellectual virtues

This chapter examines the intellectual virtues. The belief that there are specific intellectual virtues goes back as far as ancient Greece. Intellectual virtues are habits of the mind that facilitate the pursuit of truth, the avoidance of error, or other epistemic goods. Conversely, intellectual vices are habits of the mind that frustrate these goals. And it is possible that a person with intellectual virtue might not necessarily possess moral virtue. The chapter then considers different intellectual virtues: intellectual honesty; intellectual curiosity; intellectual open-mindedness; intellectual courage and perseverance; and intellectual charity.

The Excellent Mind

What makes for a good education? What does one need to count as well educated? Knowledge, to be sure. But knowledge is easily forgotten, and today’s knowledge may be obsolete tomorrow. Skills, particularly in critical thinking, are crucial as well. But absent the right motivation, graduates may fail to put their skills to good use. In this book, Nathan King argues that intellectual virtues—traits like curiosity, intellectual humility, honesty, intellectual courage, and open-mindedness—are central to any education worthy of the name. Further, such virtues are crucial to our functioning well in everyday life, in areas as diverse as personal relationships, responsible citizenship, civil discourse, and personal success. Our struggles in these areas often result from a failure to think virtuously. Drawing upon recent work in philosophy and psychology, the book paints a portrait of virtuous intellectual character—and of the vices such a character opposes. Filled with examples and applications, this book introduces readers to the intellectual virtues: what they are, why they matter, and how we can grow in them.

Courage

This chapter examines intellectual courage, the virtue needed to persist in pursuit of our intellectual aims despite threats. It notes that courage is commonly exercised not just in our efforts to gain knowledge, but also in our efforts to keep and share it. It locates intellectual courage in relation to the vices of intellectual cowardice (a deficiency) and rashness (an excess). The chapter then argues that courage centrally concerns our persistence in the face of threats rather than fears, as is commonly thought. The chapter closes by examining courage in the context of psychological experiments on conformity, and by encouraging the reader to find opportunities to act courageously in the midst of intellectual activities.

„Róbmy swoje!”, czyli ethos inteligencki w nowoczesnej parenezie Wojciecha Młynarskiego

The article contains a semantic and stylistic analysis of the song by Wojciech Młynarski entitled <em>Let’s Do What Is Ours!</em> (Pol. <em>Róbmy swoje!</em>), carried out with particular emphasis on the axiological intention of the author. The work promoting the attitude of intellectual courage, creative activity and perseverance, which serves the civilization values verbalized by the author in the form of a triad “culture, art, freedom of speech”, was considered a modern paraenesis, in which numerous linguistic and literary means (and in particular the title phrase, which became a winged word) were used to shape the worldview of the audience. The text has been reviewed against the artist’s entire legacy, the usefulness of which for didactics of Polish was reflected in the new base for teaching program for high school.

Cognitive Ecology in the Age of the Internet

The article deals with the problem of intellectual behavior in the era of development of the Internet and social networks. Just as geo-ecology has put the values of nature conservation at the forefront over those of economic gain, so cognitive ecology puts intellectual values at the forefront of the cognitive process. The author substantiates the idea that the Internet has its own cognitive ecology. An overabundance of information requires more complex skills in evaluating and analyzing information, as well as changing value-based intellectual attitudes. It is argued that the theoretical basis for the analysis of cognitive ecology in the Internet age can be the epistemology of virtues, in which various intellectual virtues and vices are studied. The article lists some intellectual virtues and vices that can be demanded when working on the Internet. These intellectual virtues include: open-mindedness, intellectual caution, intellectual courage, intellectual thoroughness, etc. It is shown that manifestation of intellectual virtues is necessary to navigate in epistemologically “unfriendly” environment of the Internet.

Arguments over Ends

In the United States, vast resources are put into end-of-life care and there is resistance to wider reliance on hospice, not to mention physician-assisted dying. How does dying get managed, and how do decisions about death get produced, within the logics that pervade contemporary healthcare? This chapter explores this question by considering how dispositions of humility and impulses toward autonomy operate both for dying persons and the caregivers attending to them in death. It argues that a relationally supported process of emotionally preparing for dying provides an experience through which we can learn about humility, autonomy, and other dispositions important for critical democratic citizenship: self-knowledge, self-determination, intellectual courage, generosity toward self and others, openness to uncertainty, and the will to persevere in our aspirations despite undeniable fragility.

A raft or a pyramid: On the nature of intellectual courage

The subject matter of the article is the problem of intellectual courage. Its origins can be traced from philosophical ethics, the psychology of morality, virtue epistemology, and the ethics of science. Intellectual courage represents the limit of reasonable fearlessness completing the continuum of “bravery – boldness – courage”. Intellectual courage is an epistemic virtue that ensures the development of knowledge (the discovery and justifica­tion of new theories, risky experiments and inventions) in the face of uncertainty and risk. The intellectual courage as an act of a selfless gift demonstrates the special epistemic sta­tus of the giver and his or her distance from the community. Being unreduced to the qual­ities of personal character, intellectual courage embodies a particular communicative phe­nomenon on the boundary of science and society: the creative loneliness.

Critical Thinking in the Digital Age: Strategies of Human Resource Management

The research introduces a strategy of utilising critical thinking (CT) as an instrument of developing professional skills set in the digital age. The research aims to evaluate the potential of CT in human resources management (HRM). It has been established that the strategy of CT offers a way of intellectual improvement within the framework of professional communication. Therefore, a systematic fostering of CT allows for successful integration of affective and cognitive aspects of communication in the context of HRM. Conversely, this research has identified the potential of the offered strategy in change- and risk management. The CT strategy has proved itself to be an effective way of professional decision-making in key cognitive aspects as well as in effective ones (intellectual courage, perseverance, confident reasoning, independent thinking in tandem with overcoming egocentrism and sociocentrism). Based on the results of the empirical research within the modern digital environment, the long-term efficiency of the offered strategy has been substantiated; the researchers have outlined the potential ways of implementing the results of the study, as well as strategy’s growth point.

Epistemic Angst, Intellectual Courage and Radical Scepticism

The overarching aim of this paper is to persuade the reader that radical scepticism is driven less by independently plausible arguments and more by a fear of epistemic limitation which can be overcome. By developing the Kierkegaardian insight that knowledge requires courage, I show that we are not, as potential knowers, just passive recipients of a passing show of putatively veridical information, we also actively need to put ourselves in the way of it by learning to resist certain forms of epistemic temptation: the Cartesian thought that we could be ‘imprisoned’ within our own representations, and, hence permanently ‘out of touch’ with an ‘external’ world, and the Reasons Identity Thesis, which has us believe that whether we are in the good case or in the bad case, our epistemic grounds are the same.

Japanese Philosophy? No Such Thing: Japan's Contribution to World Philosophizing

For almost five decades I have been studying Japanese philosophy, but only gradually have I come to realize there is no such thing. The ghost of Nakae Chōmin 中江 兆民 (1847–1901) probably gloats with satisfaction to hear this gaijin say that. My statement seems to echo his assessment more than a century ago when he pronounced that Japan had always been and continued to be devoid of philosophy. Although I admire Chōmin for his intellectual courage, standing up to the thought police even to the extent of being temporarily exiled from Tōkyō, my position is not at all the same as his. Nakae Chōmin is not only dead, but unfortunately, when it came to understanding both philosophy and its relation to Japan, he was also dead wrong. So although in reference to Japanese philosophy, I claim there is no such thing, I do not mean what Chōmin meant. To understand what I do mean, we have to examine my claim word by word.