Repeated games and cooperative behavior

2017 ◽  
pp. 124-152
Author(s):  
Weiying Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Cooperative Behavior

scholarly journals Establishing social cooperation: The role of hubs and community structure

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-264
Author(s):  
BARRY COOPER ◽  
ANDREW E. M. LEWIS-PYE ◽  
ANGSHENG LI ◽  
YICHENG PAN ◽  
XI YONG
Keyword(s):  
Community Structure ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Random Network ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Structural Features ◽  
Network Size ◽  
The Social ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
High Degree

AbstractPrisoner's Dilemma (PD) games have become a well-established paradigm for studying the mechanisms by which cooperative behavior may evolve in societies consisting of selfish individuals. Recent research has focused on the effect of spatial and connectivity structure in promoting the emergence of cooperation in scenarios where individuals play games with their neighbors, using simple “memoryless” rules to decide their choice of strategy in repeated games. While heterogeneity and structural features such as clustering have been seen to lead to reasonable levels of cooperation in very restricted settings, no conditions on network structure have been established, which robustly ensure the emergence of cooperation in a manner that is not overly sensitive to parameters such as network size, average degree, or the initial proportion of cooperating individuals. Here, we consider a natural random network model, with parameters that allow us to vary the level of “community” structure in the network, as well as the number of high degree hub nodes. We investigate the effect of varying these structural features and show that, for appropriate choices of these parameters, cooperative behavior does now emerge in a truly robust fashion and to a previously unprecedented degree. The implication is that cooperation (as modelled here by PD games) can become the social norm in societal structures divided into smaller communities, and in which hub nodes provide the majority of inter-community connections.

THE AGENCIES METHOD FOR MODELING COALITIONS AND COOPERATION IN GAMES

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (04) ◽  
pp. 539-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN F. NASH
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
High School Graduates ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Theoretical Biology ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Natural Evolution ◽  
Science Camp

The idea leading to this study originated some time ago when I talked at a gathering of high school graduates at a summer science camp. I spoke about the theme of "the evolution of cooperation" (in Nature) and about how that topic was amenable to studies involving Game Theory (which, more frequently, has been used in research in economics). After that event I was stimulated to think of the possibility of modeling cooperation in games through actions of acceptance in which one player could simply accept the "agency" of another player or of an existing coalition of players. The action of acceptance would have the form of being entirely cooperative, as if "altruistic", and not at all competitive, but there was also the idea that the game would be studied under circumstances of repetition and that every player would have the possibility of reacting in a non-cooperative fashion to any undesirable pattern of behavior of any another player. Thus the game studied would be analogous to the repeated games of "Prisoner's Dilemma" variety that have been studied in theoretical biology. These studies of "PD" (or "Prisoner's Dilemma") games have revealed the paradoxical possibility of the natural evolution of cooperative behavior when the interacting organisms or species are presumed only to be endowed with self-interested motivations, thus motivations of a non-cooperative type.

scholarly journals Direct Reciprocity Under Uncertainty Does Not Explain One-Shot Cooperation, But It Can Explain Norm Psychology

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Zefferman
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Evolutionary History ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Cultural Norms ◽  
Economic Returns ◽  
Economic Experiments ◽  
Direct Benefit ◽  
Mismatch Hypothesis

Humans in many societies cooperate in economic experiments at much higher levels than would be expected if their goal was maximizing economic returns even when interactions are anonymous and one-shot. This is a puzzle because paying a cost to benefit another player in one-shot interactions has no direct benefit to the cooperator. This paper explores the logic of two competing evolutionary hypotheses to explain this behavior. The "norm psychology" hypothesis holds that a player's choice of strategy is heavily influenced by socially-learned cultural norms. Its premise is that over the course of human evolutionary history, cultural norms varied considerably across human societies and through a process of gene-culture co-evolution, humans evolved mechanisms to learn and adopt the norms of their particular society. The "evolutionary mismatch" hypothesis holds that pro-social preferences evolved genetically in our hunter-gatherer past where one-shot anonymous interactions were rare and these evolved "protocols" for cooperation are misapplied in modern, laboratory, conditions. I compare these hypotheses by adopting a well known model of the mismatch hypothesis. I show that the cooperation generated by the model is based on a flawed assumption - that the best thing to do is cooperate in a repeated game. I show that repeated games generate a great diversity of behavioral equilibria, in support of the norm psychology hypothesis's premise. When interaction is repeated, adopting local norms is a more evolutionarily successful strategy than automatically cooperating. If various groups are at different behavioral equilibria, then cultural selection between groups tends to select for cooperative behavior.

An evolutionary perspective on cooperative behavior in gamers.

2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 208-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grant J. Devilly ◽  
Kathleen Brown ◽  
Ivan Pickert ◽  
Riley O'Donohue
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Evolutionary Perspective

On the New Book in Microeconomics by S. Bowles

2011 ◽  
pp. 115-121
Author(s):  
L. Polishchuk
Keyword(s):  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Community Ownership

The paper discusses advantages and shortcomings of the Bowles book, with the emphasis on the community ownership, altruism, and cooperative behavior. The author claims that the book while being surely valuable as an academic contribution, can not, however, substitute standard textbooks in microeconomics.

The Effect of Sanctions on Cooperative Behavior: A Study on Medium Trust Individuals in the Context of Corruption

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dewi Rosiana ◽  
Achmad Djunaidi ◽  
Indun Lestari Setyono ◽  
Wilis Srisayekti
Keyword(s):  
Logistic Regression ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Logistic Regression Model ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Research Subjects ◽  
Chi Square ◽  
Public Interests ◽  
The Public ◽  
Chi Square Analysis ◽  
Personal Interests

This study aims to describe the effect of sanctions (individual sanctions, collective sanctions, and absence of sanctions) on cooperative behavior of individuals with medium trust in the context of corruption. Both collective sanctions and individual sanctions, are systemic, which means sanctioning behavior is exercised not by each individual but by the system. Cooperative behavior in this context means choosing to obey rules, to reject acts of corruption and to prioritize public interests rather than the personal interests. Conversely, corruption is an uncooperative behavior to the rules, and ignores the public interest and prioritizes personal interests. Research subjects were 62 students. The Chi-Square Analysis was used to see the association between the variables and the logistic regression model was applied to describe the structure of this association. Individual sanction is recommended as punishment to medium trust individuals to promote cooperative behavior in the context of corruption. The results showed that individuals with medium trust had more cooperative behavior.

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