Providence

Author(s):  
William Hasker

Divine providence is God’s care, provision, foresight and direction of the universe in such a way that the universe as a whole and individual creatures within it fulfil God’s purposes. Belief in providence was affirmed by some Greek philosophers (especially the Stoics), and is a fundamental tenet of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In modern times, questions have arisen about the possibility of divine intervention in worldly affairs; this creates a difficulty for belief in providence, because it makes it hard to see how God can shape events so as to carry out his providential purposes. Theories of providence differ with regard to the extent to which God has direct and specific control over earthly events, as opposed to guiding the course of affairs in a general way towards his overall goals. The strongest affirmation of divine control comes from Calvinism, which accepts a compatibilist view of free will (that is, that free will is compatible with determinism) and affirms God’s absolute control over everything that happens. Other views affirm libertarian free will for creatures; some place limitations on God’s knowledge of the future, and process theology places stringent limits on God’s power to affect worldly events. These limitations tend to give creatures a limited degree of independence over against God, and lessen God’s direct and specific control over events.

1999 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-345
Author(s):  
TIM MAWSON

In this paper, I argue that if the libertarian free will defence were seen to fail because determinism were seen to be true, then another solution to the problem of evil would present itself. I start by arguing that one cannot, by consideration of agents' choices between morally indifferent options, reach any conclusion as to these agents' moral qualities. If certain forms of consequentialism were false, determinism true, and if there were a God who chose to create this universe, then His choice would have been between such options. Consideration of the general nature of the universe God putatively chose to create would not then license any conclusion as His moral qualities.


2007 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. P. RAGLAND

AbstractIn the Fourth Meditation, Descartes asks: ‘If God is no deceiver, why do we sometimes err?’ Descartes's answer (despite initial appearances) is both systematic and necessary for his epistemological project. Two atheistic arguments from error purport to show that reason both proves and disproves God's existence. Descartes must block them to escape scepticism. He offers a mixed theodicy: the value of free will justifies God in allowing our actual errors, and the perfection of the universe may justify God in making us able to err. Though internally coherent, Descartes's theodicy conflicts with his view of divine providence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Aleksandr Sergeyevich Mishura ◽  

This paper aims to highlight the historical and conceptual interrelations between libertarianism and classical theism (CT). In the first part of the paper, I show that the concept of CT was introduced in the contemporary philosophy of religion by the proponent of process theology Ch. H. Hartshorne to criticize European philosophical and theological tradition. Hartshorne himself thought that classical theism contradicts the libertarian understanding of free will. I further propose two hypotheses to explain the existing association between libertarianism and classical theism in the contemporary philosophy of religion. In the second part, I explore conceptual dependencies and contradictions between libertarianism and CT. I argue that although libertarianism is more suited to address the problem of evil and the doctrine of eternal damnation than theological compatibilism, it nevertheless faces serious problems on the way of reconciliation with CT. To explain evil and eternal damnation libertarian free will have to be understood as having a great value. However, the value of libertarian freedom might be challenged by exploring its contradictions with such divine perfections as divine goodness and divine foreknowledge and the doctrine of divine conservation. I further argue that to solve theological puzzles one needs to develop explicitly theological libertarian understanding of free will that depends on theological values and does not pretend to be compatible with naturalism and atheism.


Religions ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 266
Author(s):  
Cheryl K. Chen

According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why didn’t God allow creatures the freedom required for moral goodness, while intervening to ensure that all evil-doing is victimless? More recently, James Sterba has revived the playpen problem by arguing that an omnipotent and benevolent God would have intervened to prevent significant and especially horrendous evil. I argue that it is possible, at least, that such divine intervention would have backfired, and that any attempt to create a world that is morally better than this one would have resulted in a world that is morally worse. I conclude that the atheologian should instead attack the free will defense at its roots: either by denying that the predetermination of our actions is incompatible with our freely per-forming them, or by denying that the actual world—a world with both moral good and evil—is more valuable than a world without any freedom at all.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus Janew

Can we trace back consciousness, reality, awareness, and free will to a single basic structure without giving up any of them? Can the universe exist in both real and individual ways without being composed of both? This dialogue founds consciousness and freedom of choice on the basis of a new reality concept that also includes the infinite as far as we understand it. Just the simplest distinction contains consciousness. It is not static, but a constant alternation of perspectives. From its entirety and movement, however, there arises a freedom of choice being more than reinterpreted necessity and unpredictability. Although decisions ultimately involve the whole universe, they are free in varying degrees also here and now. The unity and openness of the infinite enables the individual to be creative while this creativity directly and indirectly enters into all other individuals without impeding them. A contrary impression originates only in a narrowed awareness. But even the most conscious and free awareness can neither anticipate all decisions nor extinguish individuality. Their creativity is secured.


Author(s):  
Nienke Roelants

In the early 1540ies G.J. Rheticus wrote an anonymous treatise entitled both Epistola deTerrae Motu and Dissertatio de Hypoth[esibus] Astron[omiae] Copernicanae. In thisletter he discusses why proclaiming the motion of the earth does not need to beconsidered as an impious act incompatible with the words of Holy Scripture. Based onan analysis of authorities mentioned by the author in this letter, I conclude thatRheticus’ strategy on the one hand consists in playing down the importance of thetraditional Aristotelian-Ptolemaic notions on the universe in the field of astronomy andby emphasizing the indirect character of Biblical authority in these matters. On the otherhand, he claims the absolute, immediate authority of mathematics in astronomy bywhich he consequently challenges the traditional medieval hierarchy of sciences.Rheticus considers the achievements of Copernicus to be part of divine providence.


Analysis ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 76 (3) ◽  
pp. 296-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Widerker

Author(s):  
Theodore M. Porter

This chapter explores how German economists and statisticians of the historical school viewed the idea of social or statistical law as the product of confusion between spirit and matter or, equivalently, between history and nature. That the laws of Newtonian mechanics are fully time-symmetric and hence can be equally run backwards or forwards could not easily be reconciled with the commonplace observation that heat always flows from warmer to cooler bodies. James Clerk Maxwell, responding to the apparent threat to the doctrine of free will posed by thermodynamics and statistics, pointed out that the second law of thermodynamics was only probable, and that heat could be made to flow from a cold body to a warm one by a being sufficiently quick and perceptive. Ludwig Boltzmann resisted this incursion of probabilism into physics but in the end he was obliged, largely as a result of difficulties presented by the issue of mechanical reversibility, to admit at least the theoretical possibility of chance effects in thermodynamics. Meanwhile, the American philosopher and physicist C. S. Pierce determined that progress—the production of heterogeneity and homogeneity—could never flow from rigid mechanical laws, but demanded the existence of objective chance throughout the universe.


Author(s):  
Scott A. Davison

The theodicy explored in Chapter 13 is naturalistic in the sense that it does not appeal to the existence of good things or events or processes that cannot be studied using the natural sciences. More specifically, unlike most of the theodicies that are typically discussed in the literature, this one does not involve any claims about human survival of death, the existence of a soul, libertarian human freedom, or divine intervention, miraculous or otherwise. The theodicy explored here involves the following claims: Everything that exists is intrinsically valuable to some degree; the universe as a whole is a thing of immense intrinsic value; the immense intrinsic value of the universe as a whole provides God with a justifying reason for creating it; the evil in the world is offset by the intrinsic values of the creatures affected together with the intrinsic value of the world that comes from its regularity.


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