Moral agents

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vinit Haksar
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Agent ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Inner Life ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Concern For Others

Moral agents are those agents expected to meet the demands of morality. Not all agents are moral agents. Young children and animals, being capable of performing actions, may be agents in the way that stones, plants and cars are not. But though they are agents they are not automatically considered moral agents. For a moral agent must also be capable of conforming to at least some of the demands of morality. This requirement can be interpreted in different ways. On the weakest interpretation it will suffice if the agent has the capacity to conform to some of the external requirements of morality. So if certain agents can obey moral laws such as ‘Murder is wrong’ or ‘Stealing is wrong’, then they are moral agents, even if they respond only to prudential reasons such as fear of punishment and even if they are incapable of acting for the sake of moral considerations. According to the strong version, the Kantian version, it is also essential that the agents should have the capacity to rise above their feelings and passions and act for the sake of the moral law. There is also a position in between which claims that it will suffice if the agent can perform the relevant act out of altruistic impulses. Other suggested conditions of moral agency are that agents should have: an enduring self with free will and an inner life; understanding of the relevant facts as well as moral understanding; and moral sentiments, such as capacity for remorse and concern for others. Philosophers often disagree about which of these and other conditions are vital; the term moral agency is used with different degrees of stringency depending upon what one regards as its qualifying conditions. The Kantian sense is the most stringent. Since there are different senses of moral agency, answers to questions like ‘Are collectives moral agents?’ depend upon which sense is being used. From the Kantian standpoint, agents such as psychopaths, rational egoists, collectives and robots are at best only quasi-moral, for they do not fulfil some of the essential conditions of moral agency.

scholarly journals Racionalidade e vulnerabilidade: elementos para a redefinição da sujeição moral

2007 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sônia T. Felipe
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Agent ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Central Question ◽  
Traditional Philosophy ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Tradition ◽  
Moral Decisions ◽  
Tom Regan

A filosofia moral tradicional estabelece o critério da posse da razão como exigência para a definição da pertinência ou não de um sujeito à comunidade moral humana, e, pois, a ser considerado digno de respeito ético e justiça. Contrariando a tradição moral, Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Tom Regan e Paul W. Taylor redefinem a constituição da comunidade moral e o alcance da justiça, estabelecendo a perspectiva dos que são afetados pelas ações morais, não a dos sujeitos morais agentes, como a referência para se tomar decisões éticas relativas à justiça. Enquanto a filosofia moral tradicional considera apenas a categoria dos sujeitos morais agentes, estes autores desdobram a sujeição moral em duas possibilidades: a da agência e a da paciência moral. Com este desdobramento, mantêm-se a estatura dos agentes racionais como responsáveis pela moralidade, enquanto a vulnerabilidade às ações e decisões dos sujeitos morais agentes é levada em conta, permitindo a inclusão na comunidade moral e da justiça de interesses nãoracionais, de animais e ecossistemas nãoanimados, por exemplo. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Agentes morais. Pacientes morais. Agência moral. Paciência moral. Responsabilidade. Vulnerabilidade. Kenneth E. Goodpaster. Tom Regan. Paul W. Taylor. ABSTRACT Traditional moral philosophy establishes reason as the only criterion for someone being morally considerable or recognized as member of the moral community. In contrast, Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Tom Regan and Paul W. Taylor do not agree with the moral tradition. On their perspective, the standpoint not of the agent but of the “patient” should be the central question of ethics in defining to whom principles of morality apply. While traditional philosophy operates only with the category of moral agents, these authors operates with both categories, moral agent and moral patient. They maintain that responsibility is the most significant question in defining the framework of human morality, a necessary condition to someone being considered a moral agent, possible only for rational beings, while vulnerability is the condition of being subjected to moral decisions and actions, independently of being rational or non rational. Being subjected to human morality is not a prerogative of rational beings. There are non rational interests common to humans, animals and plants, the inherent worth of life, for example, that are continuously subjected to human decisions. So, those have to be considered by ethics and justice. In order to be morally considerable it is not necessary to be rational, it is sufficient to be vulnerable to moral agency. KEY WORDS – Moral agent. Moral patient. Moral agency. Moral patience. Responsibility. Vulnerability. Kenneth E. Goodpaster. Tom Regan. Paul W. Taylor.

scholarly journals When Is a Robot a Moral Agent?

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 23-30
Author(s):  
John P Sullins lll
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Agent ◽  
Moral Rights ◽  
Moral Agents

In this paper I argue that in certain circumstances robots can be seen as real moral agents. A distinction is made between persons and moral agents such that, it is not necessary for a robot to have personhood in order to be a moral agent. I detail three requirements for a robot to be seen as a moral agent. The first is achieved when the robot is significantly autonomous from any programmers or operators of the machine. The second is when one can analyze or explain the robot’s behavior only by ascribing to it some predisposition or ‘intention’ to do good or harm. And finally, robot moral agency requires the robot to behave in a way that shows and understanding of responsibility to some other moral agent. Robots with all of these criteria will have moral rights as well as responsibilities regardless of their status as persons.

Rational Feelings and Moral Agency

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ido Geiger
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Inner Life ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Effective Force ◽  
Moral Feeling

AbstractKant's conception of moral agency is often charged with attributing no role to feelings. I suggest that respect is the effective force driving moral action. I then argue that four additional types of rational feelings are necessary conditions of moral agency: (1) The affective inner life of moral agents deliberating how to act and reflecting on their deeds is rich and complex (conscience). To act morally we must turn our affective moral perception towards the ends of moral action: (2) the welfare of others (love of others); and (3) our own moral being (self-respect). (4) Feelings shape our particular moral acts (moral feeling). I tentatively suggest that the diversity of moral feelings might be as great as the range of our duties.

scholarly journals Moral zombies: why algorithms are not moral agents

AI & Society ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carissa Véliz
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Personal Experience ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Experiential Knowledge ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Physical Components

AbstractIn philosophy of mind, zombies are imaginary creatures that are exact physical duplicates of conscious subjects for whom there is no first-personal experience. Zombies are meant to show that physicalism—the theory that the universe is made up entirely out of physical components—is false. In this paper, I apply the zombie thought experiment to the realm of morality to assess whether moral agency is something independent from sentience. Algorithms, I argue, are a kind of functional moral zombie, such that thinking about the latter can help us better understand and regulate the former. I contend that the main reason why algorithms can be neither autonomous nor accountable is that they lack sentience. Moral zombies and algorithms are incoherent as moral agents because they lack the necessary moral understanding to be morally responsible. To understand what it means to inflict pain on someone, it is necessary to have experiential knowledge of pain. At most, for an algorithm that feels nothing, ‘values’ will be items on a list, possibly prioritised in a certain way according to a number that represents weightiness. But entities that do not feel cannot value, and beings that do not value cannot act for moral reasons.

Kant on Moral Respect

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anastasia Berg
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agent ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Law ◽  
The One ◽  
Moral Respect

Abstract Kant’s account of the feeling of moral respect has notoriously puzzled interpreters: on the one hand, moral action is supposed to be autonomous and, in particular, free of the mediation of any feeling on the other hand, the subject’s grasp of the law somehow involves the feeling of moral respect. I argue that moral respect for Kant is not, pace both the ‘intellectualists’ and ‘affectivists,’ an effect of the determination of the will by the law – whether it be a mere effect or the motivating cause of action – but is instead identical to it. Drawing on Kant’s general account of feeling as the awareness of how representations and their objects harm or benefit our own powers, I argue that the identity between moral respect and the determination to action contains two elements. Moral respect is, first, a form of practical self-consciousness which constitutes the subject’s recognition of the moral law and thus of herself as intrinsically bound by it, i. e., as a moral agent. Second, respect is a capacity for receptive awareness of particular features of our environment as well as other persons insofar as they benefit and harm us as moral agents. Thereby moral respect affords us awareness in concreto of particular, morally-conditioned ends. In this way moral respect provides the key for a Kantian account of genuinely free practical receptivity.

A moral analysis of intelligent decision-support systems in diagnostics through the lens of Luciano Floridi’s information ethics

Human Affairs ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-164
Author(s):  
Dmytro Mykhailov
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Support ◽  
Medical Diagnosis ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Agent ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Medical Diagnostics ◽  
Intelligent Decision ◽  
Luciano Floridi ◽  
Intelligent Decision Support

Abstract Contemporary medical diagnostics has a dynamic moral landscape, which includes a variety of agents, factors, and components. A significant part of this landscape is composed of information technologies that play a vital role in doctors’ decision-making. This paper focuses on the so-called Intelligent Decision-Support System that is widely implemented in the domain of contemporary medical diagnosis. The purpose of this article is twofold. First, I will show that the IDSS may be considered a moral agent in the practice of medicine today. To develop this idea I will introduce the approach to artificial agency provided by Luciano Floridi. Simultaneously, I will situate this approach in the context of contemporary discussions regarding the nature of artificial agency. It is argued here that the IDSS possesses a specific sort of agency, includes several agent features (e.g. autonomy, interactivity, adaptability), and hence, performs an autonomous behavior, which may have a substantial moral impact on the patient’s well-being. It follows that, through the technology of artificial neural networks combined with ‘deep learning’ mechanisms, the IDSS tool achieves a specific sort of independence (autonomy) and may possess a certain type of moral agency. Second, I will provide a conceptual framework for the ethical evaluation of the moral impact that the IDSS may have on the doctor’s decision-making and, consequently, on the patient’s wellbeing. This framework is the Object-Oriented Model of Moral Action developed by Luciano Floridi. Although this model appears in many contemporary discussions in the field of information and computer ethics, it has not yet been applied to the medical domain. This paper addresses this gap and seeks to reveal the hidden potentialities of the OOP model for the field of medical diagnosis.

scholarly journals Relationships, Authority, and Reasons: A Second-Personal Account of Corporate Moral Agency

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Alan D. Morrison ◽  
Rita Mota ◽  
William J. Wilhelm
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Culture ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Corporate Communications ◽  
Personal Account ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Corporate Moral Agency ◽  
Fresh Perspective ◽  
Corporate Punishment

We present a second-personal account of corporate moral agency. This approach is in contrast to the first-personal approach adopted in much of the existing literature, which concentrates on the corporation’s ability to identify moral reasons for itself. Our account treats relationships and communications as the fundamental building blocks of moral agency. The second-personal account rests on a framework developed by Darwall. Its central requirement is that corporations be capable of recognizing the authority relations that they have with other moral agents. We discuss the relevance of corporate affect, corporate communications, and corporate culture to the second-personal account. The second-personal account yields a new way to specify first-personal criteria for moral agency, and it generates fresh insights into the reasons those criteria matter. In addition, a second-personal analysis implies that moral agency is partly a matter of policy, and it provides a fresh perspective on corporate punishment.

scholarly journals Menneskeverd og menneskerettighetsundervisning: En sosialsemiotisk multimodalitetsanalyse og drøfting av verdighetsbegrepet i filmen A Path to Dignity: The Power of Human Rights Education

2019 ◽  
pp. 141-168
Author(s):  
Eva Maagerø ◽  
Ådne Valen-Sendstad
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Young Children ◽  
Research Question ◽  
The State ◽  
Muslim Woman ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Rights Education ◽  
Indian Children ◽  
Concern For Others ◽  
Analytical Tools

This chapter is an analysis and discussion of the globally popular human rights education film: A Path to Dignity: the Power of Human Rights Education. The film is produced by Ellen Bruno and is a cooperation with the UN department OHCHR and the human rights education organisations HREA and SGI. The film combines human rights education and dignity. Our research question is how human rights education and dignity is presented and understood in the film. The film is organized in three parts, and addresses Indian children, a Muslim woman and police in Australia. We have analysed the part about the young children in India. In our discussion of the film we have applied social semiotic theory and related analytical tools. We have analysed the representations, interactions and composition of the film. The result of the analysis shows a focus on the local situation of the children. Through human rights education the children experience a transformation in gaining a sense of dignity. This leads to a particular concern for others whose dignity is violated. The state that is responsible for their human rights is not addressed. The film presents human rights education with an interest for individual children, and dignity is understood morally, as responsibility for the other.

Christian Belief and Moral Philosophy

2020 ◽  
pp. 76-82
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Old Testament ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
City Of God ◽  
Divine Grace ◽  
Ancient Ethics ◽  
The New Testament ◽  
Christian Literature ◽  
The Right ◽  
The City

Christian literature, from the New Testament onwards, pursues the main themes of ancient ethics, from the theological perspective derived from the Old Testament. Both Jewish and Christian writers defend their moral views by appeal to the natural law and natural reason that the Stoics acknowledge. The Christian Gospel does not reveal the moral law, but (1) makes us aware of how demanding it is, (2) shows us that we cannot fulfil its demands by our own unaided efforts, and (3) reveals that we can keep it through divine help that turns our free will in the right direction. These three claims underlie the Pauline and Augustinian doctrines of divine grace and human free will. Christian ethics looks forward to the ‘City of God’, which cannot be realized in human history. But it also engages with human societies in order to carry out the demands of the moral law.

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