Rational Feelings and Moral Agency

2011 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ido Geiger
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Inner Life ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Effective Force ◽  
Moral Feeling

AbstractKant's conception of moral agency is often charged with attributing no role to feelings. I suggest that respect is the effective force driving moral action. I then argue that four additional types of rational feelings are necessary conditions of moral agency: (1) The affective inner life of moral agents deliberating how to act and reflecting on their deeds is rich and complex (conscience). To act morally we must turn our affective moral perception towards the ends of moral action: (2) the welfare of others (love of others); and (3) our own moral being (self-respect). (4) Feelings shape our particular moral acts (moral feeling). I tentatively suggest that the diversity of moral feelings might be as great as the range of our duties.

Moral agents

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vinit Haksar
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Agent ◽  
Strong Version ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Inner Life ◽  
Moral Understanding ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Concern For Others

Moral agents are those agents expected to meet the demands of morality. Not all agents are moral agents. Young children and animals, being capable of performing actions, may be agents in the way that stones, plants and cars are not. But though they are agents they are not automatically considered moral agents. For a moral agent must also be capable of conforming to at least some of the demands of morality. This requirement can be interpreted in different ways. On the weakest interpretation it will suffice if the agent has the capacity to conform to some of the external requirements of morality. So if certain agents can obey moral laws such as ‘Murder is wrong’ or ‘Stealing is wrong’, then they are moral agents, even if they respond only to prudential reasons such as fear of punishment and even if they are incapable of acting for the sake of moral considerations. According to the strong version, the Kantian version, it is also essential that the agents should have the capacity to rise above their feelings and passions and act for the sake of the moral law. There is also a position in between which claims that it will suffice if the agent can perform the relevant act out of altruistic impulses. Other suggested conditions of moral agency are that agents should have: an enduring self with free will and an inner life; understanding of the relevant facts as well as moral understanding; and moral sentiments, such as capacity for remorse and concern for others. Philosophers often disagree about which of these and other conditions are vital; the term moral agency is used with different degrees of stringency depending upon what one regards as its qualifying conditions. The Kantian sense is the most stringent. Since there are different senses of moral agency, answers to questions like ‘Are collectives moral agents?’ depend upon which sense is being used. From the Kantian standpoint, agents such as psychopaths, rational egoists, collectives and robots are at best only quasi-moral, for they do not fulfil some of the essential conditions of moral agency.

scholarly journals Relationships, Authority, and Reasons: A Second-Personal Account of Corporate Moral Agency

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Alan D. Morrison ◽  
Rita Mota ◽  
William J. Wilhelm
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Culture ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Corporate Communications ◽  
Personal Account ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Corporate Moral Agency ◽  
Fresh Perspective ◽  
Corporate Punishment

We present a second-personal account of corporate moral agency. This approach is in contrast to the first-personal approach adopted in much of the existing literature, which concentrates on the corporation’s ability to identify moral reasons for itself. Our account treats relationships and communications as the fundamental building blocks of moral agency. The second-personal account rests on a framework developed by Darwall. Its central requirement is that corporations be capable of recognizing the authority relations that they have with other moral agents. We discuss the relevance of corporate affect, corporate communications, and corporate culture to the second-personal account. The second-personal account yields a new way to specify first-personal criteria for moral agency, and it generates fresh insights into the reasons those criteria matter. In addition, a second-personal analysis implies that moral agency is partly a matter of policy, and it provides a fresh perspective on corporate punishment.

Moral collectivism

2019 ◽  
pp. 37-56
Author(s):  
Paul Spicker
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Moral Agents

Moral collectivism is the idea that social groups can be moral agents; that they have rights and responsibilities, that groups as well as individuals can take moral action, that the morality of their actions can sensibly be assessed in those terms, and that moral responsibility cannot simply be reduced to the actions of individuals within them. This position is not opposed to individualism; it is complementary.

The Uses and Abuses of Narrative for Life

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanna Meretoja
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Narrative Ethics ◽  
Behavioral Patterns ◽  
Blind Side ◽  
Ethical Evaluation ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Narrative Imagination ◽  
Culture Of Silence ◽  
The Continuum

Chapter 4 tests hermeneutic narrative ethics as a lens for analyzing the (ab)uses of narrative for life in Julia Franck’s Die Mittagsfrau (2007, The Blind Side of the Heart), exploring how narrative practices expand and diminish the space of possibilities in which moral agents act and suffer. It demonstrates how narrative “in-betweens” bind people together, through dialogic narrative imagination, and can promote exclusion that amounts to annihilation. It addresses the necessity of storytelling for survival, and a transgenerational culture of silence that leads to the repetition of harmful emotional-behavioral patterns. It explores the continuum from being able to tell one’s own stories to violently imposed narrative identities and suggests that moral agency requires a minimum narrative sense of oneself as a being worthy and capable of goodness. The chapter argues that the ethical evaluation of narrative practices must be contextual—sensitive to how they function in particular sociohistorical worlds.

scholarly journals Corporate Moral Agency and the Responsibility to Respect Human Rights in the UN Guiding Principles: Do Corporations Have Moral Rights?

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia H WERHANE
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
United Nations ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Rights ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Business And Human Rights ◽  
Human Agent ◽  
Guiding Principles ◽  
The United Nations

AbstractIn 2011 the United Nations (UN) published the ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” Framework’ (Guiding Principles). The Guiding Principles specify that for-profit corporations have responsibilities to respect human rights. Do these responsibilities entail that corporations, too, have basic rights? The contention that corporations are moral persons is problematic because it confers moral status to an organization similar to that conferred to a human agent. I shall argue that corporations are not moral persons. But as collective bodies created, operated, and perpetuated by individual human moral agents, one can ascribe to corporations secondary moral agency as organizations. This ascription, I conclude, makes sense of the normative business responsibilities outlined in the Guiding Principles without committing one to the view that corporations are full moral persons.

Attention and Blindness: Objectivity and Contingency in Moral Perception

2002 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 319-346
Author(s):  
Rebecca Kukla
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Perceptual Skills ◽  
Universal Principles ◽  
Crucial Component ◽  
Moral Theories

Moral perception, as the term is used in moral theory, is the perception of normatively contoured objects and states of affairs, where that perception enables us to engage in practical reason and judgment concerning these particulars. The idea that our capacity for moral perception is a crucial component of our capacity for moral reasoning and agency finds its most explicit origin in Aristotle, for whom virtue begins with the quality of perception. The focus on moral perception within moral theory has made a comeback in the last few decades, especially in the hands of self-proclaimed neo-Aristotelians such as John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and Nancy Sherman. For these writers, our perceptual capacities are not static, and the laborious honing of our perceptual skills is a crucial moral task. On this picture, as Nancy Sherman puts it, “How to see becomes as much a matter of inquiry as what to do.”Moral particularists—including but not restricted to the neo-Aristotelians—have emphasized the centrality of moral perception to moral agency and judgment, as a corrective to moral theories that treat deliberation in terms of universal principles as the privileged keystone of moral agency.

scholarly journals The Theft: An Analysis of Moral Agency

Conatus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Gerard Elfstrom
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Moral Decisions

Adam and Eve’s theft marks the beginning of the human career as moral agents.   This article will examine the assumptions underlying the notion of moral agency from the perspective of three unremarkable human beings who found themselves in situations of moral difficulty.  The article will conclude that these three people could not have acted differently than they did.  It will conclude that it is unreasonable to assume that ordinary human beings will inevitably possess the resources to address difficult moral decisions.

scholarly journals Anti Corruption Attitude Of Students As A Corruption Measure Of Criminal Measures

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 114
Author(s):  
Yusrianto Kadir
Keyword(s):  
Zero Tolerance ◽  
Subjective Norms ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Control Belief ◽  
Moral Feeling

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan pembangunan karakter dalam merubah perilaku hukum mahasiswa dan model integratif pembangunan karakter dalam upaya pencegahan tindak pidana korupsi. Pendekatan teori darahkan pada dua pendekatan utama yaitu integrasi nilai anti korupsi dan pembentukan lingkungan yang tidak Permissive to corruption. Hasil pembahasan menunjukan: (1) pendidikan karakter harus melibatkan bukan saja aspek pengetahuan yang baik (moral knowing), akan tetapi juga merasakan dengan baik atau loving good (moral feeling), dan perilaku yang baik (moral action). (2) Komponen utama pembentuk intensi perilaku yaitu Attitude toward behavior, Subjective norms, Control belief. Kesimpulan diharapkan perilaku anti-korupsi mahasiswa yang disasar adalah konsistensi anti-korupsi ditengah realitas lingkungan eksternal yang masih sangat korup. Konsistensi ini diharapkan selanjutnya meningkat menjadi keberanian mahasiswa menjadi garda depan dalam mengajak masyarakat untuk melakukan zero-tolerance terhadap tindak korupsi.

Artificial Moral Agency in Technoethics

2009 ◽  
pp. 205-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
John P. Sullins
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Artificial Life ◽  
Moral Concern ◽  
Artificial Agents ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Artificial Moral Agents ◽  
Traditional Notion

This chapter will argue that artificial agents created or synthesized by technologies such as artificial life (ALife), artificial intelligence (AI), and in robotics present unique challenges to the traditional notion of moral agency and that any successful technoethics must seriously consider that these artificial agents may indeed be artificial moral agents (AMA), worthy of moral concern. This purpose will be realized by briefly describing a taxonomy of the artificial agents that these technologies are capable of producing. I will then describe how these artificial entities conflict with our standard notions of moral agency. I argue that traditional notions of moral agency are too strict even in the case of recognizably human agents and then expand the notion of moral agency such that it can sensibly include artificial agents.

¿La gracia del mérito o el mérito de la gracia? Retórica de la imagen y ambigüedad en los 'sermones' de Agustín

Augustinus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-420
Author(s):  
Pablo Irízar ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Moral Imagination ◽  
Moral Action ◽  
Social Imagination ◽  
Ongoing Effort ◽  
The Social ◽  
Scholarly Attention

The interplay between grace and merit is a recurrent Augustinian theme that is often discussed in polemical or theoretical works. Only recently has scholarly attention turned to the study of grace and merit in Augustine’s pastoral praxis. As part of this ongoing effort, the present paper offers an analysis of Augustine’s rhetoric of the image in the sermons, with special attention to the effects that the preacher/hearer dialectic produces in the social ‘moral imagination’. It is argued that Augustine’s dialectic preaching on the interplay between grace and freedom results in ambiguity concerning the sphere and boundaries of moral action in the hearer’s ‘moral imagination’. The implication on the social imagination, it is concluded, is a constant fluidity in the foreground of moral agency which either empowers or constraints the boundaries of moral action to the extent that graceand/or merit are emphasized.

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