State Recognition of Child Welfare: Feudalism; the Common Law; and the Poor Laws

2019 ◽  
pp. 9-22
Author(s):  
Kerry OșHalloran
Keyword(s):  
Child Welfare ◽  
Common Law ◽  
State Recognition ◽  
Poor Laws ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Common

The Law of Personal Status: Wives, Paupers, and Slaves

2019 ◽  
pp. 173-212
Author(s):  
Lawrence M. Friedman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Civil Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
White Men ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Poor Laws ◽  
Marriage And Divorce ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

This chapter discusses the law on marriage and divorce, family property, adoption, poor laws and social welfare, and slavery and African Americans in the United States. In the colonial period, the United States had no courts to handle matters of marriage and divorce. Marriage was a contract—an agreement between a man and a woman. Under the rules of the common law, the country belonged to the whites; and more specifically, it belonged to white men. Women had civil rights but no political rights. There were no formal provisions for adoption. A Massachusetts law, passed in 1851, was one of the earliest, and most significant, general adoption law. The so-called poor laws were the basic welfare laws.

scholarly journals Ignorance of the Law as a Defence to Rape: The Destruction of a Maxim

2012 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 336-347
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Arenson
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
Sexual Offences ◽  
The Poor ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Long Line ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Sexual Offences Act 2003 ◽  
Court Of Appeal

In DPP v Morgan, the House of Lords correctly concluded that an accused who entertained a genuine belief that a woman was consenting to carnal knowledge of her person could not be convicted of the common law crime of rape as such a belief and the requisite mens rea to convict were mutually exclusive of one another. Though England and Wales have resiled from this position by virtue of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1(b), which allows for conviction upon proof that the accused did not reasonably believe that the complainant was consenting, the Morgan principle has retained its vitality at common law as well as under the various statutory crimes of rape that exist throughout Australia, most notably the provisions of s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Despite a long line of Victorian Court of Appeal decisions which have reaffirmed the Morgan principle, the court has construed s. 37AA(b)(ii) of the Act as leaving open the possibility of an acquittal despite the fact that the accused acted with an awareness that one or more factors that are statutorily deemed as negating consent under s. 36(a)–(g) of the Act were operating at the time of his or her sexual penetration; specifically, the court held that the foregoing factors do not necessarily preclude a jury from finding that the accused acted in the genuine belief that the complainant was consenting. This article endeavours to explain how the accused could be aware of such circumstances at the time of penetration, yet still entertain such a belief. The article ultimately concludes that such an anomaly can only be explained through a combination of the poor drafting of s. 37AA(b)(ii) and the court's apparent refusal to follow the longstanding precept that ignorance of the law is never a defence to a crime, ostensibly prompted by its adherence to the cardinal precept that legislation is not to be construed as superfluous.

Skype kids and the price elasticity of demand: constructing the common law constitution

2021 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 651-671
Author(s):  
Chris Rowe
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Elasticity Of Demand ◽  
Price Elasticity Of Demand ◽  
The Poor ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Equal Citizenship ◽  
Constitutional Legitimacy

In 2017, the Supreme Court held that it was unlawful to charge a British citizen earning £15,000 a year approximately £160 to bring a claim to an employment tribunal, but lawful to prevent their partner from living with them in the UK. This article analyses these two decisions in relation to the Common Law Constitution (CLC). It shows that there was a profound discrepancy in the judicial approach, with structurally different tests employed at sharply different intensities, despite the two cases raising similar legal issues and both plausibly involving interests which have been protected at common law. It is argued that the CLC is being used as guise to promote a distinctive ideology, focused on a set of court-centred norms. This article questions the constitutional legitimacy of this development, which privileges certain norms whilst marginalising others, especially those conducive to the interests of the poor and equal citizenship.

scholarly journals The Right of Access to Justice: Judicial Discourse in Singapore and Malaysia

2007 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 1-40
Author(s):  
Gary K Y Chan
Keyword(s):  
Legal Status ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Access To Justice ◽  
Legal Representation ◽  
The Poor ◽  
Judicial Discourse ◽  
Contingency Fees ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Right ◽  
Right Of Access

AbstractThis is an essay on judicial discourse in Singapore and Malaysia pertaining to the nature and scope of the right of access to justice, including access to justice for the poor. We will examine the statements and pronouncements by the Singapore and Malaysia judiciary in case precedents and extra-judicial statements. Some of the issues explored include the legal status of this right of access to justice (namely, whether it is a right enshrined in the constitution or merely a right derived from the common law and whether it is qualified by economic and other interests) and the associated rights of legal representation, legal aid and contingency fees.

Is Style of Reasoning a Fundamental Difference Between the Common Law and the Civil Law?

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 238-290
Author(s):  
Colm Peter McGrath ◽  
◽  
Helmut Koziol ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Fundamental Difference ◽  
The Common

Rediscovering Blackstone: wpływ Williama Blackstone’a na rozwój amerykańskiej nauki prawa w recepcji Alberta W. Alschulera

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-185
Author(s):  
Edyta Sokalska
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
18Th Century ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Law School ◽  
Large Measure ◽  
American Colonies ◽  
Late 18Th Century ◽  
American Law ◽  
The Common

The reception of common law in the United States was stimulated by a very popular and influential treatise Commentaries on the Laws of England by Sir William Blackstone, published in the late 18th century. The work of Blackstone strengthened the continued reception of the common law from the American colonies into the constituent states. Because of the large measure of sovereignty of the states, common law had not exactly developed in the same way in every state. Despite the fact that a single common law was originally exported from England to America, a great variety of factors had led to the development of different common law rules in different states. Albert W. Alschuler from University of Chicago Law School is one of the contemporary American professors of law. The part of his works can be assumed as academic historical-legal narrations, especially those concerning Blackstone: Rediscovering Blackstone and Sir William Blackstone and the Shaping of American Law. Alschuler argues that Blackstone’s Commentaries inspired the evolution of American and British law. He introduces not only the profile of William Blackstone, but also examines to which extent the concepts of Blackstone have become the basis for the development of the American legal thought.

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