scholarly journals Ignorance of the Law as a Defence to Rape: The Destruction of a Maxim

2012 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 336-347
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Arenson
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
Sexual Offences ◽  
The Poor ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Long Line ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Sexual Offences Act 2003 ◽  
Court Of Appeal

In DPP v Morgan, the House of Lords correctly concluded that an accused who entertained a genuine belief that a woman was consenting to carnal knowledge of her person could not be convicted of the common law crime of rape as such a belief and the requisite mens rea to convict were mutually exclusive of one another. Though England and Wales have resiled from this position by virtue of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1(b), which allows for conviction upon proof that the accused did not reasonably believe that the complainant was consenting, the Morgan principle has retained its vitality at common law as well as under the various statutory crimes of rape that exist throughout Australia, most notably the provisions of s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Despite a long line of Victorian Court of Appeal decisions which have reaffirmed the Morgan principle, the court has construed s. 37AA(b)(ii) of the Act as leaving open the possibility of an acquittal despite the fact that the accused acted with an awareness that one or more factors that are statutorily deemed as negating consent under s. 36(a)–(g) of the Act were operating at the time of his or her sexual penetration; specifically, the court held that the foregoing factors do not necessarily preclude a jury from finding that the accused acted in the genuine belief that the complainant was consenting. This article endeavours to explain how the accused could be aware of such circumstances at the time of penetration, yet still entertain such a belief. The article ultimately concludes that such an anomaly can only be explained through a combination of the poor drafting of s. 37AA(b)(ii) and the court's apparent refusal to follow the longstanding precept that ignorance of the law is never a defence to a crime, ostensibly prompted by its adherence to the cardinal precept that legislation is not to be construed as superfluous.

scholarly journals When Misconduct in Public Office is Really a Sexual Offence

2017 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 292-302
Author(s):  
Catarina Sjölin ◽  
Helen Edwards
Keyword(s):  
Policy Development ◽  
Sexual Offending ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Sexual Misconduct ◽  
Sexual Offence ◽  
Sexual Offences ◽  
Public Office ◽  
Varied Range ◽  
The Common ◽  
Sexual Offences Act 2003

Misconduct in Public Office (MiPO) covers a wide and varied range of conduct. Beyond the defendant’s public office, there is no unifying conduct or result. A conviction for MiPO could represent putting pressure on a council official to move the route of a proposed road, or a police officer abusing his/her position for sexual gain. Sexual misconduct prosecuted as MiPO falls outside the usual regime for prosecuting and sentencing sexual offences, both obscuring the conduct by the label of MiPO and avoiding sexual offence specific consequences. To examine what kind of sexual offending MiPO has been covering, we analysed newspaper reports and appellate decisions since 2002. This enabled us to identify the conduct MiPO was being used to cover at charge, plea and conviction (or acquittal) stages. We found a significant amount of sexual misconduct being prosecuted as MiPO. We then analysed the sexual conduct to determine the “wrongs” involved, identifying particular categories. This enabled us to propose a new sexual offence (based on the Sexual Offences Act 2003 offences that are not founded on lack of consent), which marks the sexual wrong and enables a focus on the defendant’s abuse of position rather than the victim’s vulnerability. This article outlines the basis for our proposal to the Law Commission for reform of the common law offence of MiPO (as our second response to their consultations). Currently at the stage of Policy Development, the Commission aims to publish its report later this year.

Child Protection through the Criminal Law

2020 ◽  
pp. 85-114
Author(s):  
Kenneth McK. Norrie
Keyword(s):  
Corporal Punishment ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Child Protection ◽  
Adult Population ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Sexual Offences ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
A Charge

The earliest criminal law dealing with children differently from the adult population was that concerned with sexual offences. This chapter explores the changing policies of the law, from the late 19th century fear of girls being exposed to immorality and boys being exposed to homosexuality, through the more protective 20th century legislation which nevertheless hung on to old ideas of immorality and criminality, until the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 focused almost (but not quite) exclusively on protection from harm and from exploitation. The chapter then turns to the crime of child cruelty or neglect from its earliest manifestation in the common law to its statutory formulation in Prevention of Cruelty to, and Protection of, Children Act 1889, which, re-enacted in 1937, took on a form that, for all intents and purposes, remains to this day. The last part of the chapter explores the legal basis for the power of corporal punishment – the defence previously available to parents, teachers and some others to a charge of assault of a child, known as “reasonable” chastisement. Its gradual abolition from the 1980s to 2019 is described.

scholarly journals Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police; [2008] UKHL; 50

2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-152
Author(s):  
Carol Brennan
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Human Rights Act ◽  
Human Rights Act 1998 ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Exclusive Focus

WHO HAS FIRST CLAIM ON “THE LOYALTY OF THE LAW”?Smith v Chief Constable of the Sussex Police (hereafter Smith) was heard by the House of Lords at the same time as Chief Constable of the Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle and another because they had two uniting factors. First, they both concerned the recurring question of the ambit of police liability in the situation described by Lord Bingham thus: “…if the police are alerted to a threat that D may kill or inflict violence on V, and the police take no action to prevent that occurrence, and D does kill or inflict violence on V, may V or his relatives obtain civil redress against the police, and if so, how and in what circumstances?”2  Secondly, considering the cases together highlighted the wider issue of the relationship between decisions under the Human Rights Act 1998 (hereafter the HRA) and the development of the common law. The Law Lords embarked on a more extensive examination of these issues in Smith and thus that case will be the exclusive focus of this note.  In addition, the study of Smith raises questions regarding proposals for law reform as well as about judicial perceptions of policy priorities. 

Intention vs. Negligence

2019 ◽  
pp. 175-184
Author(s):  
George P. Fletcher
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Reasonable Person ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

This chapter explores the role of mental state in criminal cases, considering the concept of negligence. Lawyers trained in the common law tradition are familiar with the concept of mens rea and the maxim actus non facit reus nisi mens sit rea. Literally this means that there is no criminal (or guilty) act without a criminal (or guilty) mind. The problem is that there are both descriptive and normative interpretations of mens rea and of the maxim. The normative or moral interpretation of mens rea holds that the term equivalent to a guilty mind, for example, a basis for blaming the actor for their conduct, is something not possible in the face of the defenses considered in the last chapter. Meanwhile, negligence is based, as in the classic definition from the law of torts, on the conduct of “a reasonable person under the circumstances.” The important point is that negligence is based on the fault of not knowing.

Lawmakers, Law Lords and Legal Fault: Two Tales from the (Thames) River Bank: Sexual Offences Act 2003; R v G and Another

2004 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 130-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mitchell Davies
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
Sexual Offences ◽  
River Bank ◽  
Subjective Meaning ◽  
Serious Crime ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Sexual Offences Act 2003 ◽  
Thames River ◽  
Different Order

This article examines the conflicting approaches of Parliament and the senior courts to the need for mens rea in relation to those offences which are seriously criminal in character. Prompted by the imminent enactment of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the recent decision of the House of Lords in R v G and Another, the conclusion is reached that whilst the senior courts have become ever more sensitive to the need for true mens rea to be insisted upon as a precursor to liability for any serious crime, Parliament, in enacting the Sexual Offences Act 2003, has shown itself, in this context at least, to have priorities of a very different order. In applying a purely subjective meaning to the term reckless it is argued however that their Lordships in G have gone too far and have made prosecutions under the Criminal Damage Act 1971 for unintentionally caused criminal damage potentially unwinnable as well as having thereby perpetuated the definitional plurality of this much litigated mens rea term. The reader is accordingly guided to the conclusion that G is far from being the last word on the meaning of recklessness in English criminal law.

Duress and the Criminal Law: Another About Turn by the House of Lords

1988 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. P. Milgate
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
General Rule ◽  
The Past ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Second Degree

In the field of criminal law we should be used to the House of Lords changing its mind. In the course of the past three years the House has fundamentally altered its view on the meaning of intention, on the relationship between statutory and common law conspiracy and on the law of impossible attempts. Now we have another about turn. In R. v. Howe and Bannister the House of Lords has unanimously decided that duress can never be a defence to murder. Yet elsewhere in the criminal law (with the exception of some forms of treason) duress operates as a complete defence, leading to acquittal if raised successfully. In making murder an exception to this general rule the House, using its power under the Practice Statement of 1966, has departed from its previous decision in D.P.P. for Northern Ireland v. Lynch which allowed the defence of duress to be raised by principals in the second degree to murder. The Lynch decision, which had stood as part of the common law for some twelve years, is now consigned to the legal scrapheap.

The Right to Indemnity between Master and Servant

1956 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Jolowicz
Keyword(s):  
Cold Storage ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Married Women ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Recent Case ◽  
Legal Principle ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The proposition that a master, who has become liable for an injury caused by a servant acting in the course of his employment, can recover an indemnity from the servant is one which has been stated on a number of occasions, but until the recent case of Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Lister no clear authority could be cited in support. It is true that the master's rights against his servant have been canvassed in at least three modern cases, but in all of them the common law position has been obscured by the application of the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935. In Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Lister, however, by what those interested in legal principle can only regard as a happy chance, it was necessary for the Court of Appeal to deal with the matter independently of the Act.

Discretion and Security: Excluding Evidence under Section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

1990 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
C.J.W. Allen
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Rule Of Thumb ◽  
The Common ◽  
Political Compromise ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Of Evidence ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
The Way

Among rules of law Karl Llewellyn noted at one extreme the “rule-of-thumb, in which the flat result is articulated, leaving behind and unexpressed all indication of its reason”. At the other extreme was “the way of principle, in which the reason is clearly and effectively articulated, and that articulation is made part of the very rule”. The vice of principle, he observed, “can be a vaporish vagueness, and the techniques of its effective formulation are not easy to isolate for communication and use”. Partly for this reason, partly perhaps because of its origin in a last-minute political compromise, section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 at first confounded attempts to predict the manner of its application. One commentary suggested that it was “of no practical use”; there were dicta in the Court of Appeal to the effect that it did “no more than to re-state the power which judges had at common law before the Act of 1984 was passed”. A leading work on the law of evidence expressed the view that the sub-section was “cast in terms of such vagueness and generality as to furnish little guidance to the court”. There has been some development since those early days. It now seems clear that the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is to be regarded as a codifying Act which has to be looked at on its own wording. Section 78(1), therefore, does not merely re-state the position at common law. It is also clear that in its operation it overlaps section 76 and, through section 82(3), some of the common law. Section 78(1) may be applied in a variety of situations, with or without the presence of some element of impropriety in the way in which the evidence was obtained. Basic questions about its operation nevertheless remain.

scholarly journals Mental Distress Damages for Breach of Contract

2004 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 687
Author(s):  
Renee Holmes
Keyword(s):  
Mental Distress ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Breach Of Contract ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Sound Policy

The common law has long held that damages for the mental distress suffered after a breach of contract are unrecoverable. Like all rules, a range of exceptions has developed to mitigate the severity of this rule. In this article the author argues that both the rule and its exceptions, being based neither in principle nor sound policy, have only created confusion in the law. The decision of the House of Lords in Farley v Skinner is analysed as a possible solution to this confusion, but is found to be unhelpful. The author concludes by calling for a principled revision of this area of the law in accordance with the usual principles of damages.

scholarly journals The Concept of Consent under the Sexual Offences Act 2003

2008 ◽  
Vol 72 (6) ◽  
pp. 519-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse Elvin
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Offences ◽  
Legislative Reform ◽  
Satisfactory Level ◽  
The Law ◽  
Sexual Offences Act 2003 ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This article examines the provisions relating to consent under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It considers whether the law in this area now possesses a satisfactory level of clarity following a number of recent Court of Appeal decisions, and concludes that there may be a need for further legislative reform in this respect.

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