Proportional Representation Versus Majoritarian Systems: Free Elections and Political Parties in Poland, 1989–1991

Author(s):  
Stanislaw Gebethner
Author(s):  
Jørgen Elklit

The system used for electing the Danish Parliament (Folketinget) is a two-tier proportional representation system. It has worked well since its inception in 1920, and there are no plans of changing to another system. The system is seen as complicated by some, but Danish voters turn out in high numbers and do not seem to have problems understanding the basic elements of how the system works. The system is unique in that the individual political parties can each decide on what kind of list system they want to use and how the preferential votes cast for individual candidates will influence the eventual selection of elected candidates. The index of disproportionality shows remarkably low values, partly because the most important formal electoral threshold is only 2 per cent. Election administration is of high quality and scores generated by the Perception of Electoral Integrity project are, therefore, remarkably high.


2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 735-754 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eliora Van der Hout ◽  
Anthony J. McGann

This article provides a justification of proportional representation (PR) in strictly liberal terms. Previous justifications of proportional representation have tended to be based either on its intuitive fairness to political parties, or on its being fair to social groups. The arguments of critics of PR, we argue, likewise rely on fairness to group identities. In contrast, our result shows that proportionality is logically implied by liberal equality, that is, by the requirement that all individual voters be treated equally. Thus we provide a justification for PR in terms of the theory of voting, similar to May’s theorem for majority rule.


Xihmai ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (26) ◽  
Author(s):  
José Arturo Sosa Echeverrí­a [1]

ResumenDesde la inclusión del sistema electoral mixto para la composición de los órganos legislativos del paí­s, solo existí­a un mecanismo para acceder a las curules de representación proporcional a través de las listas que presentaban los partidos polí­ticos para esa elección en particular; de manera muy reciente, algunas legislaturas locales han adoptado un mecanismo que incluye al sistema tradicional y un nuevo método de acceder a esos espacios: además de esa lista tradicional se prevé la conformación de la segunda lista, compuesta por los candidatos que participaron en la elección bajo el principio de mayorí­a relativa; ambas listas la tomará el órgano electoral respectivo para que de forma alternada se asignen los diputados que a cada partido correspondan. Esto implica que, aunque hayan perdido la elección, los candidatos que hicieron campaña y recibieron el voto directo del electorado tienen posibilidad de arribar al Congreso, lo que genera un sentido legitimador en los diputados plurinominales porque son ellos a quienes la ciudadaní­a otorgó su voto de manera directa, además que, de este modo, se fomenta la participación ciudadana porque el elector ve reflejado su voto en la persona a quien él se lo otorgó.Palabras clave: Democracia, Elección, Representación Proporcional.AbstractSince the inclusion of the mixed electoral system for the composition of the legislative bodies of the country, there was only a mechanism to access the proportional representation seats, this was, by presenting lists of political parties for this election in particular; Very recently, some local legislatures have adopted a mechanism that includes the traditional system and a new method of accessing these spaces, this in addition to the traditional list today provides for the formation of the second list consisting of candidates who participated in the election under the principle of relative majority; both lists will be made by the respective electoral body to go alternately assigning deputies that correspond to each party. This means that candidates who campaigned and received the direct vote of the electorate, but lost the election, have a chance arriving to Congress, creating a legitimizing sense in the multi-named deputies, because they, whom the citizenship granted their vote directly, besides that it encourages citizen participation because the elector his vote reflected the person to whom he gave it.Keywords: Democracy, Election, Proportional Representation    [1] Licenciado en Derecho por la Universidad Autónoma del Estadode Hidalgo; abogado litigante; colaborador en el Instituto Estatal Electoralde Hidalgo con los cargos de Director Ejecutivo de Capacitación Electoraly Educación Cí­vica y Director Ejecutivo Jurí­dico hasta 2015; Subprocurador de Asuntos Electorales a partir del 1 de diciembre de 2015 a la fecha.Docente en el nivel medio superior en las asignaturas de Derecho Mercantil e Introducción al Estudio del Derecho; en el nivel universitario con las asignaturas de Derecho Civil y Derecho Electoral; profesor de la Facultad de Derecho de la UniversidadLa Salle Pachuca en las asignaturas de Derecho Electoral, Derecho Procesal Electoral y Derecho Procesal Penal. Actualmente, trabaja en la Procuradurí­a General de Justicia del Estado de Hidalgo.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 168-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carol Mershon

The conclusion to the special issue takes stock of both the first and the second generations of research on preferential proportional representation (PR) and electoral personalism. The article uses this appraisal in order to locate this project’s achievements within extant scholarship. It argues that the project not only reevaluates but also challenges the wisdom on preferential PR. In challenging the canon, the project enriches the study of electoral institutions, political parties, legislative politics, comparative politics, and political science more broadly.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-30
Author(s):  
Devin K. Joshi

AbstractThis study addresses the question of why so many of the world's legislators are lawyers or law graduates. Drawing from previous studies on lawyer-legislators and electoral systems, it develops the argument that ‘first-pass-the-post’ single-member district electoral systems presume a principal-agent logic of representation and are therefore conducive to political parties selecting representatives with either occupational experience or educational training in the field of law. By contrast, proportional representation (PR) elections presume a microcosm model of representation incentivizing parties to select candidates representing diverse demographic and occupational backgrounds. This conjecture is tested by examining legislator backgrounds in three large parliaments with mixed electoral systems: Germany, Japan, and South Korea. As expected, single-member plurality elections are linked to a greater share of lawyers and law graduates in parliaments compared to those elected via PR even after controlling for several alternative explanations.


2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-237
Author(s):  
Christian Tomuschat

To shape a legitimate electoral system is a tremendous challenge for any parliamentary body. It cannot evade the responsibility of enacting the requisite statutory rules since no other State organ has the authority to make determinations which are substantially of a constitutional character. How, and under what conditions, citizens choose their representatives pertains to the key issues in a democratic system. But it is a truism to state that a parliament is not a homogeneous body; it is normally composed of different groups with highly divergent interests. Groups representing large political parties tend to favor a majoritarian electoral system, following with greater or slighter variations the British model of first past the post where the highest number of ballots in a given constituency determines the winner of the seat in issue, even though the candidate may have obtained only a relative plurality. Smaller parties, on the other hand, put their preferences on proportional representation, which ensures them a share of the seats corresponding to their share of the vote. To their regret, parties supported only by a low fraction of the electorate cannot, which is self-evident, impose their preferred option, having to wait for pressure to build up in the general public to promote their concerns. Thus, parliaments are neither neutral nor objective when they make determinations in electoral matters.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document