Hating Henry Kissinger

2021 ◽  
pp. 198-210
Author(s):  
Kevin Coogan
Keyword(s):  
1984 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-52
Author(s):  
Mahmud A. Faksh

I.Since the end of World War 11, approximately eighty new states havebeen established. Only two, Pakistan and Cyprus, have undergone theagony of dismemberment when Bangladesh broke off in 1973 and theTurkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared in 1983. The worldmay now be witnessing the possible breakup of yet a third state:Lebanon, whose disintegration has been accelerated since the June 1982Israeli invasion.Shortly after the invasion began, Henry Kissinger assessed itsconsequence for Lebanon’s future, concluding, “It is neither desirablenor possible to return to the status quo ante in Lebanon.” One possibleoutcome was that some Syrian and Israeli forces would remain in thenorthern and southern ends, respectively, and the central government’sauthority would ostensibly cover the rest of the country. Implicit in theKissinger diagnosis is the possibility of eventual partition.Though the gloomy assessment by the “wizard” of US. foreign policyshould by no means be construed as a portent of an official shift awayfrom the publicly stated US. support of “Lebanon’s sovereignty andterritorial integrity,” a shadow was cast on the country’s prospects.Subsequent developments have seemed to indicate that Lebanon’sdemise looms larger than at any time since the beginning of the civil warin 1975-76.For over a year and a half national fragmentation has proceededinexorably. What many people once could imagine only with difficulty,they now acknowledge: in reality, Lebanon is facing possible death. TheSouth (35 percent of the land area) is occupied by Israel; the North andthe Biqa’ (45 percent) are controlled by Syria; Kasrawan (15 percent) iscontrolled by the Christian Maronite forces (the Lebanese Front forces),which are not subject to the government’s authority. The rest of thecountry-beleaguered Beirut and environs-was until the February1984 breakdown under the government’s shaky control supported bysymbolic US., French, Italian, and British units. The Multi-NationalForce (MNF) was subject to increasing attacks by Muslim leftist factions,as witnessed in the October 23 bombing of the quarters of U.S.Marines and French troops. Thus, instead of keeping peace, the MNFbecame ,a partisan force trying to protect itself. The US. and Frenchforces in particular seemed to have outlived their usefulness as“peacekeepers.” Recurrent fighting in southern Beirut and in theadjacent Chouf mountains, that pitted Christian Maronites and armyunits against Shi‘ite and Druse Muslims constantly threatened theexistence of President Amin Gemayel’s government and consequently arenewal of the civil war. This situation culminated in February 1984 inthe resignation of the Shafiq al-Wazzan’s cabinet, the loss ofgovernment’s control of West Beirut to Muslim-leftist militias, and theimminent collapse of Amin Gemayel’s presidency ...


1974 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 367-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alastair Buchan
Keyword(s):  

1990 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 511-528 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT L. BEISNER
Keyword(s):  

2005 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 156
Author(s):  
Lawrence D. Freedman ◽  
Jussi M. Hanhimäki

2013 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 51-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladislav Zubok

This article examines the impact of Japan on U.S.-Soviet relations during Richard Nixon's first term as U.S. president. Drawing heavily on recently declassified documents pertaining to back-channel negotiations between Nixon's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, and Soviet Ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin, the article explains why no Soviet-Japanese rapprochement proved feasible even during the height of East-West détente. The enduring hostility was in contrast to the realignments of the other major powers during this period.


2012 ◽  
Vol 70 (02) ◽  
pp. 270-275
Author(s):  
Bjørnar Sverdrup-Thygeson
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jérémie Gallon
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Marc Trachtenberg

This chapter discusses relations between France and the United States under the Nixon administration. When Nixon took office as president in early 1969, he and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger wanted to put America's relationship with France on an entirely new footing. Relations between the two countries in the 1960s, and especially from early 1963 on, had been far from ideal. Nixon and Kissinger tried to develop a close relationship with the Pompidou government and in the early Nixon–Pompidou period the two governments were on very good terms. Both governments were also interested in developing a certain relationship in the nuclear area. However, by 1973 relations between the two countries took a sharp turn for the worse. The chapter considers what went wrong and why the attempt to develop a close relationship failed.


Author(s):  
Dina Rezk

The Yom Kippur War was a critical game changer in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the politics of the Middle East. Henry Kissinger famously explained the ‘intelligence failure’ of Yom Kippur thus: ‘Our definition of rationality did not take seriously the notion of starting an unwinnable war to restore self-respect.’ The most recently released material suggests that Kissinger’s explanation requires some revising. This chapter demonstrates that British and American analysts understood perfectly well Sadat’s intentions, specifically his desire for a limited military victory to gain ‘face’ at home and leverage abroad. Instead analytical weakness lay in assessments of Egypt’s military capability where there was a unanimous consensus of Egypt’s impotency. Ideas about Arab ‘culture’ seem to have played a key role in this underestimation: the notion of a fatalistic Islam for example, prevailed in numerous analyses. In a radical revision of the conventional wisdom about the strengths and weaknesses of Western intelligence agencies, the Yom Kippur war provides a revealing case study whereby the West excelled in understanding the ‘mystery’ or intentions leading to war, but simply did not believe that Egypt possessed the capability to act effectively, and so perilously dismissed the prospect of an Egyptian attack.


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