Establishment of a De Jure Peace on the Korean Peninsula: Inter-Korean Peace Treaty-Making under International Law*

2017 ◽  
pp. 339-364
Author(s):  
Eric Yong-Joong Lee
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 206-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Semee KIM

AbstractGlobal attention to events on the Korean Peninsula has been striking in the past year. With an inter-Korean summit and an unprecedented US-DPRK summit, hopes of a final end to the Korean War have been renewed. Although these summits resulted in declarations which pronounced an end to the Korean War and an establishment of a peace regime, the declarations must not be mistaken as official peace treaties. Unlike a peace treaty, which is governed by international law, the two summit declarations are not governed by international law due to their lack of legality. Therefore, a clear distinction must be drawn between the declarations and a peace treaty. This paper aims to determine the legal status of the declarations and explain how they are merely non-binding political declarations. The paper then identifies and explores some of the legal implications of a Korean peace treaty.


2021 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-162
Author(s):  
Thomas Kleinlein

Abstract: The concept of international law underlying the Versailles Peace Treaty is marked by a complex and ambivalent combination of references to just peace and the use of the legal form. This article analyses the concept of law and the use of legal techniques and institutions in the Paris settlement, and connects it to various contemporaneous strands of ‘legalism' and to the transformation from (classical) nineteenth-century to (modern) twentieth-century international law. In a second step, the article turns to how the ambivalent legalism in the Versailles Peace Treaty impacted on the respective case law of the Permanent Court and how this case law connects to ‘modern' approaches to international law. While, in substance, the cases involving the Versailles Peace Treaty raised issues of both post-war settlement and international organisation, in doctrinal terms, the Court tentatively developed a concept of international law that squares with modern approaches. This can be demonstrated by examination of the case law, which contributed to the law of international organisations, redefined sovereignty, and developed the humanitarian dimension of international law.


1985 ◽  
Vol 32 (01) ◽  
pp. 166
Author(s):  
A.M. Stuyt

1947 ◽  
Vol 41 (6) ◽  
pp. 1188-1193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Kelsen

By its complete defeat, the surrender of its armed force, and the abolishment of its national government, Germany has ceased to exist as a sovereign state and subject of international law. By the Declaration of Berlin, June 5, 1945, the four Powers occupying the country—the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the French Republic—assumed “supreme authority with respect to Germany including all powers possessed by the German Government, the High Command, and any state, municipal, or local government or authority.” This meant that the four occupant Powers have assumed sovereignty over the former German territory and its population, though the term “sovereignty” was not used in the text of the Declaration. The four occupant Powers exercise their joint sovereignty through the Control Council, established at Berlin as the legitimate successor of the last national government of Germany. All this is in complete conformity with general international law, which authorizes a victorious state, after so-called debellatio of its opponent, to establish its own sovereignty over the territory and population of the subjugated state. Debellatio implies automatic termination of the state of war. Hence, a peace treaty with Germany is legally not possible. For a peace treaty presupposes the continued existence of the opponent belligerents as subjects of international law and a legal state of war in their mutual relations.The opposite doctrine, advocated by some authorities and governments, that Germany, in spite of the fact that there exists no independent national government, not even a “government in exile,” still exists as a sovereign state, that the four occupant Powers are not the sovereigns in relation to the German territory and its population, that they only exercise Germany's sovereignty just as a warden exercises the rights of his ward, is manifestly based on a legal fiction. According to international law, a community is a state if, and as long as, a certain population is living on a definite territory under an independent government. If one of these three essential elements of a state in the sense of international law is missing, the state as a subject of international law disappears, or, in other words, the community ceases to exist as a sovereign state. No state can exercise the sovereignty of another state. State sovereignty does not permit representation or substitution.


1997 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 427-446 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evangelos Raftopoulos

AbstractSovereignty is a concept of international public interest. In the case of the Imia Rocks, the public interest nature of territorial sovereignty may be found in the undisputed treaty delimitation of the archipelagic entity of the Dodecanese Islands between Italy and Turkey, 1932, and the Peace Treaty of Paris, 1947. Turkey's subsequent conduct, its signature without reservation of the Helsinki Final Act and its claim for the bilateralisation of the Aegean Sea Dispute Agenda on the basis of a geo-political equity are all evidence of the acceptance of the delimitation regime of the Aegean Sea. The public interest regime of the LOS Convention makes questionable Turkey's recourse to the abstract notion of a "semi-enclosed" sea and provides the basis for understanding the pragmatic dimension of the Imia Rocks crisis in the light of the protection and promotion of international common interest.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Hent Kalmo

The conventions of legal argumentation have the tendency to reinforce the notion that the development of international law is a principled affair. This article will examine the elaboration of one particular treaty – the Tartu Peace Treaty signed between Estonia and Soviet Russia in 1920 – in order to see to what extent it lends support to the idea that treaties grow out of principles. The Tartu Peace Treaty perfectly illustrates the point that the contents of a treaty can be entirely indeterminate with regard to their underlying principles. My conclusion is not that, in this case, pragmatism triumphed over principles: that the negotiating parties refrained from debates over abstract principles and took the more pragmatic route of finding an array of concrete solutions. Whilst it is true that the end result – the Treaty as it finally stood – was detached from any single foundational idea, it was not obtained by putting principles aside. The Tartu Peace Conference rather offers us a particularly good example of how principles can be used as rhetorical ploys.


1956 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
George A. Finch

The founding fifty years ago of a society to promote the establishment of international relations on the basis of law and justice was a step marking the progress that had been made at the beginning of the century in the age-long efforts to find a means of substituting reason for force in the settlement of international controversies. At that time arbitration was generally regarded as the most suitable and acceptable substitute for war. Great Britain and the United States had both heavily contributed to that conviction first by submitting to arbitration under the Jay Treaty of 1794 the numerous misunderstandings that developed in carrying out the provisions of the Peace Treaty of 1783, and then three-quarters of a century later in submitting to arbitration by the Treaty of Washington of 1871 the dangerous Alabama Claims dispute following the American Civil War.


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