The Legal Context and Social Science Evidence in Fisher v. University of Texas

2018 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-476 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine L. Horn ◽  
Patricia Marin ◽  
Liliana M. Garces ◽  
Karen Miksch ◽  
John T. Yun

Different from more traditional policy-making avenues, the courts provide an antipolitical arena that does not require broad agreement from various constituents for policy enactment. Seeking to guide court decisions on these policy issues, individuals and organizations have filed amicus briefs that increasingly include social science to support their arguments. The Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin Supreme Court case presents an ideal example to study the use of social science evidence in amicus briefs to shape educational policy. Findings from this study identify differences in the use of social science research that suggest many ways in which our current understanding of the efforts of actors to shape educational policy via the highest court in the nation is incomplete. This study also highlights why developing this understanding could be extremely useful to both the creation of educational policy and the use of antipolitical approaches to change such policy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 136571272110112
Author(s):  
Anna High

Prison informant or ‘jailhouse snitch’ evidence is a notoriously unreliable category of evidence. In light of reliability concerns, the New Zealand Supreme Court has adopted a progressive approach to the exclusion of prison informant evidence, centred on greater use of general exclusionary provisions as a threshold of reliability for the admission of suspect evidence. In so doing, the court has shifted the emphasis from deference to the jury as arbiter of ultimate reliability and towards more robust judicial gatekeeping as a safeguard against false testimony. This article critically analyses the New Zealand approach, including by way of comparison with Canada, Australia and England and Wales. The New Zealand approach is presented as a principled and important example of adapting fundamental evidentiary principles and provisions in line with emerging social science evidence. However, in light of the general concerns surrounding this class of evidence, ultimately further safeguards are still needed


2001 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Nowlin

Monahan and Walker have proposed that American judges should fundamentally alter the way they receive and assess social science evidence in court, by treating social science research as “law-like” or authoritative when certain professional research criteria are met. Strict application of the stipulated criteria to various kinds of social science research introduced into American and Canadian courts reveals, however, that such research can seldom be considered authoritative in the way Monahan and Walker imagine. Accordingly, as a general rule judges should be reluctant to apply Monahan and Walker’s “social authority” model to the courtroom resolution of difficult questions of social, economic, and cultural or historical facts.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document