they are called the appellants, and again lost. They then appealed to the House of Lords, where they also lost. There was a lot of money at stake: the difference between the £201.60 that the seeds cost as awarded by the Court of Appeal or the £90,000+ that the trial judge awarded. Consider, for a moment, what you have read and what you know so far. Does it seem fair to you that George Mitchell won? If so, why? If not, why not? So far we have considered: (a) Procedural history. (b) Facts. (c) The operative rules of law: • It is known that both common law rules and statutory rules are relevant to the case. • Further, it is known that if the common law rules are found to apply in the seller’s favour he still has to jump the hurdle presented by the statutory rules. • Recall, if there is a clash between common law rules and statutory rules, the statutory rules prevail. (d) A verbatim account of the two issues in the case (however, these are probably not fully comprehended yet, despite Figures 4.13 and 4.14, above!): • It is clear that Lord Bridge will argue through each of the issues. • If the appellants succeed in issue 1 they may still fail overall if they fail over issue 2. (Can you understand why? The answer is in the first sentence of text setting out ‘the second issue’. See Figure 4.14, above.) • Logically, one would expect Lord Bridge to commence with the arguments over issue 1, the common law issue, as this is the gateway to an argument over issue 2 which will only take place if issue 1 is decided in the appellant’s favour (and this is contentious limitation clause what he does). (e) Understanding the clause. This is set out in Figure 4.15, below. Until all of these matters are linked and understood it is not possible to fully comprehend the reasoning in the case. Now take time to consolidate the information we have so far and return to the judgment of Lord Bridge, concentrating on his arguments concerning issue 1 (Appendix 1, p 310, para 3). 4.5.2.5 Stage 4: breaking into Lord Bridge’s speech You will have already read Lord Bridge’s speech by now. It is also now appreciated that the arguments in this case are quite complex and the initial method of breaking into the text for understanding is to look at each paragraph. Paragraphs are intended to convey a new idea. So each paragraph represents an idea or a cluster of ideas. Careful ordering of paragraphs is essential in a piece of writing if a sense of progression is to be maintained. Therefore when reading for understanding a précis of each paragraph begins the process of understanding.

2012 ◽  
pp. 100-100
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Text Setting ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Stage 4 ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Initial Method

scholarly journals Doing “Practical Justice” for Duress in Contract Law

2009 ◽  
pp. 253-256
Author(s):  
M.H. Ogilvie
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Complex Case ◽  
Undue Influence ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
English Court ◽  
Conflict Of Laws ◽  
The Common ◽  
Court Of Appeal

Cases of duress in contract law are few and far between. Most are concerned with improper threats or taking advantage of a weaker party to procure a contract rather than with actual physical threats of the “[y]our money or your life” variety, which are more likely to be controlled by the criminal law. A recent decision on a preliminary issue of law in relation to duress in the English Court of Appeal answered an interesting question that appears never to have been raised in earlier cases about duress, that is, whether rescission of a contract can be granted where restitution is impossible because one of the parties has destroyed documents relating to the contract as required by the contract so that they could not be restored. The trial judge found that rescission could not be granted and that no other remedy was available in the common law for duress, but the Court of Appeal reversed that finding by assimilating the fact situation with those in which equity has done “practical justice,” thereby further fusing the common law and equity relating to duress and undue influence, and possibly also fraud as well. The facts of this highly complex case, which also involved conflict of laws, mistake, frustration, and uncertainty have yet to be resolved at trial, but the Court of Appeal entertained two preliminary questions of law, duress, and conflict of laws before sending the case to trial. This comment is focused on the duress point.

scholarly journals CIVIL LITIGATION NEGLIGENCE AND THE MALAYSIAN ADVOCATE

2013 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Baharuddeen Abu Bakar
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Civil Litigation ◽  
The Public ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Alternative Sanctions

Civil litigation negligence now stands on a surer footingfollowing cases from Canada, England and elsewhere which lay emphasis on theadversarial system rather than the structure of the profession, and immunityhas now been almost completely abolished by judicial decisions. In Malaysia,the basis of legal professional liability is expected to be re-aligned to beconsistent with the other common law countries that have abolished immunity.The questions that necessitate consideration are therefore acts that wouldconstitute negligence and those that are excusable, the relevant defences, and,of course, the alternative sanctions to civil litigation for this type ofnegligence. The fused nature of the profession in Malaysia, perceived to bemore burdensome to its members, raises the question of the appropriate standardof the duty of skill and care.(For the purposes of this article an ‘advocate’ refers to theMalaysian (and Singaporean) lawyer, who as a member of a ‘true fused’ profession,engages in litigation or ‘contentious business’ as defined in s. 3 of the LegalProfession Act 1976.) {The writer is of the firm view that criminal casesshould be considered separately from civil cases because of the difference inthe law of procedure relating to the preparation of a case for presentation incourt and the public policy considerations peculiar to each type of case asseen in the approach taken by the House of Lords in Arthur J.S. Hall vSimons in which separate judgments were delivered for each type of case.And in Rees v Sinclair [1974] 1 NZLR 180, a civil case, in whichthe New Zealand Court of Appeal did not consider the position in criminalcases.}

scholarly journals Liability for Manslaughter by Omission: Don't Let the Baby Drown!

2010 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catherine Elliott
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
The Other ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

By removing the common law rules on a duty to act from liability for manslaughter by omission, the law would more accurately reflect the intention of the House of Lords in R v Adomako (1995). The current duplicitous requirement of both a duty to act and a duty of care appears to be confusing both the trial judge and the jury. The causing of a harm by an omission does not automatically mean the conduct was less morally reprehensible than where harm is caused by an act and this reform would therefore potentially bring the law more closely into line with society's moral values. The law would be rendered clearer and simpler and injustices would be avoided due to the other requirements of the Law Commission's proposed offence of killing by gross carelessness, including causation and gross carelessness. Through this reform justice could at last be offered should a stranger choose to walk by a drowning baby.

Figure 4.14: the two issues as set out by Lord Bridge—issue 2 As can be seen, a number of matters needing to be clarified arise from the mere identification of two issues. Note that Bridge gives the two issues a short-hand label: (1) the common law issue; and (2) the statutory issue. However, students often read and re-read without appreciating how to move from lack of understanding towards understanding. They do not notice how words can be clarified by an appreciation of the intertextual links and which words or phrases could be clarified by recourse to textbooks in the area. Again the two issues are found in a paragraph of Lord Bridge’s judgment. Reading carefully paragraphs in the immediate vicinity can assist in understanding. The responsibility of the reader is to read with understanding, therefore stopping to clarify points along the way. It is useful here to ensure that the procedural history of this case is understood. This will enable the student to obtain an appreciation of the differences in opinion by the various judges who have considered the case before its arrival in the House of Lords. Lord Bridge discusses the procedural history and it is set out in the headnote. The case was won by the plaintiffs (the buyers) in the trial court (the High Court) and the defendants (the sellers) appealed to the Court of Appeal, where

2012 ◽  
pp. 99-99
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Trial Court ◽  
High Court ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Common ◽  
Short Hand ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
The Way

• Lord Bridge felt no doubts about the decision of the Court of Appeal over statute. • Lord Bridge refers to an earlier point in para 15 that it is wise to ‘refrain from interference’ in matters of legitimate judicial difference (see Appendix 1, p 313, para 15). • ‘If I were making the original decision, I should conclude without hesitation that it would not be fair or reasonable to allow the appellants to rely on the contractual limitation of their liability.’ • Appeal dismissed. A quick review of the paragraphs begins to show the patterns of argument delivery. Re-reading the paragraphs looking at the statutory diagrams (Figures 4.16 and 4.17, above) allows the argument to be reviewed whilst looking at the entire provision. The paragraph approach has also allowed the common law issue and the statutory issue to be isolated. Reviewing Figure 4.12, above, dealing with the facts, issues and procedural history enables the appreciation of the differences between the reasoning in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, although both courts reached the same decision. It should be possible at this stage to identify the precise rationale behind the court’s view of the common law issue and the statutory issue. In relation to the statutory issue, it should be possible to pinpoint precisely the statutory areas of relevance and how the court dealt with the issue. A summary of this information has been put into diagrammatic form in Figure 4.18, below. As proficiency is developed, it is possible to read carefully and move straight away to a diagrammatic representation, although, ultimately, a brief conventional textual note should be made to supplement the diagram. Brief, of course, as you will have seen, does not mean easy or simple!

2012 ◽  
pp. 112-113
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Diagrammatic Representation ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Common ◽  
Court Of Appeal

scholarly journals CIVIL LITIGATION NEGLIGENCE AND THE MALAYSIAN ADVOCATE

2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Baharuddeen Abu Bakar
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Litigation ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
The Public ◽  
Adversarial System ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Alternative Sanctions

Civil litigation negligence now stands on a surer footing following cases from Canada, England and elsewhere which lay emphasis on the adversarial system rather than the structure of the profession, and immunity has now been almost completely abolished by judicial decisions. In Malaysia, the basis of legal professional liability is expected to be re-aligned to be consistent with the other common law countries that have abolished immunity. The questions that necessitate consideration are therefore acts that would constitute negligence and those that are excusable, the relevant defences, and, of course, the alternative sanctions to civil litigation for this type of negligence. The fused nature of the profession in Malaysia, perceived to be more burdensome to its members, raises the question of the appropriate standard of the duty of skill and care.(For the purposes of this article an ‘advocate’ refers to the Malaysian (and Singaporean) lawyer, who as a member of a ‘true fused’ profession, engages in litigation or ‘contentious business’ as defined in s. 3 of the Legal Profession Act 1976.) {The writer is of the firm view that criminal cases should be considered separately from civil cases because of the difference in the law of procedure relating to the preparation of a case for presentation in court and the public policy considerations peculiar to each type of case as seen in the approach taken by the House of Lords in Arthur J.S. Hall v Simons in which separate judgments were delivered for each type of case. And in Rees v Sinclair [1974] 1 NZLR 180, a civil case, in which the New Zealand Court of Appeal did not consider the position in criminal cases.} 

scholarly journals Ignorance of the Law as a Defence to Rape: The Destruction of a Maxim

2012 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 336-347
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Arenson
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Mens Rea ◽  
Sexual Offences ◽  
The Poor ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Long Line ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Sexual Offences Act 2003 ◽  
Court Of Appeal

In DPP v Morgan, the House of Lords correctly concluded that an accused who entertained a genuine belief that a woman was consenting to carnal knowledge of her person could not be convicted of the common law crime of rape as such a belief and the requisite mens rea to convict were mutually exclusive of one another. Though England and Wales have resiled from this position by virtue of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1(b), which allows for conviction upon proof that the accused did not reasonably believe that the complainant was consenting, the Morgan principle has retained its vitality at common law as well as under the various statutory crimes of rape that exist throughout Australia, most notably the provisions of s. 38 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic). Despite a long line of Victorian Court of Appeal decisions which have reaffirmed the Morgan principle, the court has construed s. 37AA(b)(ii) of the Act as leaving open the possibility of an acquittal despite the fact that the accused acted with an awareness that one or more factors that are statutorily deemed as negating consent under s. 36(a)–(g) of the Act were operating at the time of his or her sexual penetration; specifically, the court held that the foregoing factors do not necessarily preclude a jury from finding that the accused acted in the genuine belief that the complainant was consenting. This article endeavours to explain how the accused could be aware of such circumstances at the time of penetration, yet still entertain such a belief. The article ultimately concludes that such an anomaly can only be explained through a combination of the poor drafting of s. 37AA(b)(ii) and the court's apparent refusal to follow the longstanding precept that ignorance of the law is never a defence to a crime, ostensibly prompted by its adherence to the cardinal precept that legislation is not to be construed as superfluous.

Restrictive covenants, use of land, and the restraint of trade doctrine

2021 ◽  
Vol 72 (1) ◽  
pp. 132-140
Author(s):  
David Capper
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Commercial Activity ◽  
Restrictive Covenants ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
Article 5 ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Restraint Of Trade

The common law doctrine of restraint of trade has a well-established presence in relation to contracts of employment and contracts for the sale of a business. Beyond those specific areas it reared its head from time to time, but the legal test for its applicability was not a model of clarity. Where the covenantor ceded a pre-existing freedom to engage in commercial activity, the decision of the House of Lords in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269 brought it within the doctrine, but the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Peninsula Securities Ltd v Dunnes Stores (Bangor) Ltd [2020] UKSC 36, on appeal from the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal [2018] NICA 7, has discarded that test in favour of one based on the structure of a trading society. Peninsula Securities was a case concerned with the applicability of the restraint of trade doctrine to covenants affecting the ability of a landowner and its successors in title to use the land in a way that potentially competed with the business of an adjoining occupier. The decision that the restraint of trade doctrine was not engaged in these circumstances was set against the power of the Lands Tribunal to modify or extinguish covenants affecting land under article 5 of the Property (NI) Order 1978.  

• Discusses the finding of the trial judge that under the common law the ‘relevant condition’ could not be relied upon by the sellers. The reason being the seed delivered was ‘wholly different’. (As we have already noted issue 2 (see Figure 4.14, above), the statutory issue, need only be dealt with if issue 1 (see Figure 4.13, above) is decided in favour of the sellers.) • Discusses the finding of Denning LJ in the Court of Appeal. Denning LJ thought the common law issue should be decided in favour of the sellers. He said that the wording of the condition was sufficient to cover the situation. Kerr and Oliver LJJ decided the common law issue against the sellers. • Kerr LJ’s reasoning was that the condition would only cover them for defects in the ‘correct’ named seeds. Not for delivery of the wrong seeds. • Oliver LJ’s reasoning was that the condition did not cover the breach because it only happened through the negligence of the seller. • The Court of Appeal, however, was unanimous in deciding the statutory issue against the sellers. • Lord Bridge discusses the way that Denning LJ traced the history of the court’s approach to such conditions. The conditions being ones that limit’ or totally ‘exclude’ a contractual party’s liability for any damage caused. • Lord Bridge picks out two relevant cases (Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] 1 All ER 101 and Ailsa Craig Fishing Co Ltd v Malvern Fishing Co Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 101) and uses these to explore the common law issue. Note that the judge is beginning to deal with cases decided previously and commenting upon them in relation to whether he is bound by the doctrine of precedent.

2012 ◽  
pp. 103-103
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
Relevant Condition ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Common ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Photo Production ◽  
The Way

Admissibility of confession evidence: Principles of hearsay and the rule of voluntariness

2021 ◽  
pp. 136571272110022
Author(s):  
Jennifer Porter
Keyword(s):  
Western Australia ◽  
Common Law ◽  
South Australia ◽  
Judicial Discretion ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
Important Policy ◽  
Oral Testimony ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Confession Evidence

The common law test of voluntariness has come to be associated with important policy rationales including the privilege against self-incrimination. However, when the test originated more than a century ago, it was a test concerned specifically with the truthfulness of confession evidence; which evidence was at that time adduced in the form of indirect oral testimony, that is, as hearsay. Given that, a century later, confession evidence is now mostly adduced in the form of an audiovisual recording that can be observed directly by the trial judge, rather than as indirect oral testimony, there may be capacity for a different emphasis regarding the question of admissibility. This article considers the law currently operating in Western Australia, Queensland and South Australia to see whether or not, in the form of an audiovisual recording, the exercise of judicial discretion as to the question of the admissibility of confession evidence might be supported if the common law test of voluntariness was not a strict test of exclusion.

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