Financial crises in historical perspective

Author(s):  
Adrienne Roberts
2018 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Bordo

This article surveys the co-evolution of monetary policy and financial stability for a number of countries from 1880 to the present. Historical evidence on the incidence, costs, and determinants of financial crises (the most extreme form of financial instability), combined with narratives on some famous financial crises, suggests that financial crises have many causes, including credit-driven asset price booms, which have become more prevalent in recent decades, but in general financial crises are very heterogeneous and hard to categorize. Moreover, evidence shows that the association across the country sample between credit booms, asset price booms, and serious financial crises is quite weak.


Author(s):  
Eiji Hotori ◽  
Mikael Wendschlag ◽  
Thibaud Giddey

AbstractIn this chapter, the drivers of the formalization of banking supervision are examined from seven perspectives: (a) charter requirements, (b) banknote issuance, (c) liability rules, (d) ensuring the public’s trust, (e) financial crises, (f) economic control, and (g) financial globalization. Our analysis shows that formalization occurred in response to the shifting needs of the time/era and that the formalization process was basically incremental. Notably, financial crises, which are generally considered to be the primary drivers of major regulatory and supervisory reforms, did not always play a leading role in the formalization of banking supervision. It should also be noted that from a historical perspective, regulation and supervision were not “natural” responses to a dysfunctional banking system. Rather, the formalization of banking supervision was the product of complex political actions negotiated by relevant stakeholders with divergent interests in a specific social, political, and economic environment.


2021 ◽  
pp. 165-183
Author(s):  
Laure Quennouëlle-Corre

This chapter aims to explore the different facets of the collective memory of the 1987 Crash in the US, which represented an unprecedented collapse of prices on the global stock markets. The 22.3% fall of the Dow Jones on Black Monday (19 October 1987) represents the biggest single-day stock market collapse in history—even greater than that of 24 October 1929. The crash spread to other major financial markets over the world, but was quickly resolved thanks to the central banks’ intervention on the capital markets. In the context of Reaganomics, the crash can be seen as the first financial crisis of the second globalization wave in the strictest sense of the term ‘financial’, without taking into consideration the banking crises of the 1970s and the debt crisis in the early 1980s. However, unlike other financial crises, memories of this market break remained either vague or inexistent in public opinion, or fragmented and partial for economists and historians—until the subprime crisis. Since then, the 1987 warning and the potential dangers of uncontrolled markets were brought to light. The final lesson to be learned from this example of an evolving memory is about using the past.


2019 ◽  
pp. 7-55
Author(s):  
Barry Eichengreen ◽  
Asmaa El-Ganainy ◽  
Rui Pedro Esteves ◽  
Kris James Mitchener

We consider public debt from a long-term historical perspective, showing how the purposes for which governments borrow have evolved. Periods when debt-to-GDP ratios rose explosively as a result of wars, depressions, and financial crises also have a long history. Many of these episodes resulted in debt-management problems resolved through debasements and restructurings. Less widely appreciated are successful debt consolidation episodes, instances in which governments inheriting heavy debts ran primary surpluses for long periods in order to reduce those burdens to sustainable levels. We analyze the economic and political circumstances that made these successful debt consolidation episodes possible.


Author(s):  
Youssef Cassis

This chapter surveys the development of the world’s leading financial centres since the early nineteenth century, with particular attention to their working mechanisms, international influence, competition and cooperation, and rise and decline. In addition to the conditions for the development of international financial centres identified by contemporary economic and financial literature (such as political stability, strong currency, light tax burden, skilled workforce, efficient communications, and so on), the chapter emphasizes, from a long-term historical perspective, other factors of success and failure, in particular the economic power of the country hosting an international financial centre; the effects of major wars which, even more than financial crises, have affected the destiny of financial centres; and path dependency: once established, most financial centres have experienced remarkable longevity. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the financial debacle of 2008 has not fundamentally altered the hierarchy of international financial centres.


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