Can Tight and Centralized Financial Regulation Prevent Financial Crises? Czech Governmental Bond Seignorage in the Historical Perspective

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomáš Otáhal ◽  
Václav Rybáček
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crises ◽  
Historical Perspective ◽  
Financial Regulation

An Historical Perspective on the Quest for Financial Stability and the Monetary Policy Regime

2018 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Bordo
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Financial Crises ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Historical Perspective ◽  
Asset Price ◽  
Financial Instability ◽  
Historical Evidence ◽  
Policy Regime ◽  
Extreme Form ◽  
Credit Booms

This article surveys the co-evolution of monetary policy and financial stability for a number of countries from 1880 to the present. Historical evidence on the incidence, costs, and determinants of financial crises (the most extreme form of financial instability), combined with narratives on some famous financial crises, suggests that financial crises have many causes, including credit-driven asset price booms, which have become more prevalent in recent decades, but in general financial crises are very heterogeneous and hard to categorize. Moreover, evidence shows that the association across the country sample between credit booms, asset price booms, and serious financial crises is quite weak.

Financial Regulation

2011 ◽  
Vol 216 ◽  
pp. F4-F9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray Barrell ◽  
E. Phillip Davies
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Financial Crises ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Committee Report ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Basel Committee ◽  
The Core ◽  
The World ◽  
The Relationship

The financial crisis that engulfed the world in 2007 and 2008 has led to a wave of re-regulation and discussion of further regulation that has culminated in the proposals from the Basel Committee as well as those in the Vickers Committee report on Banking Regulation and Financial Crises. This issue of the Review contains a number of papers on Banking Regulation, covering many aspects of the debate, and we can put that debate in perspective through these papers and also by discussing our work on the relationship between bank size and risk taking, which is reported in Barrell et al. (2011). We addressed the causes of the crisis in the October 2008 Review, and began to look at the costs and benefits of bank regulation in Barrell et al. (2009). In that paper we argued that we needed to know the causes of crises and whether the regulators could do anything to affect them before we discussed new regulations. It is now generally agreed that increasing core capital reduces the probability of a crisis occurring, and most changes in regulation that are being discussed see this as the core of their toolkit. The work by the Institute macro team in Barrell et al. (2009) and in Barrell, Davis, Karim and Liadze (2010) was the first to demonstrate that there was a statistically important role for capital in defending against the probability of a crisis occurring, and our findings were widely used in the policy community in the debate over reform.

Tighter Financial Regulation and its Impact on Global Growth

2010 ◽  
Vol 213 ◽  
pp. F39-F44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ray Barrell ◽  
Dawn Holland ◽  
Dilruba Karim
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crises ◽  
World Economy ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Cost Benefit Analysis ◽  
Cost Benefit ◽  
Benefit Analysis ◽  
Perceptions Of Risk ◽  
The Third ◽  
The World ◽  
Global Growth

The financial crisis that started in mid-2007 enveloped the world economy and caused a serious recession in most OECD countries. It is widely believed that it has also left a scar on potential output because it will have raised perceptions of risk and hence reduced the sustainable capital stock people wish to hold. It is inevitable that policymakers should ask what can be done to reduce the chances of this happening again, and it is equally inevitable that the banks would answer that it is too costly to do anything. There are four questions one must answer before it is possible to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of bank regulation. The first involves asking what are the costs of financial crises? The second involves asking what are the costs of financial regulation? The third involves asking what causes crises? The fourth, and perhaps the most important, involves asking whether regulators can do anything to reduce the risk of crises? Our overall approach to these issues is spelled out in a report written for the FSA in the aftermath of the crisis (see Barrell et al., 2009).

scholarly journals Drivers of the Formalization of Banking Supervision

2021 ◽  
pp. 141-156
Author(s):  
Eiji Hotori ◽  
Mikael Wendschlag ◽  
Thibaud Giddey
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crises ◽  
Historical Perspective ◽  
Banking System ◽  
Economic Environment ◽  
Banking Supervision ◽  
Liability Rules ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Regulation And Supervision ◽  
Economic Control ◽  
Political Actions

AbstractIn this chapter, the drivers of the formalization of banking supervision are examined from seven perspectives: (a) charter requirements, (b) banknote issuance, (c) liability rules, (d) ensuring the public’s trust, (e) financial crises, (f) economic control, and (g) financial globalization. Our analysis shows that formalization occurred in response to the shifting needs of the time/era and that the formalization process was basically incremental. Notably, financial crises, which are generally considered to be the primary drivers of major regulatory and supervisory reforms, did not always play a leading role in the formalization of banking supervision. It should also be noted that from a historical perspective, regulation and supervision were not “natural” responses to a dysfunctional banking system. Rather, the formalization of banking supervision was the product of complex political actions negotiated by relevant stakeholders with divergent interests in a specific social, political, and economic environment.

scholarly journals CAPITAL FLOW BONANZAS AS A FUNDAMENTAL INGREDIENT IN SPAIN'S FINANCIAL CRISES, 1850-2015

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-35
Author(s):  
Concha Betrán ◽  
Maria A. Pons
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Capital Flows ◽  
Financial Crises ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Capital Flow ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Financial Instability ◽  
Policy Regimes ◽  
Regulation And Supervision

ABSTRACT This paper analyses the mechanisms through which capital flows produced financial instability in Spain over a 165-year period. We study why and how capital bonanzas make crises more likely and severe, and whether their incidence varies depending on types of crises (currency, banking and debt crises). We conclude that most of them occurred in different monetary policy regimes, but they were associated with capital bonanzas in a liberal regulatory framework, both of which contributed to a higher likelihood and greater severity of crises. The analysis of the different monetary policy regimes, financial structures and the types of crises allows us to draw some policy implications that emphasise the need for sound financial regulation and supervision.

The 1987 Stock Exchange Crash in Historical Perspective

2021 ◽  
pp. 165-183
Author(s):  
Laure Quennouëlle-Corre
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crises ◽  
Historical Perspective ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Debt Crisis ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Subprime Crisis ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World ◽  
Global Stock Markets ◽  
Global Stock

This chapter aims to explore the different facets of the collective memory of the 1987 Crash in the US, which represented an unprecedented collapse of prices on the global stock markets. The 22.3% fall of the Dow Jones on Black Monday (19 October 1987) represents the biggest single-day stock market collapse in history—even greater than that of 24 October 1929. The crash spread to other major financial markets over the world, but was quickly resolved thanks to the central banks’ intervention on the capital markets. In the context of Reaganomics, the crash can be seen as the first financial crisis of the second globalization wave in the strictest sense of the term ‘financial’, without taking into consideration the banking crises of the 1970s and the debt crisis in the early 1980s. However, unlike other financial crises, memories of this market break remained either vague or inexistent in public opinion, or fragmented and partial for economists and historians—until the subprime crisis. Since then, the 1987 warning and the potential dangers of uncontrolled markets were brought to light. The final lesson to be learned from this example of an evolving memory is about using the past.

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