scholarly journals Introduction: the political entrepreneur for regional growth and entrepreneurial diversity

2016 ◽  
pp. 3-6
Author(s):  
Daniel Silander

Subject Prospects for Africa in the second quarter. Significance Nigeria's tightly-contested election dominates the political outlook in the coming quarter, posing an unprecedented test for the democratic credentials and institutions of the continent's largest economy. Economically, oil exporters face fiscal and foreign exchange earnings falls, putting a drag on regional growth rates. Regional disparities are also significant. Oil importers can expect a boost to budgetary and external accounts. However, the mixed global outlook will usher in other economic risks.


1972 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 511-524 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey L. Pressman

Observers of city politics have often stated that political leadership—usually mayoral leadership—is a crucial ingredient in a city's ability to deal with its problems. And studies of successful leaders in urban systems have led to the formulation of a model of the “political entrepreneur” who is adept at accumulating political resources and pyramiding them to gain increased influence. Based on four years of observation of politics in Oakland, California, this study suggests that successful mayoral leadership and resource-pyramiding may be limited by governmental structure, the personality of the mayor, and the nature of the political system.In Oakland, fragmented institutional authority and the council-manager form of government have created obstacles for elected officials. A privately oriented, “nonpolitical” mayor has avoided publicity and has tended to underutilize, rather than pyramid, his resources. Finally, in an amorphous political system characterized by a lack of group and party activity, a mayor is denied both information and support. By examining the ways in which the performance of Oakland's mayor diverges from a model of political leadership, we can identify some of the factors that support or limit such leadership.


Author(s):  
Luís Farinha ◽  
João Lopes

Making smart regions smarter through smart specialization strategies (RIS3) is today on the political and economic agenda. In this context, it becomes a priority to know the regional stakeholders' perception of RIS3, based on the prioritization of the use of resources and capacities in their territories. The aim of this study is to perform a bibliometric analysis with the keywords smart specialization, regional innovation systems, and value, rareness, imitability, and organization (VRIO). The authors aim to contribute to the clarification of the literature on regional innovation ecosystems. They also intend to suggest a new model that allows the VRIO model to be adapted to the territories. Through extensive research using the Web of Science database, five clusters were identified (multiple helix; smart specialization and RIS3; innovation and entrepreneurship; regional policies and knowledge transfer and technology commercialization; regional growth, entrepreneurial, and innovative ecosystem), whose content analysis allowed to construct the conceptual regional helix assessment model.


2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 409-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Kosack

This article argues against the scholarly consensus that governments make pro-poor policies when they are democratic. In democracies and autocracies, a government's strongest incentive is to serve citizens who are organized, and poor citizens face collective-action disadvantages. But a ‘political entrepreneur’ can help poor citizens organize and attain power with their support; to stay in power, the political entrepreneur's incentive is to maintain poor citizens’ support with pro-poor policies. Politics and education are analyzed over half-a-century in countries with little in common – Ghana, Taiwan, and Brazil. Governments that expanded education for the poor were more often autocratic than democratic, but were always clearly associated with political entrepreneurs. The results suggest an alternative understanding of government incentives to serve poor citizens.


2012 ◽  
Vol 17 (Special Edition) ◽  
pp. 243-269
Author(s):  
Ijaz Nabi

This article argues that a new growth vent in Pakistan requires tapping into external lucrative markets in a manner that will create multiple entre-ports for growth. Such a growth vent will enable the country to achieve a sustained growth path that is not as susceptible to the political vicissitudes of one mega-growth node. This will be good for regional equity within the country and will also bring new energy to the Indus Basin market. Sustained welfare improvements in this type of regional hub can occur when it transitions from being a transportation hub for goods and energy into a manufacturing hub that creates high-productivity, high-wage jobs in multiple regional growth nodes.


1969 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 315-341 ◽  
Author(s):  
James C. Scott

By way of introducing so charged a subject as corruption we do well to remind ourselves that if the traditional rulers of the colonized areas left much to be desired in terms of present standards of public office-holding, the colonizers themselves could scarcely be regarded as models of probity. Colonial office until the twentieth century was regarded more often than not as an investment in an exclusive franchise that was expected to yield a good return to the political entrepreneur who acquired it. In Spain this conception was reflected in the practice of selling certain colonial posts at public auction. Dutch practice in Batavia, although not identical, signified a similar notion of office. Here the colonial administrator owed his superiors a regular charge that could be described as a ‘license to hold office’ in return for which he could anticipate, in addition to his small salary and a share of the district crop yield, more or less open payments from the Dutch business interests he had assisted in the course of his duties.


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