scholarly journals Podhale Goralian Vowels in Józef Tischner’s Recordings of Historia filozofii po góralsku: An Acoustic Phonetic Analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 187-205
Author(s):  
Mateusz Urban

Artykuł ma charakter eksploracyjny i ma na celu ustalenie stopnia realizacji cech dialektalnych w stylizowanej wersji regionalnej odmiany języka polskiego. Przedmiotem badania są trzy tradycyjne cechy gwary podhalańskiej, które odróżniają ją od standardowej odmiany języka polskiego: rozwój tzw. samogłosek ścieśnionych, podniesienie artykulacji samogłosek przed spółgłoską nosową oraz archaizm podhalański. Za materiał posłużyły nagrania wybranych fragmentów Historii filozofii po góralsku ks. Józefa Tischnera dokonane przez niego samego. Nagrania poddano analizie akustycznej w celu zmierzenia wartości dwóch pierwszych formantów badanych samogłosek. Na podstawie pomiarów sporządzono wykresy samogłosek, według których przeprowadzono analizę wybranych cech. Badanie prowadzi do wniosków, iż nie wszystkie tradycyjne cechy gwarowe są konsekwentnie realizowane w nagraniach i w większości przypadków jest to wpływ systemu standardowego. ABSTRACT The current study is exploratory in character and aims to investigate the extent to which dialectal features are present in a stylised version of a regional variety of Polish. The focus is on three traditional features of Podhale Goralian that make it markedly different from Standard Polish: the treatment of Middle Polish raised vowels ė ȧ ȯ, prenasal raising and the Podhale archaism. The material analysed comprises a selection of recordings of Józef Tischner’s Historii filozofii po góralsku [A Goral History of Philosophy] performed by himself. The recordings were subjected to acoustic analysis to obtain values of the first two formants of the relevant vowels. An analysis was then conducted with the help of vowel plots created on the basis of the measurements. The conclusions indicate that the traditional features of Podhale Goralian are not always consistently realized in the recordings, which in the majority of cases may be attributed to the influence of Standard Polish.

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-120
Author(s):  
Diego S. Garrocho

Abstract In this work, I present a selection of mythological and cultural insights from Ancient Greece that make our ambiguous relationship with memory and oblivion explicit. From Plato to Dante, or from Orphism to Nietzsche, and even today, the experiences of memory and forgetting appear as two sides of one essential nucleus in our cultural tradition in general and in the history of philosophy in particular. I intend to present a panoramic view of the main mythological sources that mention these two experiences as well as their unequal consideration. I will thus stress the personifications of both figures, taking up their features and the moral, gnoseological, and even political implications that historically have been associated with them. This is especially apparent in the strong Platonic legacy latent in the history of philosophy, where every time it insists on defining knowledge as a form of memory, the peculiar attributes of forgetting unexpectedly surface, not as a mistake or cognitive error, but as an experience which is truly saving and therapeutic.


Author(s):  
Didier Debaise

Process and Reality ends with a warning: ‘[t]he chief danger to philosophy is narrowness in the selection of evidence’ (PR, 337). Although this danger of narrowness might emerge from the ‘idiosyncrasies and timidities of particular authors, of particular social groups, of particular schools of thought, of particular epochs in the history of civilization’ (PR, 337), we should not be mistaken: it occurs within philosophy, in its activity, its method. And the fact that this issue arises at the end of Process and Reality reveals the ambition that has accompanied its composition: Whitehead has resisted this danger through the form and ambition of his speculative construction. The temptation of a narrowness in selection attempts to expel speculative philosophy at the same time as it haunts each part of its system.


2014 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 127-137
Author(s):  
Tatsiana Hiarnovich

The paper explores the displace of Polish archives from the Soviet Union that was performed in 1920s according to the Riga Peace Treaty of 1921 and other international agreements. The aim of the research is to reconstruct the process of displace, based on the archival sources and literature. The object of the research is those documents that were preserved in the archives of Belarus and together with archives from other republics were displaced to Poland. The exploration leads to clarification of the selection of document fonds to be displaced, the actual process of movement and the explanation of the role that the archivists of Belarus performed in the history of cultural relationships between Poland and the Soviet Union. The articles of the Treaty of Riga had been formulated without taking into account the indivisibility of archive fonds that is one of the most important principles of restitution, which caused the failure of the treaty by the Soviet part.


Author(s):  
Galen Strawson ◽  
Galen Strawson

John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. This book argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. The book argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word “person” as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like “human being.” In actuality, Locke uses “person” primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word “consciousness.” When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.


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