scholarly journals Global Environment Conflict in the Postcold War Era: Linkage to an Extended Paradigm

Author(s):  
Michelle Zebich-Knos

The end of the Cold War era has opened a Pandora's Box of environmental concerns that, heretofore, took a back seat to superpower struggles. Today, conflict is no longer played out within a Cold War conceptual framework. Imperfect, and at times, inconsistent as the Cold War framework was, it nevertheless provided decision makers with a recipe for action--or inaction. Since conflict is no longer structured within this framework, the two former superpowers --the United States and Russia--no longer possess clear yardsticks for action. With superpower interference in "proxy" conflict(s) no longer the definitive factor in the international arena, I postulate that global conflict will increasingly take on an environmental character. Ironically, much of this future conflict is likely to be exacerbated by the subtle incorporation of an environmental pillar into national security policy, particularly that of the United States. This paper will examine (1) the progression of "environmental security" as a valid policy concern for nation-states, (2) why policy expansion is occurring, and; (3) the possible consequences of linking environmental problems to an expanded security paradigm.

Author(s):  
Robert J. McMahon

‘Cold wars at home’ highlights the domestic repercussions of the Cold War. The Cold War exerted so profound and so multi-faceted an impact on the structure of international politics and state-to-state relations that it has become customary to label the 1945–90 period ‘the Cold War era’. That designation becomes even more fitting when one considers the powerful mark that the Soviet–American struggle for world dominance and ideological supremacy left within many of the world’s nation-states. The Cold War of course affected the internal constellation of forces in the Third World, Europe, and the United States and impacted the process of decolonization, state formation, and Cold War geopolitics.


Author(s):  
Joseph Heller

The Johnson administration was surprised by the mid-May crisis. Israel, far less surprised, expected the US to honour the promises it made in 1957. However, when the chips were down in 1967 the Sixth Fleet failed to prevent the Arab aggression However, Washington did nothing to stop the inevitable deterioration, since any movement in Israel’s favour meaning opening a new front in the cold war, while the Vietnam war was at its height, and the German problem was still a hot issue in the cold war. The visit of foreign minister Abba Eban and General Meir Amit, head of the Mossad, to the US to warn the administration about the danger of war did not move Johnson, Rusk and McNamara. Johnson’s policy was that ‘Israel will not be alone unless it decided to be alone’. No green light was given to Israeli decision-makers, who had no choice but to treat Nasser’s challenges as casus belli..


1975 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chang Jin Park

One of the important developments in world politics during the cold-war era was the relationship between the superpowers and small nation-states. In contrast to the period before the cold war, small nation-states had considerable latitude for maneuvering in pursuit of their own interests. This phenomenon was largely rooted in the imperatives of the cold war. The relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea during the period of the Korean War is critically analyzed in light of the new reality in international relations. South Korea tried to influence the conduct of the United States in Korea by employing five techniques: (1) a public call for assistance; (2) a public call for mutual cooperation against the common enemy; (3) a calculated policy proposal for bargaining advantage; (4) refusal to cooperate; and (5) moral suasion. These techniques are examined, with the conclusion that of the five, (1) and (2) were effective; (3) and (4) were least effective; and (5) was most effective.


2021 ◽  
pp. 193-234
Author(s):  
Sebastian Rosato

This chapter examines U.S.-Soviet relations at the end of the Cold War (1985-90). The bulk of the chapter draws on the primary and secondary historical record to evaluate how American and Soviet decision makers viewed each other’s intentions, focusing on the Soviet Union’s early unilateral arms control initiatives; Moscow’s efforts to forge a “grand compromise”; the negotiation and aftermath of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; and Moscow’s retrenchment, including its withdrawal from Afghanistan and announcement that it would make significant cuts to its conventional forces in Europe. Were they confident that their counterparts had benign intentions—that is, did they trust each other—as asserted by intentions optimists? Or were they uncertain about each other’s intentions, which is to say that they mistrusted each other, as suggested by intentions pessimism? Having shown that Washington and Moscow were acutely uncertain about each other’s intentions in each case, the chapter then describes the resulting U.S.-Soviet security competition. Finally, the chapter examines the last two years of the Cold War and demonstrates that although neither side came close to trusting the other, only the United States continued to compete for security, because the Soviet Union could not afford to sustain the effort.


This book uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The chapters in this volume look at how the “emotional” side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.


Author(s):  
Anne Searcy

During the Cold War, the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union developed cultural exchange programs, in which they sent performing artists abroad in order to generate goodwill for their countries. Ballet companies were frequently called on to serve in these programs, particularly in the direct Soviet-American exchange. This book analyzes four of the early ballet exchange tours, demonstrating how this series of encounters changed both geopolitical relations and the history of dance. The ballet tours were enormously popular. Performances functioned as an important symbolic meeting point for Soviet and American officials, creating goodwill and normalizing relations between the two countries in an era when nuclear conflict was a real threat. At the same time, Soviet and American audiences did not understand ballet in the same way. As American companies toured in the Soviet Union and vice versa, audiences saw the performances through the lens of their own local aesthetics. Ballet in the Cold War introduces the concept of transliteration to understand this process, showing how much power viewers wielded in the exchange and explaining how the dynamics of the Cold War continue to shape ballet today.


Author(s):  
Sir Richard Dearlove

This article discusses the changing perceptions on national security and civic anxiety. During the Cold War and its aftermath, security was rather a simple and straightforward issue. The countries knew their enemies, where they are and the threats they presented. On the event that, the enemies's secrets were unknown, probing techniques were employed to determine the weaknesses of the enemy. This formulaic situation which seeped through in to the twenty-first century left little room for innovation. In fact, in some countries, security maintained at the Cold War levels despite criticisms that new and emerging national security threats should be addressed at a new level. Of the powerful nations, America maintained the role of a world policeman and adapted its national security priorities according to its perception of a new series of strategic threats; however these new security strategies were without a sense of urgency. However, the perception of global threats and national security radically changed in the event of the 9/11 attack. The sleeping national security priorities of America came to a full force which affected the national security priorities of other nations as well. In the twenty-first globalized world, no conflict remains a regional clash. The reverberations of the Russian military action in Georgia, the Israeli intervention in Gaza, and the results of the attacks in Mumbai resonates loudly and rapidly through the wider international security system. While today, nations continue to seek new methods for addressing new security threats, the paradox of the national security policy is that nation-states have lost their exclusive grip of their own security at a time when the private citizens are assailed by increased fears for their own security and demand a more enhanced safety from the state. Nation-states have been much safer from large-scale violence, however there exists a strong sense of anxiety about the lack of security in the face of multiplicity of threats. Nations have been largely dependent on international coordinated action to achieve their important national security objectives. National policies and security theory lack precision. In addition, the internationalization of national security has eroded the distinction between domestic and foreign security. These blurring lines suggest that the understanding of national security is still at the height of transformations.


Daedalus ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 149 (2) ◽  
pp. 101-115
Author(s):  
Jon Brook Wolfsthal

America survived the nuclear age through a complex combination of diplomatic and military decisions, and a good deal of luck. One of the tools that proved its value in both reducing the risks of nuclear use and setting rules for the ongoing nuclear competition were negotiated, legally binding, and verified arms control agreements. Such pacts between the United States and the Soviet Union arguably prevented the nuclear arms racing from getting worse and helped both sides climb off the Cold War nuclear precipice. Several important agreements remain in place between the United States and Russia, to the benefit of both states. Arms control is under threat, however, from domestic forces in the United States and from Russian actions that range from treaty violations to the broader weaponization of risk. But arms control can and should play a useful role in reducing the risk of nuclear war and forging a new agreement between Moscow and Washington on the new rules of the nuclear road.


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