Was Kennedy the ‘father’ of the US–Israeli alliance? (1962–63)

This chapter debunks the myth that President Kennedy was the ‘father’ of the American alliance. Once he became predident he had to bow before the constraints of the state department, the Pentagon and the professional staff at the White House. he accepted the beliefs and assessments of Dean Rusk, the secretary of state and Robert McNamara, the secretary of defence. The US national archives show that American diplomats in the Middle East killed Kennedy’s idea of granting an American security guarantee to Israel. Any security they warned, would be followed by deeper Soviet involvement in the region. American commitment was limited to a presidential declaration of territorial integrity of al the regional states. Thus it was no surprise chief-of-staff Rabin failed to convince the US administration to provide a more cogent commitment to Israel.

Kennedy, Israel and the Cold War before the Cuban Missile Crisis (1961–62)

Kennedys presidency marked a new era, but not to the extent of fulfilling Israel’s goals. It stopped treating Jewish emigration to Israel as escalating the conflict with the Arabs, and took Israel’s security issues more seriously. That led to the American decision to supply Israel with the Hawk missiles, although Israel was disappointed because they were defensive missiles, while Egypt had already offensive weapons, such as bombers and missiles. However, US was trying hard to convince Egypt side with the west by launching a new initiative to solve the Arab refugee question. Israel knew the return of the refugees would be the equivalent of the annihilation of the state of Israel. Ben-Gurion met Kennedy but could not convince him that Israel should be treated as an ally. Kennedy did not promise the immediate supply of Hawk missiles, and warned Israel against developing nuclear weapons, which would damage American-Israeli relations, In view of Soviet–Arab alliance Israel was left with no choice but to build the Dimona nuclear facility, thus gaining a powerful bargaining card.

The Soviet Union and the Six Day War (May 14–June 5, 1967)

No change occurred before the war to moderate Soviet political behaviour. Soviet support for the Arabs was unequivocal, while Israel was subjected to an increasing number of warnings and threats. The straits of Tiran were regarded by the Kremlin as Egyptian territory, and Israel was accused of assisting the US in the Vietnam war. Israel feeling strangled by the Arabs, launched a surprise attack which led the Soviet bloc (except for Romania) to sever diplomatic relations. However, both America and the Soviet Union were not interested in a global war. Hence a summit meeting was held in Glassboro between Johnson and Kosygin, each patron supporting its clients. Brezhnev secretly confessed the Soviet leadership’s utter frustration with its Arab clients, particularly Egypt, which failed to use the modern Soviet weaponry the Kremlin profusely supplied. He also revealed the Soviet leadership’s contempt for Israel, which was entirely economically dependent on America.

The Soviet Union, Israel and Soviet Jewry (1964–67)

The new regime in the Kremlin did not bode well for Israel, as Brezhnev and Kosygin continued to condemn Israel as agent of American imperialism. They gave official backing to the new radical regime in Damascus, and supported the PLO’s terrorist activities. In response Israel increased its activities for Soviet Jewry. The establishment of diplomatic relations between West Germany and Israel was another cause for condemning Israel as participating in the anti-soviet campaign, and the Soviet press equated Zionism and Nazism. Israel admitted it was trapped between its demographic need for the emigration of Soviet Jews and its dependence on the west. The visit to the Soviet Union of both Egyptian and Syrian heads of states, and the public Soviet support for their regimes, was ominous. A year before the Six Day War the Kremlin accused Israel of concentrating troops on the border to topple the Syrian regime.

Khrushchev, Israel and Soviet Jewry (1961–64)

Soviet-Israeli relations deteriorated because of the growing Arab dependenceon the USSR, the Soviet refusal to permit Soveit Jew to emigrate to Israel, and increasing anti-Semitism. Khrushchev’s denial of the existence of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union only drove Israel to upgrade its campaign for emigration, although Israel acknowledged that the Soviet Jewish problem could best be solved by detente. The increase of anti-Semitism reached its peak when the Ukrainian Academy of Science published a violently anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist book claiming that Ben-Gurion eliminated the Ten Commandments, and compared Zionisn to Nazism. However, the Israeli leadership was unable to convince more than few intellectuals to raise their voices in favour of Soviet Jews.

The United States and the Cold War: from Truman to Eisenhower (1948–53)

This chapter shows the change in America’s attitude towards Israel, from opposition to de jure recognition of Israel’s military capabilities for the west during ther Korean war. While in 1948 secretary of state General Marshall warned against an enduring conflict with the Arabs, Truman recognized it de facto. However, the state department continued to treart Israel as a liability. Henry Byroade claimed that Israel should not be the homeland of the Jewish people. Israel was left outside of strategic western alliances because it was assumed that its membership might push the Arabs towards the Soviet Union. The notion that Truman’s administration was pro-Israel is a myth. Although Truman himself was sympathetic, the State Department and the Pentagon did not consider Israel an asset.

Introduction

The strategic importance of the Middle East dictated Israel’s fate in the cold war. While the USSR supported the inimical Arab attitude towards Israel, the US limited its support to Israel to economic military aid. The USSR not only regarded the Arabs as a cold war asset, it accused Israel of being part and parcel of western alliances. The turning point in Soviet-Israeli relations was the Czech-Egyptian arms deal (1955) which changed the balance of power. The Suez war exemplified the explosive situation in the region, and Israel’s shaky position vis-a-vis the the Soviet Union. The combination of strategic weakness and constant Arab hatred put Israel continually on the brink of war. The eruption of another war was on the horizon immediately following the Sinai campaign.

Was Johnson the ‘father’ of the US–Israeli alliance?: the Memorandum of Understanding (1964–65)

This chapter shows how Israel persuaded the US to initiate the ‘memorandum of understanding’ which changed Israel’s deterrent capabilities. First, Israel insisted that the balance of power had changed dramatically in terms of heavy armaments and the construction of Arab forces, due to greater Soviet support. Khrushchev’s visit to Egypt aggravated anxiety of in Israel regarding a Soviet-Arab plot to destroy Israel in a surprise attack. The visit was not merely symbolic, but rather proofof Soviet solidarity with Arab intentions, including public support for the Palestinian cause. The US promised that the Sixth Fleet was ready to react to any Arab attack, but Israel had little faith in such promises, in view of the Arab summits which bid for military escalation. The Soviet made it clear that without the removal of the western bases in Turkey and the western courting of Iran, no settlement in the Middle East was possible.

The Soviet Union and Israel: from the Gromyko declaration to the death of Stalin (1947–53)

Communist ideology negated Zionism’s legitimacy, which did not bode well for lomg-term Soviet-Israeli relations. Even in short-term policies the relations were bound to explode because of Israel’s pressure for Jewish emigration. Under Stalin’s order the the Soviet-Jewish writer Ilya Ehrenburg repudiated the existence of Jewish nation. Soviet realpolitik granted greater credence to the strategic assets of the Arab world. Israel’s ‘non-identification’ policy of neutrality counted very little with Soviet Middle Eastern policy. The turning-point was the Korean war, in which Israel identified itself with the US policy of military intervention. Relations exploded in 1953 after Israeli extremists blew up the Soviet embassy and the Kremlin severed relations. Moreover, American economic aid to Israel in 1949 was interpreted by Moscow as evidence of Israel’s western orientation. Stalin’s anti-Semitism reached its peak in the Prague and Doctors trials.

Conclusions

Was Israel an asset or liability to the west during the cold war? Primary sources present a clear picture of Israel as a constant liability to the west, However, it was regarded as an asset as well at some cold war hot spots such as the Korean war, and as a guardian of Jordan. It held important cards, such as conventional and nuclear liabilities, but without global detente Israel could not survive in the long run. That was why America refused to be more than Israel’s economic patron, and declined to be Israel’s main arms supplier. Israel’s leadership could be criticised for failing to prevent the Six Day War, and American Jewish leadership for failing to influence American presidents. However, all these ‘might have been’ are baseless. The underlying factors coild not be altered: Arab enmity Soviet hatred, absence of a security guarantee, and lack of detente.