scholarly journals Red Signal from Karlsruhe: Towards a New Equilibrium or New Level of Conflict?

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
László Blutman
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Main Task ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Eu

In its PSPP decision, the German Constitutional Court for the first time declared an EU act ultra vires. The decision resulted in a flood of studies, blog posts, and comments. Most criticised the verdict raising a series of objections. We agree with some objections. However, the present study approaches the judgment from the other side. It seeks to understand the situation of the constitutional courts of Member States in the EU legal system, to examine their main dilemmas in relation to EU law, and to explore their possibilities regarding their main task, which is the protection of constitutions. The study highlights the fundamental structural tension that currently characterises the EU legal system concerning Member States’ sovereignty and examines how a balance can be struck in addressing this tension.

The German Constitutional Court and Preliminary References—Still a Match not Made in Heaven?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
The Eu

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).

W poszukiwaniu remedium na bezradność jednostki wobec unikania przez sądy krajowe pytań prejudycjalnych do TSUE – stanowisko ETPCz i sądów konstytucyjnych państw członkowskich

2019 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 32-63
Author(s):  
Hubert Bekisz
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Interesting Phenomenon ◽  
Member States ◽  
Effective Measure ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
Polish Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
The Eu

Preliminary reference to the CJEU is one of the most important achievements of the EU law. In the multicentric legal system it becomes a kind of guarantee to ensure a uniform interpretation of the EU law by courts of the Member States. However, not only is preliminary ruling an aid for judges, who adjudicate cases connected with EU law, but also it might create a possibility for individuals to have their EU rights protected. Unfortunately, EU law does not predict any effective measure, which would protect individual, when a court of the Member State unlawfully refuses to make a preliminary reference. An interesting phenomenon is an attempt to fill this gap by the European Court of Human Rights and constitutional courts of the Member States (especially the German Federal Constitutional Court) in recent years. In their case law, refusing to make a preliminary reference by courts, which are obligated to do that, was qualified as a violation of the right to a fair trial (ECHR) or the right to a lawful judge (constitutional courts). The aim of this article is to consider hitherto situation and to discuss it from the perspective of Polish law.

After the OMT Case: The Supremacy of EU Law as the Guarantee of the Equality of the Member States

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 1003-1023 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Fabbrini
Keyword(s):  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Central ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Cherry Picking ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
The Eu

This article analyzes the recent judgment of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) inGauweiler, answering the first preliminary reference ever by the German Constitutional Court (BVerfG), on the legality of the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program of the European Central Bank (ECB). As the article explains, the ECJ rejected any possible claim of illegality of a key program devised by the ECB at the height of the Euro-crisis. However, because the BVerfG had defined the OMT program as ultra vires, and had threatened to strike it down if the ECJ did not reach the same result, the article defends the principle of the supremacy of European Union (EU) law, indicating that a possible nullification of the OMT program by the BVerfG would be clearly unlawful. To re-affirm the supremacy of EU law, the article argues that this principle is functional to ensure the equality of the member states before the law, preventing each country of the EU from cherry-picking which provisions of EU it likes or not. As the article suggests, respect of the principle of the supremacy of EU law – including by the BVerfG – is ultimately in the interest of every EU member state, including of Germany.

Constitutional Jurisdictions Between the Supremacy of the Constitution and the Primacy of European Union Law

De Jure ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktoriya Mingova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Main Task ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Unique Nature

The interaction between the national constitutional jurisdictions of the Member States and the Court of Justice of the European Union raises questions that often cannot be answered unequivocally. The focus of this debate is, of course, on the fundamental question of whether European Union law takes primacy over national constitutions. This study presents the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on the establishment of the principle of autonomy of EU law in relation to the internal law of the Member States in its development, since it is precisely the positions it adopts that allow the Court of Justice to derive the principle of primacy over ‘any provision of internal law’ as a logical and natural consequence of the unique nature of EU law. On the other hand, since this integration activity of the Court of Justice is not the result of a conscious activity of the Member States, legitimated by their constitutions, the inevitable question arises of whether the results of the activity in question do not clash with the main task of the constitutional courts ‒ to ensure a coherent and uniform application of the law within the national legal order and above all in accordance with the constitution. The case law of the constitutional courts of the Member States presented in this study leads to the conclusion that they regard autonomy as a relative characteristic, which is why they reject the principle of absolute primacy of European Union law over constitutional rules. It seems that no constitutional court could abdicate its role as a court of ‘last word’ in this respect.

The Kelsenian Model of Constitutional Review in Times of European Integration – Reconsidering the Basic Features

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-37
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Kustra-Rogatka
Keyword(s):  
European Integration ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Centralized Control ◽  
Constitutional Treaty ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Basic Features ◽  
The Eu

Summary The paper deals with the changes in the centralized (Kelsenian) model of constitutional review resulting from a state’s membership of the EU, which unequivocally demonstrates the decomposition of the classic paradigm of constitutional judiciary. The main point raised in the paper is that European integration has fundamentally influenced on the four above-mentioned basic elements of the Kelsenian model of constitutional review of legislation, which are the following: the assumption of the hierarchical construction of a legal system; the assumption of the supreme legal force of the constitution as the primary normative act of a given system; a centralised model of reviewing hierarchical conformity of legal norms; coherence of the system guaranteed by a constitutional court’s power to declare defectiveness of a norm and the latter’s derogation. All its fundamental elements have evolved, i.e. the hierarchy of the legal system, the overriding power of the constitution, centralized control of constitutionality, and the erga omnes effect of the ruling on the hierarchical non-conformity of the norms. It should be noted that over the last decade the dynamics of these changes have definitely gained momentum. This has been influenced by several factors, including the “great accession” of 2004, the pursuit of formal constitutionalization of the EU through the Constitutional Treaty, the compromise solutions adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon, the entry into force of the Charter, and the prospect of EU accession to the ECHR. The CJEU has used these factors to deepen the tendencies towards decentralization of constitutional control, by atomising national judicial systems and relativizing the effects of constitutional court rulings within national legal systems. The end result is the observed phenomenon, if not of marginalisation, then at least of a systemic shift in the position of constitutional courts, which have lost their uniqueness and have become “only ones of many” national courts.

Review by Constitutional Courts of the Obligation of National Courts of Last Instance to Refer a Preliminary Question to the Court of Justice of the EU

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The Eu

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.

scholarly journals The notion of ‘employer’: Towards a uniform European concept?

2021 ◽  
pp. 203195252199115
Author(s):  
Matthijs van Schadewijk
Keyword(s):  
Functional Approach ◽  
Working Relationships ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Corporate Groups ◽  
European Legislation ◽  
Contractual Approach ◽  
First Time ◽  
The Eu ◽  
The Way

The growth in multilateral working relationships (e.g. agency work, chains of sub-contracting and corporate groups) is causing Member States to increasingly scrutinise their traditional, contractual approach to the notion of ‘employer’. So far, little attention has been paid to the boundaries and limits that EU law sets when defining the employer. The lack of attention may have come to an end with the recent AFMB judgment, in which the Court ruled, for the first time, that the concept of employer in a provision of EU law had to be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the EU. Starting from the AFMB judgment, the author analyses the concept of employer in EU law. The author finds that the concept of employer in EU law can be described as ‘uniform in its functionality’: in EU law, the national concept of the employer is never absolute, but the circumstances and the way in which the national concept must be set aside depend on the context and the objective of the European legislation in question. Through this functional approach, EU law partly harmonises the various national approaches to the concept of the employer. Nevertheless, a lack of specific reasoning on the part of the Court may grant the Member States considerable leeway to uphold their own views on the concept.

The “Polemical” Spirit of European Constitutional Law: On the Importance of Conflicts in EU Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1343-1374 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe Martinico
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Preliminary Ruling ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Cautious Approach ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The One ◽  
The Eu

Recently, scholars have argued of the necessity of going beyond “judicial dialogues” and “conflict-and-power” approaches to the analysis of the role of national Constitutional Courts in the Union. On the one hand, there are risks connected to a “too welcoming an approach by national constitutional courts to EU law”; on the other hand, it is possible to criticize both the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and some national Constitutional Courts for other, less cooperative, decisions. I share this cautious approach for many reasons, and primarily because the preliminary ruling mechanism does not exhaust all the possible means of communication between constitutional courts and the CJEU. For instance, what Komárek calls “parallel references” can serve, in some circumstances, as a technique of alternative (or hidden) dialogue, that has favored a sort of “remote dialogue” over the years. My sole point of disagreement with this scholarly position is over the role of conflicts in this scenario. Whilst Komárek seems to confine conflicts to phenomena of mere resistance or to “‘cold’ strategic considerations,” in this work I am going to adopt a much broader idea of conflict, which goes beyond mere “conflicts and power games.”

The Relationship between the EU and Member States in Constitutional Case Law: A Comparison between Western and Eastern Europe

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 189-198
Author(s):  
Constance Grewe
Keyword(s):  
Turning Point ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eastern European ◽  
European Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Constitutional Identity ◽  
The Eu

It is indeed a crucial moment now that Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries have begun to join the EU. The Maastricht Treaty was itself, in several respects, a turning point in European construction; Member States then became aware of the increasing influence of EU law and started to defend their autonomy against the ‘attacks’ stemming from it. With the accession of the CEE states, the ‘Solange story: a story about national constitutional courts resisting a straightforward surrender of national legal sovereignties, and insisting on their own role as guardians of any further transfer of powers from the national to the European level’, can now enter into ‘its chapter 3’. National or constitutional identity is the main arm of resistance, and these national reactions require a rethinking of the relationship between national and European law.

The Danger of So-Called Regulatory ‘Gold-Plating’ in Transposition of EU Law – Lessons from Poland

2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (0) ◽  
pp. 73-90
Author(s):  
Michał Jabłoński
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Interesting Aspect ◽  
Gold Plating ◽  
Member States ◽  
Regulatory Policies ◽  
Domestic Legislation ◽  
Polish Law ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Eu

Ukraine, just like Poland over thirteen years ago, is on its route to integration with the EU, which would also require a transposition of EU law into the domestic legal system. In fact, the experience of Poland and other Member States shows that transposition of EU law gives rise to several issues. One interesting aspect concerns so-called gold-plating – that is domestic legislation than goes beyond the requirements set forth in EU law. Usually, it results in a greater regulatory burden imposed on entrepreneurs. The paper discusses three examples of such gold-plating regulations in Polish law – being a consequence of implementation of the EU law. Generally speaking, gold-plating is a negative and unwelcome phenomenon. There exists extensive research that shows the cost of gold-plating for the Member States’ economies. Some of the Member States have introduced regulatory policies in order to avoid gold-plating. The analysis shows that there are several actions that need to be performed to restrict the incidence of gold-plating.

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