Developing the Jurisprudence of Constitutional Remedies for Breach of Fundamental Rights in South Africa: An Analysis of Hoffman and Related Cases

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1&2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
The Novel ◽  
Labour Law

In order to accomplish its objectives of extensively regulating rights and obligations, the 1996 Constitution of South Africa similarly provides for the enforcement of those rights by the courts. In turn, it has, in the said enforcement provisions, invested in the courts enormous discretionary powers to enable them to effectively deal with breaches of the entrenched fundamental rights as well as all constitutional rights violations. That the Constitutional Court has purposefully interpreted and made optimum use of the expressions: ‘appropriate relief’ and ‘just and equitable’ order in developing the constitutional remedies jurisprudence is crystal clear from a wealth of available case law. It is also not in doubt that the contributions of Justice Ngcobo (later Chief Justice) in this regard are intellectually gratifying. This presentation singles out for discussion and analysis the judgment of Ngcobo J in Hoffman v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) which not only typifies judicial activism at its acme; it has also introduced into the South African public and labour laws, the novel remedy of ‘instatement.’ Apparently drawn from the analogy of the labour law remedy of reinstatement, ‘instatement’ is akin to the remedy of mandamus in public law, and specific performance in the law of contract. This article moves from the premise that this innovation is one of its kind in contemporary common law jurisprudence and one which courts in the common law jurisdictions world would no doubt emulate one fine day.

The constitutional invalidity of warrantless drugs searches in South Africa

2017 ◽  
Vol 91 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-138
Author(s):  
Neil Parpworth
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
South African ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Protection ◽  
Police Powers ◽  
Individual Privacy ◽  
Recent Addition

In some jurisdictions, where individual privacy and property rights are afforded constitutional protection, legal disputes regarding police powers of entry and search sometimes extend beyond the law of tort into public law, where the challenge is to the power itself. The South African Constitutional Court has determined the constitutional validity of warrantless powers of entry and search on a number of occasions. This article discusses the most recent addition to this body of case law, as well as several related authorities from other jurisdictions. Where appropriate, reference to the position in English law also forms part of the discussion.

scholarly journals Religious Freedom and Equality as Celebration of Difference: A Significant Development in Recent South African Constitutional Case-Law

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lourens Du Plessis
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Significant Contribution ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Significant Development ◽  
Cultural Rights ◽  
Kwazulu Natal ◽  
Minority Religion ◽  
The Right

This contribution focuses on the way in which the South African Constitutional Court has, since 1997, been dealing with the (seemingly) eccentric claims of (assumedly) idiosyncratic 'religious Others'. Developments in this regard have, for the time being at least, culminated in the Constitutional Court's landmark judgment in MEC for Education: KwaZulu Natal v Pillay 2008 (2) BCLR 99 (CC), 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC)(hereafter Pillay). Constitutional Court judgments since 1997 manifesting the adjudication of such unconventional claims are assessed, eventually getting to Pillay as benchmark. This remarkable judgment, dealing with a deceptively mundane issue, has played a considerable role in fleshing out a jurisprudence of difference, putting an adherent of a vulnerable, minority religion in the right. This is not just a high point in the adjudication of constitutional entitlements of the religious (and cultural) Other in South Africa, but also a significant contribution to the growth of a jurisprudence sensitive to the predicaments and constitutional entitlements of unconventional, 'non-mainstream' claimants of religious (and cultural) rights. Finally Pillay illustrates that the constitutional guarantee of the right to freedom of religion, conscience, belief and opinion (entrenched in section 15(1) of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa 1996) can be crucially dependent upon due effect being given to the proscription of unfair discrimination on the grounds of religion, conscience, belief and opinion elsewhere (namely in section 9(3)) of the Constitution.

Quantification of damages for unlawful arrest and detention: South Africa, Namibia and Eswatini/Swaziland (2)

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 617-645
Author(s):  
Chuks Okpaluba
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Development ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Present Part ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The discussion of the South African case law on the quantification of damages arising from wrongful arrest and detention which commenced in part (1) of this series, continues in the present part. In part (1), the Constitutional Court judgment in Zealand v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2008 (4) SA 458 (CC) which emphasised the respect and reverence for the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty, and De Klerk v Minister of Police 2018 (2) SACR 28 (SCA) as well as the recent Constitutional Court judgment in the same case – De Klerk v Minister of Police 2020 (1) SACR 1 (CC); [2019] ZACC 32 (22 August 2019) – were among a host of important cases discussed. The Supreme Court of Appeal cases on quantification of damages for wrongful arrest and detention also discussed include: Mashilo v Prinsloo 2013 (2) SACR 648 (SCA); Minister of Police v Zweni (842/2017) [2018] ZASCA 97 (1 June 2018); Minister of Safety and Security v Magagula (991/2016) [2017] ZASCA 103 (6 September 2017). The first section of this part continues with the discussion of the other instances not involving failure to take the detainee to court within 48 hours or consequences of the accused person’s first appearance in court whereby Hendricks v Minister of Safety and Security (CA&R/2015) [2015] ZAECGHC 61 (4 June 2015); Mrasi v Minister of Safety and Security 2015 (2) SACR 28 (ECG); and Ramphal v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 (1) SACR 211 (E) are among the cases discussed. The second limb of the discussion in this part concerns the issue of wrongful arrest and detention under the Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 where the law has developed side by side with the traditional law of wrongful arrest and police negligence as illustrated by the case of Naidoo v Minister of Police 2016 (1) SACR 468 (SCA).

“The Terrible Genius of Literature”: Reassessing Reconciliation in Nadine Gordimer’s The House Gun

2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey J. Golden
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Law And Literature ◽  
Truth And Reconciliation Commission ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The Novel ◽  
The South ◽  
Reconciliation Commission ◽  
Truth And Reconciliation ◽  
The Law

During the three years in which Gordimer drafted The House Gun (1998), she relied heavily on South African case law, international jurisprudence, and the discerning editorial eye of Nelson Mandela’s lawyer, George Bizos. As such, my reading of The House Gun brings new attention to the novel’s engagement with the reconciliatory efforts of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the juridical work of the South African Constitutional Court to redefine the terms of reconciliation in the country. Through language in a fictional courtroom, Gordimer’s novel turns the process of repair into one that is always immediate and ongoing. It shifts the primarily retributive focus of the law into a reparative and open-ended endeavor. Justice no longer is something that “is done,” Gordimer explains, but rather is a process equally conceived by law and literature. The novel depicts harm in terms of the interpersonal, spatial, and legal fractures it creates. In this way, it expresses reconciliation in the Commission’s language of bridging an injurious past with a present always open to healing.

scholarly journals PRESENCE AS A BASIS FOR THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT SOUNDING IN MONEY: THE “REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION” TEST CONSIDERED

Obiter ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
GMN Xaba
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Natural Justice ◽  
Recognition And Enforcement ◽  
Mere Presence ◽  
The Common ◽  
Foreign Judgment ◽  
Academic Debate

A somewhat contested basis of international competence in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in South Africa is mere presence. Over the years, an academic debate has raged in South Africa over mere presence as a basis of jurisdiction for the enforcement of foreign judgments sounding in money. A recent decision by the Constitutional Court makes the topic worth revisiting.Practical circumstances, social and political considerations as well as natural justice inevitably call for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. As Forsyth aptly puts it “[a] plaintiff may sue in one country and hear with pleasure judgment given in his favour, then discover, to his dismay, that the defendant, with his assets, has absconded to another country”. In such a situation, the judgment has become brutum fulmen in the court which pronounced it and the plaintiff is placed in a grossly prejudicial position. However, because of widely accepted values and principles, legal systems of the world recognize and appreciate that a judgment rendered by the courts of one country may be enforced elsewhere, provided certain conditions are satisfied.Under South African common law one of the conditions for the enforcement of foreign judgments is that the court which pronounced the judgment must have had jurisdiction to entertain the case according to the principles of our law with reference to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. (In Reiss Engineering Co Ltd v Insamcor (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 1033 (W) 1037B the court stated that the mere fact that the foreign court may have had jurisdiction under its own laws, is not conclusive. Instead, the question of jurisdiction has to be determined in the light of the principles of our law on the jurisdiction of foreign courts. Other requirements for recognition and enforcement are that (i) the foreign judgment must be final and conclusive in its effect and not have become superannuated; (ii) the recognition and enforcement of the judgment by South African courts should not be contrary to public policy; (iii) the foreign judgment should not have been obtained by fraudulent means; (iv) the judgment must not involve the enforcement of a penal or revenue law of the foreign state; and (v) the enforcement of the foreign judgment must not be precluded by the provisions of the Protection of Business Act 99 of 1978, as amended. See Jones v Krok 1995 (1) SA 667 (AD) 685B−D.) This note is concerned only with the requirement that the foreign court that pronounced the judgment must have had jurisdiction to entertain the case according to the principles of our law with reference to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. The other four requirements are outside the scope of this paper and will not be discussed. It appears that the requirement that the foreign court must have had jurisdiction is a tenet central to the common law world. This requirement is a concept sui generis which is not affected by the internal jurisdiction rules of the foreign court, nor by the internal jurisdiction rules of the South African courts. Under South African common law there are, at least, two grounds which have been established with absolute clarity, that clothe a foreign court with international competence.

Derechos sociales y amparo constitucional

2012 ◽  
pp. 17-57
Author(s):  
María DÍAZ CREGO
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Social Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
International Treaty ◽  
Spanish Constitution ◽  
The Social ◽  
Procedural Safeguard ◽  
National Constitution

LABURPENA: Nahiz eta Espainiako Konstituzioak eskubide sozial sorta handia aitortu, bertako 53. artikuluaren jokoak oinarrizko eskubideak bermatzeko mekanismotik kanpo uzten ditu eskubide sozial horiek. Artikulu horrek zalantzan jartzen baitu eskubide sozial gehienen justiziabilitatea. Eta ez hori bakarrik; gainera, oinarrizko eskubideak Auzitegi Konstituzionalean bermatzeko espresuki eraturiko auzibidetik kanpo uzten ditu, hots, babes-errekurtsotik kanpo. Eskubide sozialen degradazio hori, ohikoa Zuzenbide Konparatuan, saihestu izan da, auzitegi nazional eta nazioarteko askotan, eskubideoi zeharkako babesa ematen dieten estrategien bitartez. Ildo horretan, gaurko azterlan honen xedea da babes-errekurtsoetan ezarritako jurisprudentzia konstituzionala analizatzea, ikusteko zer neurritaraino baliatu den Auzitegi Konstituzionala estrategia horietaz Konstituzioak aitortzen dituen eskubide sozial gehienak babes-errekurtsoek eskaintzen duten aterpetik kanpo uzteko joerari aurre egiteko. RESUMEN: A pesar de que la Constitución española reconoce un importante elenco de derechos sociales, el juego de su artículo 53 les excluye de los principales mecanismos de garantía de los derechos fundamentales. Este precepto no sólo pone en duda la justiciabilidad de la mayoría de los derechos sociales, sino que les excluye de la vía procesal específicamente pensada para garantizar los derechos fundamentales ante el Tribunal Constitucional: el recurso de amparo. Esta degradación de los derechos sociales, habitual en Derecho comparado, ha sido salvada por muchos tribunales nacionales e internacionales utilizando estrategias de protección indirecta de estos derechos. En esta línea, el objeto del presente trabajo es analizar la jurisprudencia constitucional sentada en recursos de amparo a fin de identificar en qué medida el Tribunal Constitucional ha hecho uso de esas estrategias para paliar la exclusión de la mayoría de los derechos sociales reconocidos en la Constitución de la protección que otorga el amparo. ABSTRACT: Although the Spanish Constitution recognizes a remarkable cast of social rights, its article 53 excludes these rights from the mechanisms built to guarantee the protection of constitutional rights. Article 53 brings into question the justiciability of most of the social rights recognized in the Spanish Constitution and deprives most of them from the protection granted by the recurso de amparo, the procedural safeguard specifically designed to protect fundamental rights in case of individual violations before the Spanish Constitutional Court. However, this situation is not so atipical as many other national and international courts face this sort of limits by developing a creative case law in order to protect social rights even when the national constitution or the international treaty they interpretate do not expressly recognize these rights. In this sense, the aim of this paper is to analyse the Spanish Constitutional Court’s case law as to determine to what extent it has made use of the indirect strategies to ensure the justiciability of social rights that other courts have already used.

Justice Sandile Ngcobo and the Judicial Reinforcement of Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (1&2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Maropeng Mpya ◽  
Nomthandazo Ntlama
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Intergovernmental Relations ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Public Authority ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
Judicial Reasoning ◽  
Judicial Authority

The importance of co-operative governance is strengthened by the authority vested in the judiciary—to ensure the judicial review of any conduct, rule or law that runs contrary to the prescripts of the envisaged collaborative relations. Of particular significance is the establishment of the Constitutional Court, where retired Chief Justice Ngcobo distinguished himself as an independent thinker, within the limitations of judicial authority, in advancing the principles of co-operative governance. His rich intellect demonstrates an alternative way of arriving at the constitutionalised South African jurisprudence that has spanned twenty-two years of democracy in regulating public authority. This article reviews and provides an account of Justice Ngcobo’s selected case law in the judicial enforcement of the principles of co-operative governance. The objective is to give impetus to the advancement of an unwavering commitment and a well thought-out, futuristic and progressive outlook on the evolution of South African jurisprudence. These were motivated by a zeal to establish his deep-rooted philosophy that informed his thoughts in judicial reasoning. The motivation raises a question that is intended to help determine whether his contribution has shifted the culture of dictatorship of the pre-democratic dispensation to the affirmation of the principles of constitutional supremacy in a way that befits the general populace affected by the different spheres of government.

scholarly journals IS THERE STILL DEFAMATION BASED ON ADULTERY UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN LAW? A CRITICAL REVIEW J v J (4918 2012) [2016] ZAKZDHC 33 (unreported)

Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael C Buthelezi
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
High Court ◽  
Personality Rights ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Made In

On 22 July 2016, the Durban High Court ruled (per Masipa J) that there is no longer an action for defamation founded on the publication of allegations of adultery against another person. The court solely based its finding on the earlier judgment of the Constitutional Court (CC) in DE v RH (2015 (5) SA 83 (CC); 2015 (9) BCLR 1003 (CC), hereinafter “DE”). Earlier, in June 2015, in the DE judgment, the CC had unanimously struck down delictual action for contumelia and loss of consortium damages founded on adultery. In annulling this action, the CC held that the common-law action for contumelia and loss of consortium was no longer viable and that it was incompatible with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Still, a question that was never considered by the courts prior the judgment of J is whether the DE judgment has automatically abolished other delictual actions aimed at protecting personality rights, specifically an action for defamation, and in general, actions for invasion of privacy and impairment of dignity, all founded on allegations of adultery. In this judgment, the court held that in view of the decision of DE, “public opinion no longer considers adultery as tabooed... a statement to the effect that a person committed adultery can no longer convey a meaning with the propensity to define a person …”. Nevertheless, when the opportunity to definitively answer this question ultimately presented itself, albeit in relation to defamation of character (or the protection of reputation), the court in J failed to satisfactorily address this vital question. As it will be demonstrated in this contribution, the judgment of Masipa J in the J judgment does not appear to be legally sound. Primarily, no authority, other than the CC judgment of DE, is used to support the judgment of J. As a result, the judgment has not even succeeded in dealing with the question of defamation, let alone other actions (namely, privacy and dignity) – all founded on adultery. Instead, the judgment creates confusion whether the judgment of DE extends to an action for defamation, and possibly to privacy and dignity. The objective of this note is to provide a critical analysis of the high court judgment in J. The critique is undertaken in light of the reasoning in DE and other like judgments. It begins by setting out the background to the ruling of the high court, followed by a commentary on the judgment. The commentary is undertaken in the form of a comparative analysis between the approaches adopted by the court in DE and in J, highlighting the striking differences in approaches by the two courts, when they develop the common-law. In addition, the critique of the high court judgment is made in light of the interests that the judgment of DE sought to protect when it abolished an action in adultery, and those that were at issue in the judgment of J. Thereafter, a conclusion is provided. The stance that the note adopts is that the CC in DE did not repeal defamation action founded on allegations of adultery; and that even if such action were to be annulled privacy and dignity ought to remain, as of necessity.

Balancing Free Trade Principles with Other Constitutional Provisions in the Context of Preferential Trade Agreements

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-107
Author(s):  
Liliana Lizarazo-Rodríguez ◽  
Philippe De Lombaerde
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
National Level ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Regulatory Architecture ◽  
The Government ◽  
The One ◽  
Economic Modernization

Colombia’s Constitution of 1991 is an ambitious text which tries to strike a balance between laying a strong foundation for economic modernization and liberalization, on the one hand, and the creation of a Social State of Law and the protection of an impressive list of constitutional rights, on the other. Because of the doctrine that has been developed by the Constitutional Court since then, it has been considered as one of the most activist courts worldwide, next to courts such as the South African court. One of the factors that has thereby complicated its task is the fact that, since the 1990s, the government has actively multiplied its international economic commitments. In this article, case law of the Colombian Constitutional Court is analyzed, with a focus on balancing: (a) between the binding character of (regional and bilateral) free trade commitments and the constitutional competences of the sub-national level, and (b) between international free trade commitments and the protection of constitutional social rights. Both cases shed light on the balancing task of the court in a complex international context, in the presence of a multi-level regulatory architecture.

scholarly journals MARITAL RAPE: A TALE OF TWO LEGAL SYSTEMS

Obiter ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oyebanke Yebisi ◽  
Victoria Balogun
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
South African ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Criminal Code ◽  
Marital Rape ◽  
The South ◽  
Sexual Offences ◽  
The Common

Marital rape is a form of sexual violence, which is often downplayed due to the common law position that a man cannot rape his wife. While certain jurisdictions have enacted laws criminalising it, other jurisdictions have yet to criminalise it. This paper focuses on the criminal aspects of marital rape and examines the laws regarding marital rape in South Africa and the general rape provisions in Nigeria. While marital rape is punishable under South African criminal law, it is not in Nigeria. In this paper, the provisions of the South African Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Other Related Matters) Act of 2007, the Criminal Code Act, and the Penal Code Act – Nigeria in relation to rape and marital rape – are analysed. This paper also discusses the South African Sexual Offences Court, sentencing for rape in the selected countries, and relevant case law. It concludes that South Africa (SA) has a generally good framework with respect to rape and marital rape, but the country should work more on the strict application of the laws in place. It also suggests that Nigeria should establish a sexual offences court using the South African model and should amend the Criminal Law to expressly criminalise marital rape.

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