scholarly journals La aplicación del artículo 155 de la Constitución a Cataluña. Un examen de su dudosa constitucionalidad

Author(s):  
Joan RIDAO MARTÍN

LABURPENA: Kataluniako autogobernu-erakunde burujabeei Espainiako Konstituzioaren 155. artikulua aplikatu zaie modu aitzindarian. Artikulu horrek, hain zuzen, estatuaren hertsadura-mekanismoa xedatzen du, eta erabaki horrek, atzean dagoen gatazka politikoan eduki duen eraginaz harago, transzedentzia handia izan du konstituzio mailan. Horrenbestez, eta Estatuaren legezkotasuna eskualdeko gobernuen aurrean babesteko Konstituzioak dituen baliabideen legitimitatea zalantzan jarri gabe (estatu konposatu gehienen konstituzio-ordenamenduek ezartzen dituzte horrelakoak), orain arte ezagutu ez den Espainiako praxiaren berritasunak, horren inguruan zabaldu den eztabaidarekin batera, Konstituzioaren bidezkotasuna aztertzera bultzatzen gaitu: bai premisei, bai ezohiko baliabide horren babespean hartutako neurriei dagokienez. Azterketa hori eginda, gainera, zenbait akats antzeman daitezke; eta akats horiek, ziurrenik, konstituzio-kontrakotasuna azaleratzen dute. RESUMEN: La pionera aplicación del mecanismo de coerción estatal del artículo 155 de la Constitución Española a las instituciones de autogobierno de Cataluña ha tenido una evidente trascendencia constitucional, más allá de las repercusiones sobre el conflicto político que subyace en su fundamento. Así, sin poner en duda la legitimidad de los instrumentos constitucionales de protección de la legalidad estatal frente a la actuación de los gobiernos regionales, presentes en la mayoría de ordenamientos constitucionales de los Estados compuestos, la novedad que presenta la hasta ahora inédita praxis española, y la litigiosidad desatada al respecto, nos invita a realizar un examen de la justeza constitucional tanto de los presupuestos como de las medidas adoptadas al amparo de ese extraordinario recurso, con el resultado de que de ese escrutinio se derivan diversos vicios que determinan su más que probable inconstitucionalidad. ABSTRACT: The pioneering enforcement of the state coercion mechanism of article 155 of the Spanish Constitution to the self-government institutions of Catalonia has had an evident constitutional transcendence, beyond the implications on the political conflict that underlies its basis. Thus, without questioning the legitimacy of the constitutional instruments for the protection of State legality against the actions by regional governments, present in most of the constitutional systems of the composite States, the novelty presented by the hitherto unprecedented Spanish praxis, and litigation unleashed in this regard, invites us to scrutinize the constitutional fairness of both the principles and the measures adopted under this extraordinary measure, with the result that this scrutiny leads to various flaws that determine its more than likely unconstitutionality.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
Proma Ray Chaudhury

Abstract Operating within the androcentric premises that support idealized models of populist leadership, self-representations cultivated by female populist leaders often involve precarious balancing acts, compelling them to appropriate contextualized traditionalist discourses and modes of power to qualify for conventional leadership models. This article engages with the stylistic performance of populist leadership by Mamata Banerjee of the All India Trinamool Congress in the state of West Bengal, India, focusing on her adoption of the discursive mode of political asceticism, nativist rhetoric, and religious iconography. Through an interpretive analysis of selected party documents, autobiography, and semistructured interviews with Banerjee's followers and critics, the article delineates Banerjee's populist self-fashioning as a political ascetic and explores perceptions of her leadership. The article argues that while the self-makings of female populist leaders remain fraught and contested, they contribute substantially toward redrawing the boundaries of both conventional leadership models and the broader political landscapes they inhabit.


Author(s):  
Heather Hamill

This chapter argues that, from the early days of the political conflict in the 1970s the conditions were such that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) adopted some of the functions of the state, namely the provision of policing and punishment of ordinary crime. The hostility of the statutory criminal justice system, particularly the police, toward the working-class Catholic community dramatically increased the costs of using state services. The high levels of disaffection and aggression among working-class Catholics toward the police meant that the state could no longer fulfill its function and police the community in any “normal” way. A demand for policing therefore existed. Simultaneously, this demand was met and fostered by the IRA, which had the motivation, the manpower, and the monopoly on the use of violence necessary to carry out this role.


Author(s):  
Jelle J.P. Wouters

This chapter examines how protracted political conflict shapes the ways ordinary Naga men and women ‘see’ the postcolonial state. For most Nagas, long decades of conflict were marked by a dual relation to the state. On the one hand, they experienced the coercive, repressive powers of the state, while, after the enactment of Nagaland in 1963, the state manifested itself as a source of largesse and livelihood, as part of a politically driven policy of ‘seduction’ to tie Nagas to existing state structures and the political status quo. These historical experiences muddled distinctions between the state as a benevolent provider and protector, and that of a dispenser of bodily violence and misery, between the state as a lucrative resource and reservoir of public resentment. The way Naga villagers engage and ‘see’ the state, I argue, is mediated by this historical ambiguity.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 287-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aleida Assmann

The first part of the article invites a fresh look at the often defined concepts of ‘space’ and ‘place’, connecting them to different subject positions, mental frames and projects. The second part addresses memory issues that underlie the political conflict between the state of Israel and Palestinians in the Near East. It will analyse two seemingly incompatible memories related to the same events and topography. The focus of the essay is not only on the divisive force with which two incompatible histories are constructed in the same landscape but also on recent memory practices and performances that raise awareness of this impasse and work towards a more complex and inclusive transnational memory of the entangled history of 1948.


2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 560-585
Author(s):  
Sinja Graf

This essay theorizes how the enforcement of universal norms contributes to the solidification of sovereign rule. It does so by analyzing John Locke’s argument for the founding of the commonwealth as it emerges from his notion of universal crime in the Second Treatise of Government. Previous studies of punishment in the state of nature have not accounted for Locke’s notion of universal crime which pivots on the role of mankind as the subject of natural law. I argue that the dilemmas specific to enforcing the natural law against “trespasses against the whole species” drive the founding of sovereign government. Reconstructing Locke’s argument on private property in light of universal criminality, the essay shows how the introduction of money in the state of nature destabilizes the normative relationship between the self and humanity. Accordingly, the failures of enforcing the natural law require the partitioning of mankind into separate peoples under distinct sovereign governments. This analysis theorizes the creation of sovereign rule as part of the political productivity of Locke’s notion of universal crime and reflects on an explicitly political, rather than normative, theory of “humanity.”


1994 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Berk

The election of 1912 retains its hold on the imagination of students of American political development. Long interpreted as a conflict between tradition and modernity, Martin Sklar has recently argued that the old order had passed by 1912. In law and economy, competitive-proprietary capitalism had been eclipsed by administration. The political conflict was now overwhowould administer prices and investment, the corporation of the state?


2004 ◽  
Vol 25 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 41-53
Author(s):  
Dudley Knowles

Hegel's account of freedom is complex and difficult. It integrates a doctrine of free agency, a theory of social freedom, and a self-determining theodicy of Spirit. To achieve full understanding, if full understanding is possible, the student must both disentangle and articulate the components, and then fit together the separate pieces into an intelligible whole. And what is true of the whole is true of the parts; each element is in turn complex and controversial.In this paper, I want to investigate one very small aspect of this picture — the political phenomenology of the citizen of Hegel's rational state. Whether we are delineating the contours of free agency or re-telling Hegel's story about the modes of freedom constitutive of the institutions of the modern state, sooner or later we shall have to interpret Hegel's description of the self-consciousness of the typical citizen. We shall have to give some account of what citizens take to be their political standing, and show how both this standing and the citizens' understanding of it contribute to freedom.This should not be a controversial claim. To paraphrase portions of the famous statement at PR §260: The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. Members of families integrated into civil society knowingly and willingly acknowledge their citizenship and actively pursue the ends of the state. They do not live as private persons merely; in understanding, endorsing and acting out their ethical status as citizens they achieve such subjective fulfilment as isnecessaryfor them to be truly free.


Duty to Self ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 160-194
Author(s):  
Paul Schofield

This chapter argues for the existence of political duties owed to the self, which justify state coercion for the sake of the individual coerced. A person can pose a threat to her own freedom, and to her own ability to acquire what she is owed. Thus, a person’s relationship to herself raises concerns about both right and justice, thereby licensing the state to subject her to paternalistic policy, justified on liberal grounds. Paternalistic laws discussed include those outlawing tobacco, those limiting the amount of debt a person can take on, forced savings programs, and prohibitions on slavery contracts.


Duty to Self ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 139-159
Author(s):  
Paul Schofield

This chapter discusses difficulties with the idea that there exist duties to the self that the state may paternalistically force a person to discharge. The liberal tradition typically prizes freedom, and so views with suspicion any suggestion that a person ought to be coerced for her own sake. State coercion is permissible only to realize right and justice, which are usually thought to regulate relationships between distinct persons. Since a person’s relationship to herself is typically not thought to be one regulated by right or justice, coercion of a person for her own sake has been consistently rejected within the liberal tradition.


Author(s):  
Andrei Bespalov

AbstractMainstream political liberals hold that state coercion is legitimate only if it is justified on the grounds of reasons that all may reasonably be expected to accept. Critics argue that this public justification principle (PJP) is self-defeating, because it depends on moral justifications that not all may reasonably be expected to accept. To rebut the self-defeat objection, I elaborate on the following disjunction: one either agrees or disagrees that it is wrong to impose one’s morality on others by the coercive power of the state. Those who disagree reject PJP, they understand politics as war. Those who agree accept PJP, they understand politics as competition. Political competitors abide by PJP to avoid politics as war, by enforcing PJP on political combatants they engage in a war that is unavoidable. In both cases their exercise of political power has a justification that is reasonably acceptable to all.


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