scholarly journals Against Public Reason’s Alleged Self-Defeat

Author(s):  
Andrei Bespalov

AbstractMainstream political liberals hold that state coercion is legitimate only if it is justified on the grounds of reasons that all may reasonably be expected to accept. Critics argue that this public justification principle (PJP) is self-defeating, because it depends on moral justifications that not all may reasonably be expected to accept. To rebut the self-defeat objection, I elaborate on the following disjunction: one either agrees or disagrees that it is wrong to impose one’s morality on others by the coercive power of the state. Those who disagree reject PJP, they understand politics as war. Those who agree accept PJP, they understand politics as competition. Political competitors abide by PJP to avoid politics as war, by enforcing PJP on political combatants they engage in a war that is unavoidable. In both cases their exercise of political power has a justification that is reasonably acceptable to all.

Duty to Self ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 160-194
Author(s):  
Paul Schofield

This chapter argues for the existence of political duties owed to the self, which justify state coercion for the sake of the individual coerced. A person can pose a threat to her own freedom, and to her own ability to acquire what she is owed. Thus, a person’s relationship to herself raises concerns about both right and justice, thereby licensing the state to subject her to paternalistic policy, justified on liberal grounds. Paternalistic laws discussed include those outlawing tobacco, those limiting the amount of debt a person can take on, forced savings programs, and prohibitions on slavery contracts.


Duty to Self ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 139-159
Author(s):  
Paul Schofield

This chapter discusses difficulties with the idea that there exist duties to the self that the state may paternalistically force a person to discharge. The liberal tradition typically prizes freedom, and so views with suspicion any suggestion that a person ought to be coerced for her own sake. State coercion is permissible only to realize right and justice, which are usually thought to regulate relationships between distinct persons. Since a person’s relationship to herself is typically not thought to be one regulated by right or justice, coercion of a person for her own sake has been consistently rejected within the liberal tradition.


2011 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher W. Morris

AbstractState power is widely thought to be coercive. The view that governments must wield force or that their power is necessarily coercive is widespread in contemporary political thought. John Rawls is representative in claiming that (political power is always coercive power backed up by the government(s use of sanctions, for government alone has the authority to use force in upholding its laws.( This belief in the centrality of coercion and force plays an important but not well appreciated role in contemporary political thought. I wish to challenge this belief and the considerations that motivate it. States are not necessarily coercive or coercive (by definition.( Their claimed authority is prior to the force they wield. Legitimate states should need to resort to coercion and force much less than other states, and that fact seems unappreciated in contemporary political thought.


Author(s):  
Joan RIDAO MARTÍN

LABURPENA: Kataluniako autogobernu-erakunde burujabeei Espainiako Konstituzioaren 155. artikulua aplikatu zaie modu aitzindarian. Artikulu horrek, hain zuzen, estatuaren hertsadura-mekanismoa xedatzen du, eta erabaki horrek, atzean dagoen gatazka politikoan eduki duen eraginaz harago, transzedentzia handia izan du konstituzio mailan. Horrenbestez, eta Estatuaren legezkotasuna eskualdeko gobernuen aurrean babesteko Konstituzioak dituen baliabideen legitimitatea zalantzan jarri gabe (estatu konposatu gehienen konstituzio-ordenamenduek ezartzen dituzte horrelakoak), orain arte ezagutu ez den Espainiako praxiaren berritasunak, horren inguruan zabaldu den eztabaidarekin batera, Konstituzioaren bidezkotasuna aztertzera bultzatzen gaitu: bai premisei, bai ezohiko baliabide horren babespean hartutako neurriei dagokienez. Azterketa hori eginda, gainera, zenbait akats antzeman daitezke; eta akats horiek, ziurrenik, konstituzio-kontrakotasuna azaleratzen dute. RESUMEN: La pionera aplicación del mecanismo de coerción estatal del artículo 155 de la Constitución Española a las instituciones de autogobierno de Cataluña ha tenido una evidente trascendencia constitucional, más allá de las repercusiones sobre el conflicto político que subyace en su fundamento. Así, sin poner en duda la legitimidad de los instrumentos constitucionales de protección de la legalidad estatal frente a la actuación de los gobiernos regionales, presentes en la mayoría de ordenamientos constitucionales de los Estados compuestos, la novedad que presenta la hasta ahora inédita praxis española, y la litigiosidad desatada al respecto, nos invita a realizar un examen de la justeza constitucional tanto de los presupuestos como de las medidas adoptadas al amparo de ese extraordinario recurso, con el resultado de que de ese escrutinio se derivan diversos vicios que determinan su más que probable inconstitucionalidad. ABSTRACT: The pioneering enforcement of the state coercion mechanism of article 155 of the Spanish Constitution to the self-government institutions of Catalonia has had an evident constitutional transcendence, beyond the implications on the political conflict that underlies its basis. Thus, without questioning the legitimacy of the constitutional instruments for the protection of State legality against the actions by regional governments, present in most of the constitutional systems of the composite States, the novelty presented by the hitherto unprecedented Spanish praxis, and litigation unleashed in this regard, invites us to scrutinize the constitutional fairness of both the principles and the measures adopted under this extraordinary measure, with the result that this scrutiny leads to various flaws that determine its more than likely unconstitutionality.


Author(s):  
S.S. Hasanova ◽  
R.R. Hatueva ◽  
A.L. Arsaev

This article discusses the pros and cons of applying professional income tax. Professional income tax is not mandatory, but an alternative way to pay 2 taxes on self-employment or part-time work. The introduction of this tax can mediate an increase in revenues to the state budget, which is of particular importance for the country in post-crisis conditions.


Author(s):  
Arjun Chowdhury

This chapter provides an informal rationalist model of state formation as an exchange between a central authority and a population. In the model, the central authority protects the population against external threats and the population disarms and pays taxes. The model specifies the conditions under which the exchange is self-enforcing, meaning that the parties prefer the exchange to alternative courses of action. These conditions—costly but winnable interstate war—are historically rare, and the cost of such wars can rise beyond the population’s willingness to sacrifice. At this point, the population prefers to avoid war rather than fight it and may prefer an alternative institution to the state if that institution can prevent war and reduce the level of extraction. Thus the modern centralized state is self-undermining rather than self-enforcing. A final section addresses alternative explanations for state formation.


1998 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 554-588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross Grantham

THE concept of ownership is a complex, powerful and controversial idea. In law it explains, justifies and gives moral force to a host of rights and duties as well as serving to legitimate the allocation of wealth and privilege. The influence of this idea is, furthermore, everywhere embodied in the law. In company law, legal and economic conceptions have both rested on and have been shaped by the normative implications of ownership. Historically, ownership was the principal explanation and justification for the central role of shareholders in corporate affairs. As owners, shareholders were entitled to control the management of the company and to the exclusive benefit of the company's activities. Ownership also served to legitimate the corporate form itself. So long as it was owned by individuals the economic and political power of the company was both benign and a bulwark against the intrusion of the state.


2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 560-588 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Biggers ◽  
Michael J. Hanmer

Recently, many states have reversed the decades-long trend of facilitating ballot access by enacting a wave of laws requesting or requiring identification from registrants before they vote. Identification laws, however, are not an entirely new phenomenon. We offer new theoretical insights regarding how changes in political power influence the adoption of identification laws. In the most extensive analysis to date, we use event history analysis to examine why states adopted a range of identification laws over the past several decades. We consistently find that the propensity to adopt is greatest when control of the governor’s office and legislature switches to Republicans (relationships not previously identified), and that this likelihood increases further as the size of Black and Latino populations in the state expands. We also find that federal legislation in the form of the Help America Vote Act seems to enhance the effects of switches in partisan control.


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