Algunas manifestaciones de la libertad de conciencia en una sociedad globalizada

Author(s):  
Lorenzo MARTÍN-RETORTILLO BAQUER

LABURPENA: Giza Eskubideen Europako Auzitegiaren duela gutxiko bi ebazpenek erakutsi dute kultura ezberdinen ezaugarriek erlijio-askatasuna mugatu dezaketela. Alde batetik, Holandako talde erlijioso baten kasua dugu. Brasildik jasotako ohitura baten eraginez, gurtzaren ekintza garrantzitsuenetako bat substantzia haluzinogeno baten kontsumoa da, drogen aurkako legediak berariaz debekatzen duena. Bestetik, erlijio sunita Ahmadiyya fedeagatik aldatzearen ondorioz jazarpena jasaten duen pakistandarraren kasua dugu. Bere herrialdetik ihes egin eta Frantzian babesa eskatu behar izan du, jakinik Pakistanera itzultzera behartzen badute, tratu txarrak jasotzeko arriskuan egongo dela. RESUMEN: Dos recientes decisiones del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos ilustran acerca de cómo la influencia de las peculiaridades de distintas culturas puede afectar al ejercicio de la libertad religiosa. Uno de los supuestos, ofrece el caso de un grupo religioso establecido en Holanda y que, por influencia brasileña, considera como uno de los más importantes actos del culto el consumo de una sustancia alucinógena que está expresamente prohibida por la legislación antidroga. El otro caso contempla las persecuciones de que es objeto en Paquistán un sunita por cambiar de religión y pasar a profesar la fe ahmadia. Hasta el punto de tener que escapar del país, lo que le lleva a refugiarse en Francia, donde pedirá asilo. Con el riesgo de que, si es expulsado a su país, se expone a ser objeto de malos tratos. ABSTRACT: Two recent decisions by the European Court of Human Rights show how the influence of the peculiarities of different cultures can have an impact in the exercise of the religious freedom. One of the cases offers the case of a religious group in Holland and that due to Brazilian influence considers one of its more important worshipping acts the use of one hallucinogenic substance totally barred by the antidrug legislation. The other case considers the prosecutions suffered by a sunni in Pakistan for having changed religion and been practicing the ahmadian faith. To the point of eventually escaping from the country which brings him to look for shelter in France where he will ask for asylum. There is the risk that if he is expelled to his country it might be exposed to abuses.

Author(s):  
Konstantinos Margaritis

Freedom of religion has been constantly characterized as one of the foundations of a democratic society. On the other hand, the significance of physical education in the development of children's overall personality is beyond dispute. Thus, the question that arises is, What happens in a case of a conflict involving the above? The aim of this chapter is to provide an answer on the basis of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In particular, the fundamental cases of Dogru vs. France and Kervanci vs. France will be examined, as well as the recent case of Osmanoglu and Kocabas vs. Switzerland. Through the analysis of the cases, useful conclusions will be drawn on the possible impact of religious freedom on physical education.


Legal Theory ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 244-271
Author(s):  
Paul Billingham

ABSTRACTThe idea of “church autonomy” has risen to prominence in law and religion discourse in recent years. Defenders argue that church autonomy is essential to protecting religious freedom, while critics argue that it permits great harm. This heated dispute often obscures the fact that religious group autonomy is not all-or-nothing. Religious organizations can enjoy some autonomy without being free from all legal oversight. This article thus seeks to make progress in the debate by providing a taxonomy of kinds of judicial examination of religious organizations’ decisions—focusing on employment decisions—and normatively assessing each kind. I argue that religious groups should enjoy protection from certain kinds of examination, but other kinds are justifiable, and even required. My argument supports an approach similar to that seen in some recent European Court of Human Rights decisions, rather than the less discriminating approach of U.S. courts.


Author(s):  
Francisco José Morales Yago

El concepto de «diálogo entre Tribunales» se ha empleado con muy diversos sentidos. En el presente trabajo, tomando en cuenta la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y de los Tribunales españoles, el concepto se entiende como la interrelación recíproca entre Tribunales de distintos ordenamientos, con consecuencias prácticas reflejadas en las resoluciones de esos Tribunales, a la vista de la jurisprudencia de otros. Estas consecuencias pueden ir desde la exposición de críticas o soluciones alternativas, a la modificación, o incluso revisión, de la propia jurisprudencia anterior.The concept of «dialogue between courts» has been used with different meanings. In this article, and based on the case law of both the European Court of Human Rights and Spanish courts, «dialogue between courts» is understood as the reciprocal interrelations between courts of different legal orders, with practical consequences for their judgments, in view of the case law of the other courts. These consequences may range from offering citicisms or alternative solutions, to amending,, or even overruling their previous case law.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 137
Author(s):  
Mariane Morato Stival ◽  
Marcos André Ribeiro ◽  
Daniel Gonçalves Mendes da Costa

This article intends to analyze in the context of the complexity of the process of internationalization of human rights, the definitions and tensions between cultural universalism and relativism, the essence of human rights discourse, its basic norms and an analysis of the normative dialogues in case decisions involving violations of human rights in international tribunals such as the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and national courts. The well-established dialogue between courts can bring convergences closer together and remove differences of opinion on human rights protection. A new dynamic can occur through a complementarity of one court with respect to the other, even with the different characteristics between the legal orders.


Author(s):  
Dolores Morondo Taramundi

This chapter analyses arguments regarding conflicts of rights in the field of antidiscrimination law, which is a troublesome and less studied area of the growing literature on conflicts of rights. Through discussion of Ladele and McFarlane v. The United Kingdom, a case before the European Court of Human Rights, the chapter examines how the construction of this kind of controversy in terms of ‘competing rights’ or ‘conflicts of rights’ seems to produce paradoxical results. Assessment of these apparent difficulties leads the discussion in two different directions. On the one hand, some troubles come to light regarding the use of the conflict of rights frame itself in the field of antidiscrimination law, particularly in relation to the main technique (‘balancing of rights’) to solve them. On the other hand, some serious consequences of the conflict of rights frame on the development of the antidiscrimination theory of the ECtHR are unearthed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-53
Author(s):  
Kaushik Paul

In recent years, the wearing of Islamic dress in public spaces and elsewhere has generated widespread controversy all over Europe. The wearing of the hijab and other Islamic veils has been the subject of adjudication before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on many occasions. The most recent case before the ECtHR as to the prohibition on wearing the hijab is Lachiri v Belgium. In this case, the ECtHR held that a prohibition on wearing the hijab in the courtroom constitutes an infringement of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to freedom of religion or belief. From the perspective of religious freedom, the ruling of the Strasbourg Court in Lachiri is very significant for many reasons. The purpose of this comment is critically to analyse the ECtHR's decision in Lachiri from the standpoint of religious liberty.


2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lori G. Beaman

Moreover, with the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to identify in the constant central core of Christian faith, despite the inquisition, despite anti-Semitism and despite the crusades, the principles of human dignity, tolerance and freedom, including religious freedom, and therefore, in the last analysis, the foundations of the secular State.A European court should not be called upon to bankrupt centuries of European tradition. No court, certainly not this Court, should rob the Italians of part of their cultural personality.In March, 2011, after five years of working its way through various levels of national and European courts, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights decided that a crucifix hanging at the front of a classroom did not violate the right to religious freedom under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Specifically, Ms. Soile Lautsi had complained that the presence of the crucifix violated her and her children's right to religious freedom and that its presence amounted to an enforced religious regime. The Grand Chamber, reversing the lower Chamber's decision, held that while admittedly a religious symbol, the crucifix also represented the cultural heritage of Italians.


Author(s):  
Egidijus Küris

Western legal tradition gave the birth to the concept of the rule of law. Legal theory and constitutional justice significantly contributed to the crystallisation of its standards and to moving into the direction of the common concept of the rule of law. The European Court of Human Rights uses this concept as an interpretative tool, the extension of which is the quality of the law doctrine, which encompasses concrete requirements for the law under examination in this Court, such as prospectivity of law, its foreseeability, clarity etc. The author of the article, former judge of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court and currently the judge of the European Court of Human Rights, examines how the latter court has gradually intensified (not always consistently) its reliance on the rule of law as a general principle, inherent in all the Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, to the extent that in some of its judgments it concentrates not anymore on the factual situation of an individual applicant, but, first and foremost, on the examination of the quality of the law. The trend is that, having found the quality of the applicable law to be insufficient, the Court considers that the mere existence of contested legislation amounts to an unjustifiable interference into a respective right and finds a violation of respective provisions of the Convention. This is an indication of the Court’s progressing self-approximation to constitutional courts, which are called to exercise abstract norm-control.La tradición occidental alumbró la noción del Estado de Derecho. La teoría del Derecho y la Justicia Constitucional han contribuido decisivamente a la cristalización de sus estándares, ayudando a conformar un acervo común en torno al mismo. El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos emplea la noción de Estado de Derecho como una herramienta interpretativa, fundamentalmente centrada en la doctrina de la calidad de la ley, que implica requisitos concretos que exige el Tribunal tales como la claridad, la previsibilidad, y la certeza en la redacción y aplicación de la norma. El autor, en la actualidad Juez del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y anterior Magistrado del Tribunal Constitucional de Lituania, examina cómo el primero ha intensificado gradualmente (no siempre de forma igual de consistente) su confianza en el Estado de Derecho como principio general, inherente a todos los preceptos que forman el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, hasta el punto de que en algunas de sus resoluciones se concentra no tanto en la situación de hecho del demandante individual sino, sobre todo y ante todo, en el examen de esa calidad de la ley. La tendencia del Tribunal es a considerar que, si observa que la ley no goza de calidad suficiente, la mera existencia de la legislación discutida supone una interferencia injustificable dentro del derecho en cuestión y declara la violación del precepto correspondiente del Convenio. Esto implica el acercamiento progresivo del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos a los Tribunales Constitucionales, quienes tienen encargado el control en abstracto de la norma legal.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-135
Author(s):  
Alexandre Silva Guerreiro

O conceito de humanismo passou por transformações ao longo do tempo. Desde a Grécia Antiga até a contemporaneidade, formou-se um caleidoscópio humanista que abarca significados diversos e, até mesmo, antagônicos. Este artigo propõe uma investigação sobre o humanismo, tendo como objetivo a formulação do humanismo ético para, em seguida, conectá-lo aos direitos humanos. Para isso, considera-se a contribuição de Emmanuel Lévinas (1993, 2008) no que concerne à responsabilidade pelo Outro, bem como a formulação da ética como relacional de acordo com Olinto Pegoraro (2005). A partir disso, buscamos aproximar humanismo ético e direitos humanos. No entanto, é preciso entender os direitos humanos dentro de uma perspectiva polissêmica que também marca o humanismo, trazendo para essa relação a noção de direitos humanos contra-hegemônicos, conforme proposta por Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014). Humanismo ético e direitos humanos encontram-se no desejo de transformação da realidade a partir da reflexão e da ação. Assim, concluímos que os direitos humanos, em sua translação contra-hegemônica, com sua pulsão pela positivação de direitos e pela valorização das diferenças e da diversidade, são atravessados por um humanismo ético que está profundamente conectado com o desejo de mudança social e de responsabilidade pelo Outro, numa perspectiva levinaseana.   Del humanismo ético a los derechos humanos El concepto de humanismo ha experimentado transformaciones a lo largo del tiempo. Desde la Antigua Grecia hasta la época contemporánea, se formó un caleidoscopio humanista que engloba significados diferentes o incluso antagónicos. Este estudio propone una investigación sobre el humanismo con el objetivo de formular el humanismo ético y luego conectarlo con los derechos humanos. Para eso, consideramos la contribución de Emmanuel Lévinas (1993, 2008) con respecto a la responsabilidad para con el Otro, así como la formulación de la ética como relacional según Olinto Pegoraro (2005). A partir de esto, buscamos aunar el humanismo ético y los derechos humanos. Sin embargo, es necesario entender los derechos humanos desde una perspectiva polisémica que también marca el humanismo, trayendo a esta relación la noción de derechos humanos contrahegemónicos, como propone Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014). El humanismo ético y los derechos humanos se encuentran en el deseo de transformar la realidad a través de la reflexión y la acción. Así, concluimos que los derechos humanos, en su traducción contrahegemónica, con su afán por la positivación de los derechos y por valorar las diferencias y la diversidad, están atravesados por un humanismo ético que está profundamente conectado con el deseo de cambio social y con la responsabilidad por el Otro, en un perspectiva levinaseana. Palabras clave: Humanismo. Ética. Lévinas. Derechos humanos.   From ethical humanism to human rights The concept of humanism has undergone transformations over time. From ancient Greece to contemporary times, a humanistic kaleidoscope was formed that encompasses different and even antagonistic meanings. This article proposes an investigation on humanism, aiming at the formulation of ethical humanism and then connecting it with human rights. For this, we consider Emmanuel Lévinas contributions (1993, 2008) regarding responsibility for the Other, as well as the notion of ethics as relational according to Olinto Pegoraro (2005). Also, we seek to bring together ethical humanism and human rights. However, it is necessary to understand human rights within a polysemic perspective that also marks humanism, bringing to this relation the notion of counter-hegemonic human rights, as proposed by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014). Ethical humanism and human rights come together with the desire to transform reality through reflection and action. Thus, we conclude that human rights, in their counter-hegemonic translation with their drive for positivation of rights and differences and diversity valorization are crossed by an ethical humanism that is deeply connected with the desire for social change and responsibility for the Other, in a Levinasean perspective. Keywords: Humanism. Ethic. Lévinas. Human Rights.


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