Algunas reflexiones en torno a la sentencia Negrepontis-Giannisis contra Grecia y la jurisprudencia reciente del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos en materia de reconocimiento de decisiones judiciales extranjeras

Author(s):  
Juan M. VELÁZQUEZ GARDETA

LABURPENA: Giza Eskubideen Europako Auzitegiaren Negrepontis-Giannisis vs. Grezia epaiak atzerriko erabakiak libre zirkulatzeko bidea zabaldu du, prozesu zuzen bat izateko eskubidetik etorria, Giza Eskubideen Europako Hitzarmeneko 6.1 artikuluan aitortua. GEEAren jurisprudentzia-lerro horren eboluzioa abiatzen da Wagner eta J.M.W.L. vs. Luxenburgo eta McDonald vs. Frantzia erabakiekin, baina guk aipatzen duguna aurrerapausoa handia da, eskubidea ez zaiolako lotzen beste zuzenbide substantibo bati, eta berezko eskubidea dela planteatzen da. Gainera, ohar aipagarriak egiten dira atzerriko epai judizialak geldiarazteko ordena publikoko salbuespenari buruz, eta haien eragina leuntzen da. Oso interesgarria da EBko arautegien aplikazio-esparrutik ihes egiten duten erabakietan aplikatzeko, non exequaturra desagertzen den ad hoc prozedura gisa, baina eragindako alderdiak hura ez aitortzeko aukera mantentzen da. Ildo horretan, GEEAk Negrepontis-en erabilitako argudioak garrantzi berezikoak dira, kontuan hartuz GEEHk inspiratzen duela Batasuneko Zuzenbidea eta auzitegiak egiten duen artikuluen interpretazioa. RESUMEN: El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos abre en su sentencia Negrepontis-Giannisis c. Grecia una vía de ampliación de las posibilidades a la libre circulación de decisiones extranjeras como un derecho derivado del derecho a un proceso equitativo reconocido en el art. 6.1 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos. La evolución de esta línea jurisprudencial del TEDH arranca con las decisiones Wagner y J.M.W.L. c. Luxemburgo y McDonald c. Francia pero en la que nos ocupa se produce un avance considerable porque no se ata el derecho al reconocimiento a otro derecho sustantivo sino que se plantea como un derecho en sí mismo. Además se establecen notables consideraciones en cuanto a la excepción de orden público como freno a la ejecución de decisiones judiciales extranjeras y se suaviza su efecto. Es especialmente interesante para su aplicación en aquellas decisiones que escapan del ámbito de aplicación de los correspondientes reglamentos de la UE donde desaparece el exequátur como procedimiento ad hoc pero se mantiene la posibilidad de oposición al reconocimiento por la parte afectada. En este sentido, los argumentos utilizados por el TEDH en Negrepontis son de especial relevancia, teniendo en cuenta el carácter inspirador del Derecho de la Unión que tiene el CEDH y por ende de la interpretación que dicho tribunal haga de su articulado. ABSTRACT: The European Court of Human Rights in its judgment Negrepontis-Giannisis v. Greece opens the extension of the possibilities for a free movement of foreign decisions as a right derived from the right to a fair hearing of article 6.1 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The evolution of this case law trend of the ECHR begins with decisions Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg and McDonald v. France but in the judgment we are now analyzing a considerable development is made because the right to the recognizition is not linked to other substantive right but it is considered as a right itself. Besides remarkable considerations are established as far as the exception to the public order is concerned as a brake to the execution of foreign judicial decisions and it softens its effect. It is especially interesting for its application in those decisions that go beyond the scope of application of the corresponding regulations of the EU where the exequatur as an ad hoc procedure is missing but it maintains the possibility of opposition to the recognizition by the affected party. In this sense, the reasoning of the ECHR in Negrepontis is of special relevance, taking into account the inspiring character of the European Law forthe ECHR and hence the interpretation of that Tribunal of its articles.

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 168-173
Author(s):  
Tamara Gerasimenko

The subject. The article is devoted to the subject of the exhaustion of domestic remediesbefore filing a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights.The purpose. The purpose of this article is to show and reveal the characteristics of suchimportant condition of lodging a complaint before the European Court of Human Rights asthe exhaustion of domestic remedies.The methodology. The following scientific methods have been used to write this article:analysis, comparing and making conclusions.Results, scope of application. The right of individual petition is rightly considered to be thehallmark and the greatest achievement of the European Convention on Human Rights. Individualswho consider that their human rights have been violated have the possibility oflodging a complaint before the European Court of Human Rights. However, there are importantadmissibility requirements set out in the Convention that must be satisfied beforea case be examined. Applicants are expected to have exhausted their domestic remediesand have brought their complaints within a period of six months from the date of the finaldomestic decision. The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies forms part of customaryinternational law, recognized as such in the case – law of the International Court of Justice.The rationale for the exhaustion rule is to give the national authorities, primarily the courts,the opportunity to prevent or put right the alleged violation of the Convention. The domesticlegal order should provide an effective remedy for violations of Convention rights.Conclusions. The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is an important part of the functioningof the protection system under the Convention and its basic principle. 


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 333-360
Author(s):  
Jonathan Collinson

Abstract This article rationalises the case law of the European Court of Human Rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights in deportation cases involving children. The Court engages in a balancing exercise between the right to family life of the deportee’s family on the one side, and the public interest in deportation on the other. This article expands on existing case law analysis by suggesting that in deportation cases, the Court considers Article 8 as a form of commonly held right, rather than an individual right held by one member of the family. Furthermore, the balance is argued to be constructed as a relationship between two factors on both sides, rather than of a sole factor on either side as being determinative. This article concludes that the best interests of the child (one of the ‘Üner criteria’) is not adequately reflected in the Court’s deportation decision-making practice.


Author(s):  
Lara Redondo Saceda

El artículo 8 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos –que protege los derechos al respeto la vida privada y familiar, el domicilio y la correspondencia– se ha configurado en estos setenta años de Convenio como uno de los escenarios habituales del desarrollo del margen de apreciación nacional y la doctrina de las obligaciones positivas del Estado. Esto parece justificarse en el contenido y estructura de este artículo y en las restricciones y limitaciones al ejercicio de estos derechos establecidas por su párrafo segundo. En este marco, el objetivo de este artículo es analizar cuál ha sido el papel del artículo 8 CEDH en el desarrollo de estos estándares interpretativos y cómo ha influido en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights –which protects the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence– has been configured as a traditional place for the development of the margin of appreciation and the doctrine of State’s positive obligations. The scope and structure of this article and its limitation clause in the second paragraph seem to justify these developments. In this context, the objective of this article is to analyse the role of Article 8 ECHR in the development of these interpretative standards and its influence in the European Court of Human Rights case-law.


Author(s):  
Luis López Guerra

En estrecha conexión con la crisis económica, se ha presentado un considerable número de demandas ante el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos solicitando la protección de derechos económicos y sociales. Aún cuando el Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos se ocupa de los llamados derechos «de la primera generación», la jurisprudencia del Tribunal, a partir de Airey c. Irlanda ha mantenido que no existe una completa separación entre derechos civiles y derechos sociales. Aplicando esta jurisprudencia, el Tribunal, en los últimos años, ha emitido diversas sentencias en que se considera que los derechos del Convenio también imponen obligaciones a los estados en materias de relevancia económica y social, como la cuantía de las pensiones, el derecho a la vivienda familiar o el tratamiento de los inmigrantes.Closely related to the economic crisis, a considerable number of requests for protection of economic and social rights have been filed at the European Court of Human Rights. Although the European Convention on Human Rights addresses the so-called «first generation» rights, Court case law since Airey vs. Ireland has maintained that a complete separation of civil and social rights cannot be made. In applying that case law, over the last few years the Court has issued several judgments underscoring that Convention rights also impose obligations on the States in matters of economic and social relevance, such as the amount of pensions, the right to a family home or the treatment of immigrants.


Author(s):  
Lucía CASADO CASADO

LABURPENA: Lan honetan, lehen-lehenik, hurbilpen orokor bat egingo dugu Giza Eskubideak eta Oinarrizko Askatasunak Babesteko Europako Hitzarmenak jasotzen dituen diskriminazio-debekuaren eta hezkuntzarako eskubidearen eraketari; eta ondoren, arraza-diskriminazioaren debekuak hezkuntzarako eskubidearekin duen lotura aztertuko dugu, Giza Eskubideen Europako Auzitegiaren jurisprudentziaren esparruan. Horretarako, eremu horretako lau epai esanguratsuri helduko diegu: Giza Eskubideak eta beste batzuk Txekiar Errepublikaren aurka kasua, bi epai sortarazi dituena (bata Bigarren Sekzioarena, eta bestea Sala Nagusiarena); Sampanis eta beste batzuk Greziaren aurka kasua, eta Orsus eta beste batzuk Kroaziaren aurka kasua. Kasu horietan planteatzen den auzia da ea estatu jakin batzuek ijito etniako umeak eskolaratzeko abiarazi dituzten neurriak diskriminatzaileak diren ala ez. Horretaz gainera, gogoeta batzuk egingo ditugu alor horretako jurisprudentziaren bilakaeraz eta beraren ondorioez. RESUMEN: este trabajo, tras realizar una aproximación general a la configuración de la prohibición de discriminación y al derecho a la instrucción en el Convenio Europeo para la protección de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, analiza la prohibición de discriminación racial en conexión con el ejercicio del derecho a la instrucción en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Para ello, examina cuatro sentencias relevantes recaídas en este ámbito (casos D.H. y otros contra República Checa, que ha dado lugar a dos sentencias —una de la Sección 2.ª y otra de la Gran Sala—; Sampanis y otros contra Grecia; y Orsus y otros contra Croacia), en las que se plantea si las medidas adoptadas por determinados Estados en relación con la escolarización de niños de etnia gitana son o no discriminatorias. También se realizan algunas consideraciones en torno a la evolución jurisprudencial en este ámbito y sus consecuencias. ABSTRACT: After a general approximation to the configuration of the prohibition of discrimination and of the right of instruction by the European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, this work analyzes the prohibition of racial discrimination in relation with the exercise of the right of instruction within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. For this purpose, four relevant judgments on the subject (cases D.H and others against the Czech Republic, which produced two rulings: one by the Second section and other by the Grand Chamber; Sampanis against Greece; and Orsus and others against Croatia) where it arose whether the measures adopted by some States in relation to the schooling of kids from the gypsy ethnic group are or not discriminatory are studied. Some considerations regarding the evolution by the case law regarding this area are also carried out and their consequences.


2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


Author(s):  
Guido Raimondi

This article comments on four important judgments given by the European Court of Human Rights in 2016. Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland addresses the issue of how, in the context of sanctions regimes created by the UN Security Council, European states should reconcile their obligations under the UN Charter with their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to respect the fundamentals of European public order. Baka v. Hungary concerns the separation of powers and judicial independence, in particular the need for procedural safeguards to protect judges against unjustified removal from office and to protect their legitimate exercise of freedom of expression. Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary is a judgment on the interpretation of the Convention, featuring a review of the “living instrument” approach. Avotiņš v. Latvia addresses the principle of mutual trust within the EU legal order and the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léon E Dijkman

Abstract Germany is one of few jurisdictions with a bifurcated patent system, under which infringement and validity of a patent are established in separate proceedings. Because validity proceedings normally take longer to conclude, it can occur that remedies for infringement are imposed before a decision on the patent’s validity is available. This phenomenon is colloquially known as the ‘injunction gap’ and has been the subject of increasing criticism over the past years. In this article, I examine the injunction gap from the perspective of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I find that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting this provision supports criticism of the injunction gap, because imposing infringement remedies with potentially far-reaching consequences before the validity of a patent has been established by a court of law arguably violates defendants’ right to be heard. Such reliance on the patent office’s grant decision is no longer warranted in the light of contemporary invalidation rates. I conclude that the proliferation of the injunction gap should be curbed by an approach to a stay of proceedings which is in line with the test for stays as formulated by Germany’s Federal Supreme Court. Under this test, courts should stay infringement proceedings until the Federal Patent Court or the EPO’s Board of Appeal have ruled on the validity of a patent whenever it is more likely than not that it will be invalidated.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 353-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Hilson

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to provide an initial attempt at analysis of the place of risk within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and, where appropriate, the Commission, focusing on the related issues of public concern and perception of risk and how the ECHR dispute bodies have addressed these. It will argue that, for quite some time, the Court has tended to adopt a particular, liberal conception of risk in which it stresses the right of applicants to be provided with information on risk to enable them to make effective choices. Historically, where public concerns in relation to particular risks are greater than those of scientific experts—nuclear radiation being the prime example in the case law—the Court has adopted a particularly restrictive approach, stressing the need for risk to be ‘imminent’ in order to engage the relevant Convention protections. However, more recently, there have been emerging but as yet still rather undeveloped signs of the Court adopting a more sensitive approach to risk. One possible explanation for this lies in the Court’s growing awareness of and reference to the Aarhus Convention. What we have yet to see—because there has not yet been a recent, post-Aarhus example involving such facts—is a case where no imminent risk is evident. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that the Court’s old-style approach to public concern in such cases, in which it rode roughshod over rights to judicial review, is out of line with the third, access to justice limb of Aarhus.


Author(s):  
Ferran ARMENGOL FERRER

LABURPENA: Egonkortasuneko Mekanismo Europarrean (EME) baldintzapena nola aplikatzen den aztertuko dugu artikulu honetan, Europar Batasunaren esparruan aitortuta dauden oinarrizko eskubideen ikuspegitik. Horretarako, giza eskubideen alorrean nazioarteko hitzarmenak aplikatzearen alde egin duten jarrera doktrinalak hartu dira erreferentziatzat, Nazioarteko Diru Funtsak (NDF) eta nazioarteko beste finantza-erakunde batzuek garapen bidean diren herrialdeekiko operazioetan txertatu duten baldintzapenari muga jartzeko. Europar Batasunaren eremuan 2009-2010 urteetako zor publikoaren krisiari erantzuna emateko sortu diren organismoek eta, batez ere, EMEk (euro eremuan egonkortasuna ziurtatzeko organismoak,) ordea, egiturazko elementu gisa sartu dute baldintzapena haien operazioetan, NDFaren antzeko filosofia hartuta, hau da, zuhurtziaren bitartez lortu nahi dute hazkunde ekonomikoa, eta, horren ondorioz, oinarrizko eskubide batzuk ezin izan dira behar bezala gauzatu. Horrek mahai gainean jartzen du kontu bat, ea politika horiek bateragarri ote diren Europar Batasunaren helburu eta printzipioekin; hasiera batean «zuzenbidezko komunitatea» esamoldeaz definitu baitzuten EB, eta giza eskubideetan oinarrituta eraiki. Justizia Auzitegiak horri buruz idatzi zuen lehenengo epai —goiztiarrak— (Pringle epaiak), ordea, ez zuen zehaztu EMEren baldintzapenak Europar Batasunaren xede eta printzipioekin eta giza eskubideekiko errespetuarekin bat egiten ote duen. Hala ere, badirudi irizpide hori aldatzen ari dela, Ledra Advertising-en duela gutxi eman den epaiaren harira; izan ere, jabetzarako eskubideari dei egiteko atea ireki du, baldintzapena ezartzearen ondorioz eragindako kalteengatiko ordaina eskatzeari dagokionez. Hortaz, EME Europako Diru Funtsean eraldatuta bakarrik heldu ahalko zaie oinarrizko eskubideei, EME erkideko erakunde gisa eratzen bada, baldintzapenaren ondorio kaltegarriak geldiarazteari edo arintzeari begira. Are gehiago, Europako Diru Funtsean baldintzapena judizialki kontrolatzea erreferentea izan liteke nazioarteko beste finantza-erakunde batzuentzat. RESUMEN: El presente artículo analiza la aplicación de la condicionalidad en el Mecanismo Europeo de Estabilidad (MEDE) desde la perspectiva de los derechos fundamentales reconocidos en el ámbito de la Unión Europea. A tal efecto, se toman como referencia las posiciones doctrinales que han venido defendiendo la aplicación de los convenios internacionales en materia de derechos humanos como límite a la condicionalidad introducida por el FMI y otras instituciones financieras internacionales en sus operaciones con los países en desarrollo. Los organismos creados en el ámbito de la Unión Europea para dar respuesta a la crisis de la Deuda pública de 2009-10, y de modo singular el MEDE, organismo creado para garantizar la estabilidad de la zona euro, han introducido, sin embargo, la condicionalidad como un elemento estructural en sus operaciones, con una filosofía parecida a la del FMI, es decir, conseguir el crecimiento económico a partir de la austeridad, con lo que se ha visto perjudicado el ejercicio de diversos derechos fundamentales. Ello plantea la cuestión de la compatibilidad de tales políticas con los objetivos y principios de la Unión Europea, definida en su día como «Comunidad de Derecho» y fundada sobre los valores de los derechos humanos. La primera —y temprana— sentencia dictada al respecto por el Tribunal de Justicia (sentencia Pringle) dejó, sin embargo, en el aire la cuestión de la compatibilidad de la condicionalidad del MEDE con los objetivos y principios de la Unión Europea y el respeto de los derechos humanos. Parece, no obstante, que este criterio tiende a modificarse a partir del reciente fallo en Ledra Advertising, que ha abierto la puerta a invocar el derecho de propiedad para ser indemnizado por los daños causados por la aplicación de la condicionalidad. Con todo, será a partir de la transformación del MEDE en el Fondo Monetario Europeo, si éste se constituye como institución comunitaria, como puede hacerse efectiva la invocación de los derechos fundamentales para frenar o mitigar los efectos perjudiciales de la condicionalidad. Más aún, el control judicial de la condicionalidad en el FME podría servir como referente para otras instituciones financieras internacionales. ABSTRACT: This article analyses the application of conditionality within the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) from the perspective of the fundamental rights recognized within the EU. To this end, we take as a reference the doctrinal positions that have been defending the application of international conventions on human rights as a limit to the conditionality introduced by the IMF and another financial international institutions in their operations with developing countries. The public agencies created within the EU in order to meet the demands of the public debt crisis of 2009-10, and specifically the ESM, a body created to guarantee the Euro zone’s stability, have nonetheless introduced the conditionality as a structural element in their operations, with a philosophy comparable to that of the IMF, i.e. to achieve economic growth from austerity, thus impairing the exercise of several fundamental rights. That raises the question of compatibility of those policies with the objectives and principles of the EU, defined one day as a «community of law» and founded upon the values of fundamental rights. The first —and early— judgement delivered on this ground by the European Court of Justice (Pringle case) left nevertheless in the air the compatibility of the conditionality of ESM with the objectives and principles of the EU and with the respect to human rights. It seems however that this criteria tends to be modified by the recent judgment Ledra Advertising that opened the door to invoke the right to property in order to be compensated by damages caused as a consequence of conditionality. Even so, it will be after the transformation of the ESM into an European Monetary Fund, if this is constituted as a Community institution, that invoking fundamental rights shall be effective in order to stop or mitigate the adverse effects of conditionality. What is more, the judicial control over conditionality within the EMF might serve as a reference for other international financial institutions.


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