scholarly journals Exhaustion of domestic remedies as a condition of lodging a complaint before the European Court of Human Rights

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 168-173
Author(s):  
Tamara Gerasimenko

The subject. The article is devoted to the subject of the exhaustion of domestic remediesbefore filing a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights.The purpose. The purpose of this article is to show and reveal the characteristics of suchimportant condition of lodging a complaint before the European Court of Human Rights asthe exhaustion of domestic remedies.The methodology. The following scientific methods have been used to write this article:analysis, comparing and making conclusions.Results, scope of application. The right of individual petition is rightly considered to be thehallmark and the greatest achievement of the European Convention on Human Rights. Individualswho consider that their human rights have been violated have the possibility oflodging a complaint before the European Court of Human Rights. However, there are importantadmissibility requirements set out in the Convention that must be satisfied beforea case be examined. Applicants are expected to have exhausted their domestic remediesand have brought their complaints within a period of six months from the date of the finaldomestic decision. The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies forms part of customaryinternational law, recognized as such in the case – law of the International Court of Justice.The rationale for the exhaustion rule is to give the national authorities, primarily the courts,the opportunity to prevent or put right the alleged violation of the Convention. The domesticlegal order should provide an effective remedy for violations of Convention rights.Conclusions. The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is an important part of the functioningof the protection system under the Convention and its basic principle. 

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Léon E Dijkman

Abstract Germany is one of few jurisdictions with a bifurcated patent system, under which infringement and validity of a patent are established in separate proceedings. Because validity proceedings normally take longer to conclude, it can occur that remedies for infringement are imposed before a decision on the patent’s validity is available. This phenomenon is colloquially known as the ‘injunction gap’ and has been the subject of increasing criticism over the past years. In this article, I examine the injunction gap from the perspective of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I find that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights interpreting this provision supports criticism of the injunction gap, because imposing infringement remedies with potentially far-reaching consequences before the validity of a patent has been established by a court of law arguably violates defendants’ right to be heard. Such reliance on the patent office’s grant decision is no longer warranted in the light of contemporary invalidation rates. I conclude that the proliferation of the injunction gap should be curbed by an approach to a stay of proceedings which is in line with the test for stays as formulated by Germany’s Federal Supreme Court. Under this test, courts should stay infringement proceedings until the Federal Patent Court or the EPO’s Board of Appeal have ruled on the validity of a patent whenever it is more likely than not that it will be invalidated.


Author(s):  
Juan M. VELÁZQUEZ GARDETA

LABURPENA: Giza Eskubideen Europako Auzitegiaren Negrepontis-Giannisis vs. Grezia epaiak atzerriko erabakiak libre zirkulatzeko bidea zabaldu du, prozesu zuzen bat izateko eskubidetik etorria, Giza Eskubideen Europako Hitzarmeneko 6.1 artikuluan aitortua. GEEAren jurisprudentzia-lerro horren eboluzioa abiatzen da Wagner eta J.M.W.L. vs. Luxenburgo eta McDonald vs. Frantzia erabakiekin, baina guk aipatzen duguna aurrerapausoa handia da, eskubidea ez zaiolako lotzen beste zuzenbide substantibo bati, eta berezko eskubidea dela planteatzen da. Gainera, ohar aipagarriak egiten dira atzerriko epai judizialak geldiarazteko ordena publikoko salbuespenari buruz, eta haien eragina leuntzen da. Oso interesgarria da EBko arautegien aplikazio-esparrutik ihes egiten duten erabakietan aplikatzeko, non exequaturra desagertzen den ad hoc prozedura gisa, baina eragindako alderdiak hura ez aitortzeko aukera mantentzen da. Ildo horretan, GEEAk Negrepontis-en erabilitako argudioak garrantzi berezikoak dira, kontuan hartuz GEEHk inspiratzen duela Batasuneko Zuzenbidea eta auzitegiak egiten duen artikuluen interpretazioa. RESUMEN: El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos abre en su sentencia Negrepontis-Giannisis c. Grecia una vía de ampliación de las posibilidades a la libre circulación de decisiones extranjeras como un derecho derivado del derecho a un proceso equitativo reconocido en el art. 6.1 del Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos. La evolución de esta línea jurisprudencial del TEDH arranca con las decisiones Wagner y J.M.W.L. c. Luxemburgo y McDonald c. Francia pero en la que nos ocupa se produce un avance considerable porque no se ata el derecho al reconocimiento a otro derecho sustantivo sino que se plantea como un derecho en sí mismo. Además se establecen notables consideraciones en cuanto a la excepción de orden público como freno a la ejecución de decisiones judiciales extranjeras y se suaviza su efecto. Es especialmente interesante para su aplicación en aquellas decisiones que escapan del ámbito de aplicación de los correspondientes reglamentos de la UE donde desaparece el exequátur como procedimiento ad hoc pero se mantiene la posibilidad de oposición al reconocimiento por la parte afectada. En este sentido, los argumentos utilizados por el TEDH en Negrepontis son de especial relevancia, teniendo en cuenta el carácter inspirador del Derecho de la Unión que tiene el CEDH y por ende de la interpretación que dicho tribunal haga de su articulado. ABSTRACT: The European Court of Human Rights in its judgment Negrepontis-Giannisis v. Greece opens the extension of the possibilities for a free movement of foreign decisions as a right derived from the right to a fair hearing of article 6.1 of the European Convention of Human Rights. The evolution of this case law trend of the ECHR begins with decisions Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg and McDonald v. France but in the judgment we are now analyzing a considerable development is made because the right to the recognizition is not linked to other substantive right but it is considered as a right itself. Besides remarkable considerations are established as far as the exception to the public order is concerned as a brake to the execution of foreign judicial decisions and it softens its effect. It is especially interesting for its application in those decisions that go beyond the scope of application of the corresponding regulations of the EU where the exequatur as an ad hoc procedure is missing but it maintains the possibility of opposition to the recognizition by the affected party. In this sense, the reasoning of the ECHR in Negrepontis is of special relevance, taking into account the inspiring character of the European Law forthe ECHR and hence the interpretation of that Tribunal of its articles.


Author(s):  
Lucía CASADO CASADO

LABURPENA: Lan honetan, lehen-lehenik, hurbilpen orokor bat egingo dugu Giza Eskubideak eta Oinarrizko Askatasunak Babesteko Europako Hitzarmenak jasotzen dituen diskriminazio-debekuaren eta hezkuntzarako eskubidearen eraketari; eta ondoren, arraza-diskriminazioaren debekuak hezkuntzarako eskubidearekin duen lotura aztertuko dugu, Giza Eskubideen Europako Auzitegiaren jurisprudentziaren esparruan. Horretarako, eremu horretako lau epai esanguratsuri helduko diegu: Giza Eskubideak eta beste batzuk Txekiar Errepublikaren aurka kasua, bi epai sortarazi dituena (bata Bigarren Sekzioarena, eta bestea Sala Nagusiarena); Sampanis eta beste batzuk Greziaren aurka kasua, eta Orsus eta beste batzuk Kroaziaren aurka kasua. Kasu horietan planteatzen den auzia da ea estatu jakin batzuek ijito etniako umeak eskolaratzeko abiarazi dituzten neurriak diskriminatzaileak diren ala ez. Horretaz gainera, gogoeta batzuk egingo ditugu alor horretako jurisprudentziaren bilakaeraz eta beraren ondorioez. RESUMEN: este trabajo, tras realizar una aproximación general a la configuración de la prohibición de discriminación y al derecho a la instrucción en el Convenio Europeo para la protección de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, analiza la prohibición de discriminación racial en conexión con el ejercicio del derecho a la instrucción en la jurisprudencia del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Para ello, examina cuatro sentencias relevantes recaídas en este ámbito (casos D.H. y otros contra República Checa, que ha dado lugar a dos sentencias —una de la Sección 2.ª y otra de la Gran Sala—; Sampanis y otros contra Grecia; y Orsus y otros contra Croacia), en las que se plantea si las medidas adoptadas por determinados Estados en relación con la escolarización de niños de etnia gitana son o no discriminatorias. También se realizan algunas consideraciones en torno a la evolución jurisprudencial en este ámbito y sus consecuencias. ABSTRACT: After a general approximation to the configuration of the prohibition of discrimination and of the right of instruction by the European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, this work analyzes the prohibition of racial discrimination in relation with the exercise of the right of instruction within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. For this purpose, four relevant judgments on the subject (cases D.H and others against the Czech Republic, which produced two rulings: one by the Second section and other by the Grand Chamber; Sampanis against Greece; and Orsus and others against Croatia) where it arose whether the measures adopted by some States in relation to the schooling of kids from the gypsy ethnic group are or not discriminatory are studied. Some considerations regarding the evolution by the case law regarding this area are also carried out and their consequences.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-78

In the spirit of Latin maxim Ubi jus, ibi remedium, it is claimed that the right to an effective remedy permeates the entire European Convention human rights system, giving it a real and effective dimension. An argument is also made for a right to a trial within a reasonable time, meaning that an excessive length of proceedings can be remedied as well. As the principle of subsidiarity lies at the heart of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, the establishment of an effective remedy before the national bodies/authorities is required. In the light of these general considerations, while celebrating the 70th anniversary of the European Convention of Human Rights, the underlying idea of this article is to highlight the fundamental standards of assessing the effectiveness of the remedies with regard to the length of proceedings established in European Court of Human Rights case-law. The focus is placed on the development, current status and functioning of the remedy for excessive length of proceedings in North Macedonia as a Member State of the Council of Europe. The article attempts to answer the question of whether the legal remedy for excessive length of proceedings that exists in Northern Macedonia can be considered effective within the meaning of the European Convention of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights case-law. Keywords: a right to a trial within a reasonable time; excessive length of proceedings; undue delays; an effective remedy; an effective length-of-proceedings remedy; ECtHR case-law; jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of North Macedonia.


2002 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-106
Author(s):  

AbstractThe subject of this article is the right to cross-examine witnesses as laid down in Article 6 paragraph 3(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Case law of the European Court and Commission of Human Rights shows that general principles are applied by the Convention organs. Thus, it is practicable – in more general terms – to outline some acceptable possibilities of using statements made to the police or in court before the beginning of the hearing without violating the fair hearing requirement in Article 6.


2014 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Przemysław Florjanowicz-Błachut

The core function of the judiciary is the administration of justice through delivering judgments and other decisions. The crucial role for its acceptance and legitimization by not only lawyers, but also individulas (parties) and the hole society plays judicial reasoning. It should reflect on judge’s independence within the exercise of his office and show also judicial self-restraint or activism. The axiology and the standards of proper judicial reasoning are anchored both in constitutional and supranational law and case-law. Polish Constitutional Tribunal derives a duty to give reasoning from the right to a fair trial – right to be heard and bring own submissions before the court (Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution), the right to appeal against judgments and decisions made at first stage (Article 78), the rule of two stages of the court proceedings (Article 176) and rule of law clause (Article 2), that comprises inter alia right to due process of law and the rule of legitimate expactation / the protection of trust (Vertrauensschutz). European Court of Human Rights derives this duty to give reasons from the guarantees of the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 § 1 of European Convention of Human Rights. In its case-law the ECtHR, taking into account the margin of appreciation concept, formulated a number of positive and negative requirements, that should be met in case of proper reasoning. The obligation for courts to give sufficient reasons for their decisions is also anchored in European Union law. European Court of Justice derives this duty from the right to fair trial enshrined in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Standards of the courts reasoning developed by Polish constitutional court an the European courts (ECJ and ECtHR) are in fact convergent and coherent. National judges should take them into consideration in every case, to legitimize its outcome and enhance justice delivery.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-53
Author(s):  
Kaushik Paul

In recent years, the wearing of Islamic dress in public spaces and elsewhere has generated widespread controversy all over Europe. The wearing of the hijab and other Islamic veils has been the subject of adjudication before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on many occasions. The most recent case before the ECtHR as to the prohibition on wearing the hijab is Lachiri v Belgium. In this case, the ECtHR held that a prohibition on wearing the hijab in the courtroom constitutes an infringement of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to freedom of religion or belief. From the perspective of religious freedom, the ruling of the Strasbourg Court in Lachiri is very significant for many reasons. The purpose of this comment is critically to analyse the ECtHR's decision in Lachiri from the standpoint of religious liberty.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 353-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Hilson

Abstract The aim of this chapter is to provide an initial attempt at analysis of the place of risk within the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and, where appropriate, the Commission, focusing on the related issues of public concern and perception of risk and how the ECHR dispute bodies have addressed these. It will argue that, for quite some time, the Court has tended to adopt a particular, liberal conception of risk in which it stresses the right of applicants to be provided with information on risk to enable them to make effective choices. Historically, where public concerns in relation to particular risks are greater than those of scientific experts—nuclear radiation being the prime example in the case law—the Court has adopted a particularly restrictive approach, stressing the need for risk to be ‘imminent’ in order to engage the relevant Convention protections. However, more recently, there have been emerging but as yet still rather undeveloped signs of the Court adopting a more sensitive approach to risk. One possible explanation for this lies in the Court’s growing awareness of and reference to the Aarhus Convention. What we have yet to see—because there has not yet been a recent, post-Aarhus example involving such facts—is a case where no imminent risk is evident. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes that the Court’s old-style approach to public concern in such cases, in which it rode roughshod over rights to judicial review, is out of line with the third, access to justice limb of Aarhus.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 244-269
Author(s):  
Christine Carpenter

Abstract Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to freedom of religion and conscience. The language of Article 9(1) has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as including protections for acts of proselytism, when properly committed and respectful of the rights and freedoms of others. This was the view taken in the foundational Article 9 case of the Court, Kokkinakis v. Greece. In the decades since Kokkinakis, however, the view of the Court on proselytism appears to have shifted, in particular in Article 9 cases involving religious garments. This article seeks to determine whether the Court is consistent in its views on proselytism between these religious garment cases and earlier examples of Article 9 case law.


Author(s):  
James Gallen

James Gallen’s chapter reviews the case and the contributions of Adrian Hardiman and Conor O’Mahony to this book. Gallen argues that their discussion reveals the tension between the principle of subsidiarity and the right to effective protection and an effective remedy in the European Convention on Human Rights. The chapter argues that the case of O’Keeffe v Ireland also raises concerns about the European Court of Human Right methodology for the historical application of the Convention and about the interaction of Article 3 positive obligations with vicarious liability in tort. A further section examines the impact of the decision for victims of child sexual abuse and identifies that the decision provides the potential for an alternative remedy to the challenging use of vicarious liability in Irish tort law.


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