Ideological Competition

We model political competition not over policy programs, but over ideologies: models of the world that organize voters’ experiences and guide the inferences they draw from observed outcomes. Policy-motivated political parties develop ideologies, and voters choose the ideology that best explains their observations. Preferences over policies are then induced by the adopted ideology. We show that in equilibrium political parties always propose different models of the world. This divergence extends to all features of the environment, not just policy dimensions. The degree of divergence on policy dimensions increases after periods of policy stability and falls after periods of policy change.

STRATEGIC AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE BANKING SECTOR

The article considers ecosystem processes taking place in the Russian banking industry. Banks play a crucial role in the economies of countries, they help in maintaining monetary policy, stability of the financial system as a whole.

Analysis on the Supply Willingness of Mortgage Loan of Farmland Management Right under the Government-Led Mode in China Western’s Region

In this paper, the Probit model was established based on the survey data of 105 loan officers in China’s Western Region, and the factors influencing the willingness of mortgage loan supply of farmland management rights under the government-led model were investigated from the perspective of financial supply. The research shows that farmers’ income, farmers’ policy awareness, farmland scale, loan experience, risk compensation system, legal perfection and policy stability have a positive impact on the willingness of loan officers to issue mortgage loans for farmland management rights. Factors such as farmers’ age and education level have a negative impact on the willingness to supply. In addition, by comparing the stability of the regression model before and after the addition of risk compensation system, legal perfection degree and policy stability degree, it is concluded that the policy variables have a great influence on the decision-making of financial institutions.

In Conclusion: Revisiting the Past, Looking to the Future

This chapter looks back at post-independence economic history to understand the stranglehold that socialism acquired on the Indian economy in the early years, the launch of reforms in 1991 under Prime Ministers Narasimha Rao and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, partial reversals under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and a return to reforms under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It particularly emphasizes the role that a socialistically inclined bureaucracy plays in continuing to hold back reforms. The chapter concludes by making the case that despite a slowdown in growth at the present time, India’s future is bright—but only if the leadership stays the course on economic reforms. The chapter concludes with a number of cautionary notes relating to policy. These relate to policy stability, the necessity of migrating half or more of the agricultural workforce to industry and services, creating an ecosystem that would help firms to grow larger, the centrality of success in export markets, and the need for investment in labor-intensive sectors of the economy.

Delegation and political turnover

We study a two-period delegation model with an uncertain future principal. In the first period, an incumbent principal decides whether to delegate policy-making authority to an agent or make policy herself. Before the second period, there is an election, and another principal with different preferences may take power. The main result is that the incumbent can exploit the uncertainty about the future principal to extract policy surplus from the agent. The agent’s uncertainty about the future principal pushes him to implement a policy that both principals accept. The surplus from this compromise policy makes the incumbent better off than she would be without the possibility of turnover. We also find that when costs are low, policy stability can increase as elections become more competitive, as the agent has more incentive to implement a compromise policy. We then allow the incumbent to appoint the agent. We show that as the incumbent becomes more likely to retain office, she prefers more policy conflict with the agent.