Emergency management and homeland security: Exploring the relationship

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (6) ◽  
pp. 483
Author(s):  
Jerome H. Kahan, BA, BS, MSEE

In the years after the 9/11 tragedy, the United States continues to face risks from all forms of major disasters, from potentially dangerous terrorist attacks to catastrophic acts of nature. Professionals in the fields of emergency management and homeland security have responsibilities for ensuring that all levels of government, urban areas and communities, nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and individual citizens are prepared to deal with such hazards though actions that reduce risks to lives and property. Regrettably, the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the nation's ability to deal with disasters is unnecessarily challenged by the absence of a common understanding on how these fields are related in the workforce and educational arenas. Complicating matters further is the fact that neither of these fields has developed agreed definitions. In many ways, homeland security and emergency management have come to represent two different worlds and cultures. These conditions can have a deleterious effect on preparedness planning for public and private stakeholders across the nation when coordinated responses among federal, state, and local activities are essential for dealing with consequential hazards. This article demonstrates that the fields of emergency management and homeland security share many responsibilities but are not identical in scope or skills. It argues that emergency management should be considered a critical subset of the far broader and more strategic field of homeland security. From analytically based conclusions, it recommends five steps that be taken to bring these fields closer together to benefit more from their synergist relationship as well as from their individual contributions.

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (5) ◽  
pp. 13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane A. Bullock, BA ◽  
George D. Haddow, MURP

Our nation continues to experience increased frequency and severity of weather disasters. All of these risks demand that we look at the current system and assess if this system, which is predicated on strong Federal leadership in partnership with State and local governments and which failed so visibly in Hurricane Katrina, needs to be rebuilt on a new model. We are suggesting a plan of action that, we believe, is practical, achievable, and will reduce the costs in lives, property, environmental and economic damage from future disasters. The next President is the only person who can make this happen.We suggest that the next President undertake the following steps: (1) move FEMA out of the Department of Homeland Security; (2) appoint a FEMA Director, who is a trusted adviser to the President; (3) include the appointment of the FEMA Director in the first round of Presidential appointees to the Cabinet; (4) rebuild the Federal Response Plan; (5) remove the hazard mitigation and long-term recovery functions from FEMA; (6) invest $2.5 billion annually in hazard mitigation; (7) support community disaster resiliency efforts. The next President will have the opportunity to build the new partnership of Federal, State and local governments, voluntary agencies, nonprofits and the private sector that is needed to make our nation resilient. The question is will the next President take advantage of this opportunity?


2007 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 436-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. De Lorenzo

AbstractDisaster preparedness and response have gained increased attention in the United States as a result of terrorism and disaster threats. However, funding of hospital preparedness, especially surge capacity, has lagged behind other preparedness priorities. Only a small portion of the money allocated for national preparedness is directed toward health care, and hospitals receive very little of that. Under current policy, virtually the entire funding stream for hospital preparedness comes from general tax revenues. Medical payers (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurance) directly fund little, if any, of the current bill. Funding options to improve preparedness include increasing the current federal grants allocated to hospitals, using payer fees or a tax to sub- sidize preparedness, and financing other forms of expansion capability, such as mobile hospitals. Alternatively, the status quo of marginal preparedness can be maintained. In any event, achieving higher levels of preparedness likely will take the combined commitment of the hospital industry, public and private payers, and federal, state, and local governments. Ultimately, the costs of pre- paredness will be borne by the public in the form of taxes, higher healthcare costs, or through the acceptance of greater risk.


Plant Disease ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 98 (6) ◽  
pp. 708-715 ◽  
Author(s):  
James P. Stack ◽  
Richard M. Bostock ◽  
Raymond Hammerschmidt ◽  
Jeffrey B. Jones ◽  
Eileen Luke

The National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN) has developed into a critical component of the plant biosecurity infrastructure of the United States. The vision set forth in 2002 for a distributed but coordinated system of plant diagnostic laboratories at land grant universities and state departments of agriculture has been realized. NPDN, in concept and in practice, has become a model for cooperation among the public and private entities necessary to protect our natural and agricultural plant resources. Aggregated into five regional networks, NPDN laboratories upload diagnostic data records into a National Data Repository at Purdue University. By facilitating early detection and providing triage and surge support during plant disease outbreaks and arthropod pest infestations, NPDN has become an important partner among federal, state, and local plant protection agencies and with the industries that support plant protection.


2005 ◽  
Vol 2005 (1) ◽  
pp. 943-948
Author(s):  
Joseph Gleason

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY During the summer of 2004, the First Coast Guard District in Boston, Massachusetts supported both Presidential political nominating conventions for the 2004 election. The Democratic National Convention was held in Boston, Massachusetts on July 26–29, 2004, and the Republican National Convention was held in New York City from August 30th to September 2, 2004. This was the first time both conventions have taken place within the geographic area of responsibility of a single Coast Guard District. The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security declared both of these events as National Special Security Events under Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62). PDD-62 formalized and delineated the roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in the development of security plans for major events. The 2004 Democratic and Republican Conventions were the first political conventions held in the United States since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the months before the Democratic National Convention, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice stated that there was credible intelligence from multiple sources indicating that al-Qaeda planned to attempt an attack on the United States during the period leading up to the election. (Joint Statement of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and Attorney General John Ashcroft on May 28, 2004) The terrorist attacks on the Madrid rail system were a direct attempt by AI Qaeda to influence the elections in Spain, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security was going to take all appropriate steps to prevent a similar attack in the United States. (Schmidt and Priest, Washington Post May 26, 2004; Page A02) The 2004 Conventions offered a significant challenge for the Coast Guard and other federal, state, and local agencies that had dual responsibility for coordinating security operations while being prepared to respond to a disaster including oil spills and hazardous substance releases—the combination of what was previously designated as crisis and consequence management under PDD-39. This paper will examine lessons learned from planning and operations in support of the conventions. Having served as the First District Project Officer for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, this paper is written as my observations of the lessons learned and offers some insight into what went well and possible areas for improvement as I observed throughout the more than 18 months of planning for these events of national significance. The Coast Guard planning and operational support for the Democratic and Republican National Conventions demonstrated the importance of a team approach to planning, interagency coordination and partnerships, pre-event preparedness activities, and pre-deploying personnel and resources for response. It is my hope that the observations contained in this paper can benefit federal, state, and local agencies as they prepare for large significant events in the future including National Special Security Events.


1997 ◽  
Vol 1997 (1) ◽  
pp. 261-263
Author(s):  
Jim Staves ◽  
Jim Taylor

ABSTRACT The current approach to preparedness for oil and hazardous materials spills in the United States is a maze of federal, state, and local programs that often overlap. The National Response Team (NRT), in cooperation with the Region 6 Response Team (RRT), has developed a contingency plan format that simplifies existing federal regulatory requirements into a single integrated contingency plan (ICP). This format, which was developed by a working group chaired by the EPA Region 6, with representatives from government, industry, labor, and environmental groups, can be used as a model for cooperative projects involving the public and private sectors. The purpose of the ICP is to simplify emergency response plans at facilities. A facility using the ICP format would benefit from the reduced costs of maintaining and updating plans and from the simplified training for responders. Use of the ICP format should also reduce confusion about which plan to use during a response and should improve coordination between facilities and state and federal response agencies.


Commonwealth ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennie Sweet-Cushman ◽  
Ashley Harden

For many families across Pennsylvania, child care is an ever-present concern. Since the 1970s, when Richard Nixon vetoed a national childcare program, child care has received little time in the policy spotlight. Instead, funding for child care in the United States now comes from a mixture of federal, state, and local programs that do not help all families. This article explores childcare options available to families in the state of Pennsylvania and highlights gaps in the current system. Specifically, we examine the state of child care available to families in the Commonwealth in terms of quality, accessibility, flexibility, and affordability. We also incorporate survey data from a nonrepresentative sample of registered Pennsylvania voters conducted by the Pennsylvania Center for Women and Politics. As these results support the need for improvements in the current childcare system, we discuss recommendations for the future.


Government increasingly relies on nonprofit organizations to deliver public services, especially for human services. As such, human service nonprofits receive a substantial amount of revenue from government agencies via grants and contracts. Yet, times of crises result in greater demand for services, but often with fewer financial resources. As governments and nonprofits are tasked to do more with less, how does diversification within the government funding stream influence government-nonprofit funding relationships? More specifically, we ask: How do the number of different government partners and the type of government funder—federal, state, or local—influence whether nonprofits face alterations to government funding agreements? Drawing upon data from over 2,000 human service nonprofits in the United States, following the Great Recession, we find nonprofit organizations that only received funds from the federal government were less likely to experience funding alterations. This helps to illustrate the economic impact of the recession on state and local governments as well as the nonprofit organizations that partner with them.


2019 ◽  
pp. 184-208
Author(s):  
David M. Struthers

This chapter examines the World War One period in which the federal, state, and local governments in the United States, in addition to non-state actors, created one of the most severe eras of political repression in United States history. The Espionage Act, the Sedition Act, changes to immigration law at the federal level, and state criminal syndicalism laws served as the legal basis for repression. The Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM), Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), and other anarchists took different paths in this era. Some faced lengthy prison sentences, some went underground, while others crossed international borders to flee repression and continue organizing. This chapter examines the repression of radical movements and organizing continuities that sustained the movement into the 1920s.


Author(s):  
Howard G. Wilshire ◽  
Richard W. Hazlett ◽  
Jane E. Nielson

Along the Colorado Plateau’s high-standing Mogollon Rim in northern Arizona’s Coconino National Forest stands a small patch of big trees that matured well before Europeans came to North America. Massive ponderosa pines, and even pinyon pines and western junipers, tower above the forest floor, shutting out all but the most shade-tolerant competitors. Few places like this one still exist anywhere in the United States, even on national forest lands. A tourist hoping to see all the diversity that earliest European arrivals found commonplace in the western landscape must seek out a wide scattering of isolated enclaves across the region. Western forests no longer contain the grand glades and lush thickets that our forerunners encountered because most woodlands, especially those owned by the public, largely serve a wide variety of human purposes, as campsites or home sites, board-feet of lumber, potential jobs, recreational playgrounds, and even temples of the spirit. We also rely on forests to maintain habitat for endangered species and seed banks for restoring depleted biodiversity—and to provide us with clean air and water, stable hillside soils, and flood control in wet years. Forests must perform these roles while being consumed, fragmented by roads, and heavily eroded. But there is no guarantee that these most beloved and iconic of natural resources can sustain such a burden. Federal, state, and local government agencies oversee and regulate western U.S. forest lands and their uses, trying to manage the complex and only partly understood biological interactions of forest ecology to serve public needs. But after nine decades of variable goals, and five decades of encroaching development, western woodlands are far from healthy. Urban pollution and exotic tree diseases, some brought by humans, are killing pines, firs, and oaks. Loggers have more than decimated the oldest mountainside forests—most valuable for habitat and lumber alike—with clearcutting practices that induce severe soil erosion. Illegal clearings for marijuana farms are increasing.


Author(s):  
Christopher G. Reddick

This chapter examines homeland security information systems (HSIS) with a focus on local governments. Local governments are typically the first at the scene when responding to an emergency or a terrorist attack. The most notable incidents are Hurricane Katrina and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In both of these incidents the first responders were the local governments, which faced dual issues of communication and information sharing. It is important to understand the current level of preparedness and use of HSIS in local governments. This chapter tries to discern the relative priority of HSIS compared to other priorities of local governments in the realm of homeland security. This chapter first outlines some background information on local governments with respect to their organizational structure and level of homeland security preparedness. The second section outlines the stages of e-government adoption, which is commonly discussed in the local e-government literature. Third, there is a discussion of homeland security information sharing between the federal, state, and local governments. There is some evidence presented from existing surveys of the impact of HSIS on local governments. Finally, there is survey results presented from a study conducted by the International City/ County Management Association (ICMA) on homeland security preparedness. This survey information is used to determine where HSIS fits into local priorities on homeland security.


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