scholarly journals Negligent Sexual Assault: Reform Of The Criminal Law And A Tort Alternative

Author(s):  
Tom Tian ◽  
Richard Sawyer
Keyword(s):  

Negligent Sexual Assault: Reform Of The Criminal Law And A Tort Alternative

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-135
Author(s):  
Tatjana Hörnle

#MeToo became a powerful social movement, and the accusations of sexual misconduct destroyed the careers of many persons. In its first part, the article critically examines #MeToo, concluding that the naming and shaming of individuals in social media is a problematic instrument of social control. The second part analyses changes in criminal laws on sexual offenses, for instance the new German law on sexual assault. The traditional model of sexual assault and rape that emphasizes violence deserves criticism. For contemporary criminal laws, the focus must be on consent and communication. The article discusses the merits and disadvantages of “No means No” and “Only Yes means Yes” as starting points for law reform.


2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janine Benedet

This article surveys rape law reform efforts in Canadian criminal law by mapping these changes onto the decisions of the Alberta Court of Appeal. First, the article outlines how decisions in the 1970s and 1980s reflected ideas and assumptions about sexual offences. It then traces how these ideas were challenged in law reform efforts in 1983 and 1992. Next the article turns to the definition of non-consent and the Ewanchuk case, and how the reasons at the Court of Appeal reflect evolving attitudes to sexual assault. Finally, the article ends with reflections on sexual assault law following the Ewanchuk decision.


2020 ◽  
pp. 57-74
Author(s):  
Stuart P. Green

This chapter focuses on a range of issues common to all six of the rape paradigms that are described in subsequent chapters. It begins with a brief historical overview of rape law, observing a significant expansion in the definition of rape and sexual assault along two axes, namely, the kinds of sexual contact covered and the means by which nonconsent is manifested. It then considers the disparate ways in which the labels rape and sexual assault have been used, and makes an argument for retaining the term rape in the criminal law. Next, it considers how the physical act requirement in rape and sexual assault has been defined in a range of criminal codes, finally touching on some of the challenges of offense grading.


2021 ◽  
pp. 468-517
Author(s):  
Michael J. Allen ◽  
Ian Edwards

Course-focused and contextual, Criminal Law provides a succinct overview of the key areas on the law curriculum balanced with thought-provoking contextual discussion. This chapter discusses the main sexual offences including rape, assault by penetration, sexual assault, causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent, offences against children, familial sex offences, offences against persons with a mental disorder, and preparatory offences. The chapter situates the offence of rape in particular in the context of broader discussions about consent and trial by jury. Two of ‘The law in context’ features examine the prevalence of ‘rape myths’ that may affect how jurors decide whether a man has committed rape and the procedural issues that affect the success of rape prosecutions.


2020 ◽  
pp. 277-294
Author(s):  
Stuart P. Green

This chapter considers sadomasochistic assault. Although no offense in the criminal law is specifically labeled as such, this kind of conduct has been prosecuted under general (nonsexual) assault and battery provisions. Consent normally is allowed as a defense to charges of assault involving other kinds of (nonsexual) consensual pain infliction, such as occurs in surgery, sports, tattooing, and religious flagellation. Sadomasochistic assault prosecutions differ in that the consent or volenti defense is generally disfavored. The chapter offers an argument for why consensual sadomasochistic sex is more wrongful than these others kinds of consensual harm causing, based on the doctrine of double effect (the idea that it is permissible to cause harm as a side effect of bringing about a good result, even though it would not be permissible to cause such harm as a means to bringing about the same good end). But even if that argument is correct, it would not necessarily justify SM’s criminalization. Also considered here is the problem of how to distinguish between SM that is truly consensual and that which is not. Given the role playing it sometimes involves, there exists a possibility that without appropriate safeguards, SM might serve as a cover for what is essentially rape and sexual assault.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (13) ◽  
pp. 66-89
Author(s):  
Farid Samir Benavides Vanegas

The crime of homicide is said to have an aggravating cir- cumstance when it is committed due to the “fact of be- ing a woman.” In Colombia, only until the 4th of March 2015, The Supreme Court of Justice, for the first time, addressed a case in which a penalty with an aggravating circumstance of this nature was imposed, establishing the relevant factors to constitute this type of crime. The present text analyses the crime of femicide within a wider context of violence against women just as the concepts of gender-based violence, violence against women and fi- nally, sexual assault and femicide; these concepts are ana- lyzed with the purpose of showing the different factors involved in this phenomenon. El delito de homicidio tiene una agravante que se configu- ra cuando el delito se comete por “el hecho de ser mujer”. En Colombia, solo hasta el 4 de marzo de 2015 la Corte Suprema de Justicia se ocupó por primera vez de un caso en el cual se daba aplicación a la agravante, y determinó los elementos que son importantes para su configuración. En este texto analizo el concepto de feminicidio dentro de un contexto más amplio de violencia contra la mujer, al igual que los conceptos de violencia de género, violencia contra la mujer y, finalmente, violencia sexual y feminici- dio, todo ello con el propósito de mostrar los diferentes elementos que están alrededor de este fenómeno. 


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Scott

In R. v. Daviault, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized a defence of extreme intoxication to general intent offences, including sexual assault. In the aftermath of Daviault, Parliament swiftly enacted section 33.1 of the Criminal Code. While the lower courts are divided on the constitutionality of section 33.1, its operation precludes a defence of extreme intoxication for some general intent offences. Thus, intoxication can prevent the complainant from giving valid consent, but cannot prevent the accused from forming the necessary intent. How should criminal liability be determined where two individuals become voluntarily intoxicated to the point of incapacity and engage in sex? In theory, the criminal law is committed to the protection of the bodily integrity of all individuals and to the punishment of only the morally blameworthy. However, this article argues that the law’s treatment of mutual voluntary intoxication violates these core principles of our justice system.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan Birtles

Consent is an extremely important principle within the law—so important it is defined twice within the Criminal Code: first in s. 265, the assault provision which also governs the law of sexual assault, and again in s. 273.1, where the Code provides additional definition specifically within the context of sexual assault. The limits of consent have been further defined through case law, especially in R v Ewanchuk. Canadians would be surprised to discover that Ewanchuk determined it is illegal to initiate sexual activity via sexual touching, or to kiss a sleeping spouse. To keep people safe from inappropriate sexual touching, we have outlawed activities most intimate partners would not object to: this creates a dilemma about when protection exceeds its necessity and becomes inappropriate control of sexual autonomy. It is this dilemma this article addresses. Ultimately, this article argues that Canada’s sexual assault laws must change for two reasons: first, by criminalizing behaviour that is not morally wrong, the criminal law is overbroad and doesn’t fulfil its expressive function, and; while enacted with the noble goal of protecting the sexual autonomy of women, our consent laws serve to restrict the sexual autonomy of women in ways that are objectionable.


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