scholarly journals 2018 WA Lee Equity Lecture:

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 137
Author(s):  
David Russell AM RFD QC
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Hague Convention ◽  
Honorary Member ◽  
Teaching Community ◽  
University College ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Hague ◽  
The One ◽  
Fiduciary Liability

May I commence by acknowledging the honour done to me by asking me to give this, the nineteenth WA Lee lecture. I studied Equity, in part, under Professor Lee and he was a prominent member of the teaching community at my University College. At that time, and later, I came to appreciate the extent to which his reputation was established, not just in Australia, but throughout the common law world. Perhaps the most telling of a number of indications, once publications such as the masterful Ford & Lee are put to one side, is the fact that when Donovan Waters QC, former Oxford don, STEP Honorary Member and one of the negotiators of the Hague Trust Convention,[1] visited Australia as a guest of STEP, the one Australian he specifically asked us to arrange for him to meet was Tony Lee.  So to give this lecture before an audience including Tony Lee, fills me with not a little trepidation. He – and no doubt many others of you – will be immediately aware of any errors or imperfections.  It is small consolation that, on this occasion at least, he will not be marking the paper.  In choosing the topic for the paper, I had in mind a paper given by the Hon Dyson Heydon, AC QC, to the first STEP Australia Conference.[2]  Mr Heydon QC observed that: This paper is an edited version of a paper presented at the 2018 WA Lee Equity Lecture delivered on 21 November 2018 at the Banco Court, Supreme Court of Queensland, Brisbane. * AM RFD QC; BA (UQ), LLB (UQ), LLM (UQ). [1] Adopted by Australia and implemented in the Trusts (Hague Convention) Act 1991 (Cth). [2] JD Heydon, ‘Modern Fiduciary Liability: the Sick Man of Equity’ (2014) 20 Trusts & Trustees 1006.

scholarly journals 2018 WA Lee Equity Lecture: Equity in an Age of Uncertainty

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 137
Author(s):  
David Russell
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Honorary Member ◽  
Teaching Community ◽  
University College ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Hague ◽  
The One

May I commence by acknowledging the honour done to me by asking me to give this, the nineteenth WA Lee lecture. I studied Equity, in part, under Professor Lee and he was a prominent member of the teaching community at my University College.  At that time, and later, I came to appreciate the extent to which his reputation was established, not just in Australia, but throughout the common law world. Perhaps the most telling of a number of indications, once publications such as the masterful Ford & Lee are put to one side, is the fact that when Donovan Waters QC, former Oxford don, STEP Honorary Member and one of the negotiators of the Hague Trust Convention,[1] visited Australia as a guest of STEP, the one Australian he specifically asked us to arrange for him to meet was Tony Lee.  So to give this lecture before an audience including Tony Lee fills me with not a little trepidation. He – and no doubt many others of you – will be immediately aware of any errors or imperfections.  It is small consolation that, on this occasion at least, he will not be marking the paper.        

scholarly journals The Common Law Choice of Law Rules for Resulting and Constructive Trusts

2005 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-883 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adeline Chong
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Hague Convention ◽  
Choice Of Law ◽  
Foreign Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Hague ◽  
English Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Hague Convention ◽  
Rules Set

There is a dearth of authority and in-depth discussion concerning what the choice of law rules are for claims involving the assertion that property is held on a resulting or constructive trust. It is usually thought that the choice of law rules set out by the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition (hereafter the ‘Hague Trusts Convention’), as enacted into English law by the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987, apply. However, it is arguable that this is not so for some types of resulting and constructive trusts, namely those governed by a foreign law; or, at the very least, that some doubt exists as to whether the Hague choice of lawrules apply to all resulting and constructive trusts. It is therefore important that the common law choice of law rules for such trusts is clearly elucidated. Unfortunately, this is an area of the law that is distinctly undeveloped. The aim of this article is to consider what are or should be the common law choice of law rules for resulting and constructive trusts.

Part III Jurisdiction, Foreign Judgments and Awards, 16 Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments—The Traditional Rules

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torremans Paul
Keyword(s):  
Family Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Hague Convention ◽  
Administration Of Justice ◽  
Recognition And Enforcement ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Hague ◽  
Foreign Judgment ◽  
The Hague Convention

This chapter focuses on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under the traditional rules. It begins with a discussion of the theory underlying recognition and enforcement, followed by an analysis of enforcement under the Brussels/Lugano system and family law. It then considers the principles on which the successful litigant may take advantage of a foreign judgment at common law, along with defences to recognition and enforcement of such judgments. It also examines direct enforcement of foreign judgments by statute such as the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, Administration of Justice Act 1920, and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005. Finally, it assesses the inter-relation of the common law rules of recognition and those provided by statute (other than the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982), especially in the fields of jurisdiction and defences, and the jurisdictional provisions of Brussels I Recast.

Knowing Habeas Corpus When You See It

2018 ◽  
pp. 9-11
Author(s):  
Eric M. Freedman
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Habeas Corpus ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Government ◽  
Enemy Combatant

Viewing habeas corpus through a legal lens frequently misleads. The common law “rule” against controverting the return to writs of habeas corpus was commonly evaded through devices permitting judicial examination of the underlying facts and law. In many cases concluding “writ denied,” the prisoner in fact obtained “habeas corpus without the writ.” Failure to understand this explains why the Fourth Circuit performed so badly in rejecting the challenge of Yaser Hamdi to his detention as an enemy combatant. The Supreme Court very properly reversed that decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), resulting in the prisoner’s speedy release when the government was confronted with having to actually prove in court the claims it had made on paper.

REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE AND GRANT PERMISSION TO ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AWARDS DUE TO IMPROPER NOTIFICATION ABOUT ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anayit Khoperiya ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Hague Convention ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Assistance ◽  
Commercial Arbitration ◽  
International Commercial Arbitration ◽  
Negative Case ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Hague ◽  
The Hague Convention

The article analyses the refusal to recognize and grant permission to enforce awards of international commercial arbitration because of improper notification about the arbitration. The study concerns the new case law of the Supreme Court in cases of recognition and granting permission to enforce the awards of international commercial arbitration in cases where the party against whom the decision is made denies that it has been notified of the arbitration or appointment of an arbitrator. Particular attention was paid to the analysis of the decisions of the Supreme Court in cases No. 824/26/19 of November 28, 2019 and No. 824/69/19 of February 13, 2020 on the application of Jurginsky Mashzavod LLC on the enforcing of the decision of the Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation on debt collection from PJSC Pokrovske Mine Management. These decisions were assessed as a negative case law that does not contribute to the development of arbitration in Ukraine. It was concluded that in cases No. 824/26/19 and No. 824/69/19 the Supreme Court formulated two extremely negative opinions for the development of international commercial arbitration: 1) the need to inform the different jurisdictions parties of the arbitration proceedings, where in these jurisdictions the Hague Convention is binding, in form of provision of international legal assistance, which would harm the pace of arbitration proceedings; 2) the necessity to notify the parties by arbitration via mail with a postal description of the enclosed documents. The provisions of the Hague Convention regarding the requirement of arbitration notifications of the parties on the implementation of arbitration proceedings using the procedure of international legal assistance were analysed. It was established that the provisions of this convention cannot be interpreted as establishing an obligation for arbitration tribunals to notify the parties of the arbitration proceedings, which are situated in states-parties to this convention, through the procedure of international legal assistance only. The practice of the Supreme Court in other cases on the recognition and granting permission to enforce of international commercial arbitration decisions, where the party against which the decision was made denies that it has been notified about the arbitration or appointment of an arbitrator, was positively assessed. This practice is pro-arbitration. It was emphasized the importance of forming pro-arbitration practice of the Supreme Court, which ensures the image of Ukraine as a friendly jurisdiction for arbitration and for investment accordingly.

Remedies for equitable wrongs

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Burrows
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Breach Of Contract ◽  
Turn On ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
Law Courts ◽  
Substantive Law ◽  
Court Of Chancery

Torts and breach of contract are termed common law wrongs because they were historically developed in the common law courts. Equitable wrongs are civil wrongs that historically were developed in the Court of Chancery. Despite the fusion of the common law courts and the Court of Chancery by the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873–1875, much of the substantive law has not been fused. One example is the continued distinction between common law and equitable wrongs. In a rational fused system, nothing should turn on whether a civil wrong is common law or equitable. But that is not the present law.

British Virgin Islands

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arabella di Iorio
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Virgin Islands ◽  
British Virgin Islands ◽  
Law System ◽  
The Common ◽  
Eastern Caribbean ◽  
Common Law System ◽  
Trust Law

The legal system of the British Virgin Islands is a common law system based on the English model, comprising statute law and binding case precedents. The principles of English common law and equity apply in the BVI (subject to modification by BVI statutes) pursuant to the Common Law (Declaration of Application) Act (Cap 13) and the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (Virgin Islands) Act (Cap 80) respectively. The general principles of trust law are based on English law.

11. Illegality

2020 ◽  
pp. 405-434
Author(s):  
Jack Beatson ◽  
Andrew Burrows ◽  
John Cartwright
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
Restraint Of Trade

This chapter considers what counts as illegality and the effect of illegality on a contract (and consequent restitution). The approach of the Courts to illegality has been transformed for the better, and simplified, by the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza in 2016. Illegal conduct, tainting a contract, can vary widely from serious crimes (eg murder) to relatively minor crimes (eg breach of licensing requirements) through to civil wrongs and to conduct that does not comprise a wrong but is contrary to public policy. As regards the effect of illegality, where a statute does not deal with this, the common law approach is now to apply a range of factors. A final section of the chapter examines contracts in restraint of trade.

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