scholarly journals Are You There, Law? It's Me, Semen

2021 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Anita Bernstein

Joining a conversation about menstruation and the law, this Essay interprets “law” to mean regulation––a source of burden, constraint, and interference justified by reason. The object of my regulatory agenda is a substance perceived by Western thinkers at least since Aristotle as the superior counterpart to menstrual fluid.1 Traditions that celebrate semen as vital or affirmative, while recoiling from and controlling the other gendered emission that hurts no one, get reality backward. Law as burden, constraint, and interference ought to regulate semen and leave menstrual fluid alone. Contrast the two substances. One of them started out with the potentially useful function of building a uterine lining. That possibility concluded, menstrual fluid is benign. The other effluvium started out with the potentially useful function of launching a pregnancy. Pregnancy is a good thing when it is desired by the person who has to live with the bulk of pregnancy’s detriments. Along with its capacity to do an important job, semen causes quite the array of harms. A statute on point for this purpose, the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, regulates material that “may cause substantial personal injury or substantial illness during or as a proximate result of any customary or reasonably foreseeable handling or use.”2 Because semen “has the capacity to produce personal injury or illness to man through ingestion, inhalation, or absorption through any body surface,” it also aligns with the definition of “toxic” in the statute.3 Judges, policymakers, litigants, and ordinary people can all learn from well-established legal labels to understand semen as a stark example of an externality. Nothing in this statute impedes the characterization I propose: The FHSA lists substances that lie outside its purview,4 and semen is not among them. Labeling, containment, and emergency protocols—splash protection, if you like—are the hazardous-substance safety impositions I would apply to semen.

1984 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederic B. Fitch

In [3] a definition of negation was presented for the system K′ of extended basic logic [1], but it has since been shown by Peter Päppinghaus (personal communication) that this definition fails to give rise to the law of double negation as I claimed it did. The purpose of this note is to revise this defective definition in such a way that it clearly does give rise to the law of double negation, as well as to the other negation rules of K′.Although Päppinghaus's original letter to me was dated September 19, 1972, the matter has remained unresolved all this time. Only recently have I seen that there is a simple way to correct the definition. I am of course very grateful to Päppinghaus for pointing out my error in claiming to be able to derive the rule of double negation from the original form of the definition.The corrected definition will, as before, use fixed-point operators to give the effect of the required kind of transfinite induction, but this time a double transfinite induction will be used, somewhat like the double transfinite induction used in [5] to define simultaneously the theorems and antitheorems of system CΓ.


Author(s):  
Edward Lamberti

Chapter 5 considers Barbet Schroeder’s English-language American true-life drama Reversal of Fortune (1990) and his French-language political documentary Terror’s Advocate (2007), two films about lawyers and legal systems. Desmond Manderson refers in his collection Essays on Levinas and Law: A Mosaic (2009) to the ‘mosaic’ of a Levinasian approach to the law, as, sceptical of legal systems but devoted to justice, Emmanuel Levinas posits an ethics that refuses to crystallise into a prescriptive view of how the law should work in respect of the Other. I argue that these two Schroeder films, with their multi-faceted, ‘mosaic-like’ styles and structures, perform this fractured Levinasian refusal to settle on a fixed, simplistic definition of the law’s purpose. I analyse Reversal of Fortune for its multiple story strands and the different visual styles Schroeder deploys to delineate them, along with elements of performance – especially from Jeremy Irons as Claus von Bülow – that complicate questions of otherness. In discussing the documentary Terror’s Advocate, I draw on Stella Bruzzi’s work on performative documentary (2006) to explore how Schroeder uses film style to perform both the bravado of the film’s protagonist, the real-life criminal lawyer Jacques Vergès, and the Levinasian ‘mosaic’ of the legal situations he surveys.


2021 ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter examines the rules of international law governing the birth, the life, and the death of treaties. Treaties, a formal source of international law, are agreements in written form between States or international organizations that are subject to international law. A treaty falls under the definition of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), no matter what form or title it may have. The most important factor is that it sets out obligations or entitlements under international law. The VCLT enumerates the rules governing the ‘birth’, ie the steps from the negotiation until the entry into force of the treaty; the ‘life’, ie the interpretation and application of the treaty; and its ‘demise’, ie its termination. The two fundamental tenets are, on the one hand, the principle ‘pacta sunt servanda’ and, on the other, the principle of contractual freedom of the parties.


1987 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-323
Author(s):  
Raphael Loewe

Twenty years ago I attempted to clarify thinking about Judaism in proposing a more refined terminology which, if properly used, would eliminate the all too frequent fallacies of equivocation by which discussion is bedevilled (‘Defining Judaism:Some Ground-Clearing’, Jewish Journal of Sociology, VII, 2, 1965, pp. 153–75). It is not my purpose here simply to exhume that article: on the other hand, I do not feel that I can usefully begin again ab initio, since the situation has not been radically transformed as it had been in the thirty years preceding 1965. The two decades since and including the Six Days War have witnessed much entrenchment of position, intensification of doctrinaire assertion, and heightening of enthusiasm, but little inclination (until the Lebanon War began to stimulate it in Israel) towards questioning what have become popularly accepted axioms:and it is still the case that anyone who dares to question the assumption that Israeli national sovereignty now is, and for all time will remain, a sine qua non for the survival of Judaism will not get much of a hearing. What I intend here is to reconsider my earlier findings from the angles of belief, authority, and peoplehood, particularly since I feel that the last-mentioned had perhaps been allowed inadequate weight in my previous endeavour. I consequently repeat here, for convenience of reference, the terminological distinctions proposed in that article, together with the tentative working definition of Judaism with which it concluded. I doubt its usefulness, save from a negative standpoint, i.e. what it excludes. But if we are to consider peoplehood, we need to know who, and what, is a Jew: and the only uniquely valid definition of a Jew that satisfies me is a transmitter of Judaism. The question seems to me otherwise meaningless without some terms of reference, e.g. who is a Jew for purposes of joining synagogue X, or speaking for Anglo-Jewry or world Jewry at forum Y, or qualifying for Israeli citizenship under the law of return, etc. Here, then, is my tentative formula:


2016 ◽  
pp. 67-98
Author(s):  
Przemysław Saganek

The text of Przemysław Saganek is a part of a wider discussion on the Mediterranean migration crisis. The author underlines the multi-aspect character of the crisis and the fact that several branches of international law which are at stake in it. They cover: the law on refugees, human rights, the law of the sea, the maritime law, the rules on territorial sovereignty and on the crossing of borders. What is of importance are customary norms, treaties and norms of the EU law. The idea of the author is to look at the instruments of international law which may act as incentive for hundreds of thousands of newcomers or as main obstacles for the states to put an end to uncontrolled inflow of people through their borders. His idea is to identify such instruments and start discussion on their possible suspension or termination if the crisis persists. The author comes to the conclusion that the definition of a refugee from the 1951 Geneva Conventionis not by itself a source of problems. The same concerns the subsidiary protection as introduced by the EU qualification directive. The same can be said about the scope of rights of persons covered by the international protection. The only element which requires discussion is the possible redefinition of the right to national treatment as regards the social aid. On the other hand, the scope of powers of states to defend their borders depends on the interpretation of the EU instruments on the protection of borders and the rights of applicants for international protection. The author comes to the conclusion that neither the procedural directive, nor the 2016 Schengen Border Code can be interpreted as a source of the right of an applicant to enter the territory of a Member State. On the other hand, the geographical conditions and the law of the sea make Greece and Italy the most vulnerable for the inflow of persons. The necessity of important changes to the law and its interpretation are referred to in a general way.


Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter examines the rules of international law governing the birth, the life, and the death of treaties. Treaties, a formal source of international law, are agreements in written form between States or international organizations that are subject to international law. A treaty falls under the definition of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) no matter what form or title it may have. The most important factor is that it sets out obligations or entitlements under international law. The VCLT enumerates the rules governing the ‘birth’, i.e. the steps from the negotiation until the entry into force of the treaty; the ‘life’, i.e. the interpretation and application of the treaty; and its ‘demise’, i.e. its termination. The two fundamental tenets are, on the one hand, the principle ‘pacta sunt servanda’ and, on the other, the principle of contractual freedom of the parties.


Yuridika ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Riko Eka Kusuma

AbstractSince the enactment of Law No. 12 Year 2008 on the second Amendment to the Law Number 32 Year 2004 on Regional Government, as an interpretation of Article 18 , to bring new changes in governance in the region. This law has fundamentally changed the practices of government, one of which is related to the position, duties and functions of the District. The main changes was in the definition of the township itself besides the other changes such as the shape of the organization, financing, personnel appointments, logistics fulfillments and accountability,. Previously, the District was an administrative region in the context of the work environment that organizes the implementation of tasks in the area of public administration. While according to the Law No. 12 of 2008, Article 126 Section 3, the District is the district/city in the context of the principle of decentralization. That is, if used within the framework of the principle of deconcentration district, it is one of the administrative area, in addition to national, provincial, district and municipality, as well as administrative city. At the present time the Districts is the working area of the districts of the region. However, districts are not a territory, it is a service areas.Keywords: Delegation of authority, Head of District, Regional Government


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 11-28
Author(s):  
Kamil Zaradkiewicz

The second part of the article concerns the interpretation and application in the central parts of Poland of the provisions of the Napoleonic Code on vacant inheritances. The Code does not provide a definition of the vacant inheritance. The key to the interpretation of the provisions on the acquisition of vacant inheritances by the state is the term “is presumed to be” (a vacant inheritance) used in the former Article 811 of the Napoleonic Code (French: est réputée vacante), see the current Article 809 of the French Civil Code which omits the term “is presumed to be”).This indicates that, in the absence of suitable heirs, the law introduced a specific rebuttable presumption of a vacant inheritance, belonging to the state. Only after an appropriate period of time did the presumption turn into certainty, i.e. it resulted in the inability to invoke the inheritance title. In practice, this meant that thirty years after the time necessary to draw up an inventory of the inheritance and to deliberate (ad deliberandum), the inheritance ultimately fell to the State. The mechanism adopted in the Napoleonic Code made it possible, on the one hand, for the heir to acquire the inheritance, which remained under the supervision of a curator for the period when it was presumed vacant, and on the other hand, it prevented the existence of inheritances without a claimant, i.e. inheritances devoid of the persons entitled to take them over. In the post-war period, when the communist authorities passed subsequent legal acts concerning the provisions of the inheritance law, the deadlines for heirs to apply for inheritance changed. Ultimately, the legislator did not adopt the model of vacant inheritances in the regulations harmonising the inheritance law on the Polish lands since 1947; instead, a solution analogous to the one provided for in the German Civil Code of 1986 (BGB) was adopted. The “shortening” of the statute of limitations also influenced the assessment of the admissibility of further application of the provisions of the Napoleonic Code in regard to vacant inheritances during the period of the People’s Republic of Poland regime (despite the existence of different inheritance law solutions).


Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas ◽  
Efthymios Papastavridis

This chapter examines the rules of international law governing the birth, the life, and the death of treaties. Treaties, a formal source of international law, are agreements in written form between States or international organizations that are subject to international law. A treaty falls under the definition of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) no matter what form or title it may have. The most important factor is that it sets out obligations or entitlements under international law. The VCLT enumerates the rules governing the ‘birth’, i.e. the steps from the negotiation until the entry into force of the treaty; the ‘life’, i.e. the interpretation and application of the treaty; and its ‘demise’, i.e. its termination. The two fundamental tenets are on the one hand, the principle ‘pacta sunt servanda’ and on the other, the principle of contractual freedom of the parties.


1960 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-225
Author(s):  
J. A. Jolowicz

The rules of the substantive law of damages on the one hand and the rules of pleading on the other ought to be kept strictly apart, for although a faulty pleading, if not amended in time, may dcprive a plaintiff of compensation for some part of his damage as effectively as a decision that the damage is too remote, the substantive law can only be rationally considered on the assumption that any case coming under discussion has been properly pleaded. It should follow, therefore, that the distinction between special and general damages is one solely belonging to the rules of pleading. If an item of special damage has been inadequately pleaded. or proved it cannot be recovered, but this is a consequence of failure to comply with those rules. It has no bearing on the substantive law whatever. It does appear, however, that there is at present some confusion as to the nature of the distinction between special and general damages and that this confusion is indirectly affecting the substantive law in certain types of case—notably actions for damages for personal injury.


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