Law, Economics and Politics in the Constitutionalisation of Europe

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 123-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Joerges
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Real World ◽  
Conceptual Structure ◽  
Empirical Models ◽  
Normative Structure ◽  
The Real ◽  
Normative Dimension ◽  
Analytical Approaches ◽  
Two Sides ◽  
Economics And Politics

This essay is continuing the path between the disciplines of law and political science that I have been following for a couple of years now. This is a somewhat delicate exercise. In addressing my own discipline, law, I argue that it should renew its perceptions of reality and open up its normative and dogmatic conceptual structure. To political scientists engaged in integration research, I suggest that they ought to take the law’s normative structure seriously and open up their analytical and empirical models to this peculiar reality. ‘Two goals?! No wonder he never gets anywhere!’ By no means, I would object, we are only looking at the two sides of the same coin. And there are good reasons to undertake such efforts: Europe’s constitution is too important to be left up to the lawyers; but it is also something that cannot be grasped by empirical and analytical approaches which are unable to address the normative dimension of the ‘real’ world.

Law, Economics and Politics in the Constitutionalisation of Europe

2003 ◽  
Vol 5 ◽  
pp. 123-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Joerges
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Real World ◽  
Conceptual Structure ◽  
Empirical Models ◽  
Normative Structure ◽  
The Real ◽  
Normative Dimension ◽  
Analytical Approaches ◽  
Two Sides ◽  
Economics And Politics

This essay is continuing the path between the disciplines of law and political science that I have been following for a couple of years now. This is a somewhat delicate exercise. In addressing my own discipline, law, I argue that it should renew its perceptions of reality and open up its normative and dogmatic conceptual structure. To political scientists engaged in integration research, I suggest that they ought to take the law’s normative structure seriously and open up their analytical and empirical models to this peculiar reality. ‘Two goals?! No wonder he never gets anywhere!’ By no means, I would object, we are only looking at the two sides of the same coin. And there are good reasons to undertake such efforts: Europe’s constitution is too important to be left up to the lawyers; but it is also something that cannot be grasped by empirical and analytical approaches which are unable to address the normative dimension of the ‘real’ world.

scholarly journals Downward movement: (se) baisser ‘to fall’

Kalbotyra ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 74 ◽  
pp. 35-48
Author(s):  
Joanna Cholewa
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Physical Space ◽  
Conceptual Structure ◽  
Downward Movement ◽  
The Real ◽  
Physical Strength ◽  
Single Sentence ◽  
The World ◽  
Object Classes ◽  
Two Parameters

This article aims to disambiguate the French verb baisser, which describes the downward movement of an entity, and to present its conceptual structure. Our approach is strongly based on the belief that the meaning of the word is conceptual, and that it reflects the world being looked at, not the real world (Honeste 1999, 2005). Our interest will focus on the locative and abstract meanings of the chosen verb, the uses of which we will study. Each use is a set formed by a predicate, defined by its arguments whose field is delimited by the predicate itself (Gross 2015). Arguments are defined using object classes. Each use is illustrated by a single sentence and a translation into Polish, the translation being a synonym of a word in another language. The type of event described by the verb will be studied, taking into account: the situation described by the verb (kinematic, dynamic, according to Desclés 2003, 2005); belonging to one of the four groups of verbs of movement, distinguished by Aurnague (2012) according to two parameters: change of location and change of elementary locative relwation; polarity (initial, median and final, according to Borillo 1998). Baisser has twelve uses (locative and abstract). Their invariant meaning is downwards movement, which is conceptualized in different ways: displacement of an entity downwards in physical space, but also as a decrease along a scale: of quantifiable value, of sound, of luminosity, intensity or quality, and finally of physical strength and of quality.

scholarly journals Instability in Stable Marriage Problem: Matching Unequally Numbered Men and Women

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gui-Yuan Shi ◽  
Yi-Xiu Kong ◽  
Bo-Lun Chen ◽  
Guang-Hui Yuan ◽  
Rui-Jie Wu
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Small Deviation ◽  
Stable Marriage ◽  
Stable Marriage Problem ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
Marriage Problem ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Stable Marriage Problem ◽  
Unequal Number ◽  
Two Sides

The goal of the stable marriage problem is to match by pair two sets composed by the same number of elements. Due to its widespread applications in the real world, especially the unique importance to the centralized matchmaker, a very large number of questions have been extensively studied in this field. This article considers a generalized form of the stable marriage problem, where different numbers of men and women need to be matched pairwise and the emergence of single men or women is inevitable. Theoretical analysis and numerical simulations confirm that even a small deviation on the number of men and women from the equality condition can have a large impact on the matching solution of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. These results provide insights to many of the real-world applications when matching two sides with an unequal number.

Models-As-Fables: An Alternative to the Standard Rationale for Using Formal Models in Political Science

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
James Johnson
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Real World ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
The Real ◽  
The Way

Political scientists invoke the standard rationale to justify making and using formal models. It goes like this: (1) we rely on formal models to generate predictions, (2) we treat these predictions as empirical hypotheses, and (3) we seek to test these hypotheses against evidence derived from the “real world.” I show that this interpretation of formal models as directly empirical is inadequate just insofar as it fails to capture the way we actually use them. I then offer an alternative rationale for making and using formal models. Specifically, I argue that we use models, like we use fables, for conceptual purposes.

Three Types of Science

1969 ◽  
Vol 2 (04) ◽  
pp. 598-599
Author(s):  
Michael Haas
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Real World ◽  
Presidential Address ◽  
Individual Case ◽  
Soap Opera ◽  
Measuring Instruments ◽  
Scientific Achievement ◽  
The Real ◽  
The World ◽  
The Future

Hollywood applauds Glendon Schubert's script for a possible soap opera in his pre-view ofApproaches to the Study of Political Science. Stereotypic characters, miscasting of actors, words put in the mouths of fictitious persons, and maudlin grief are all present in his poignantad hominenremarks, while a task which I regard as important — the development of a science of politics — is curiously overlooked by Mr. Schubert as the main purpose of the volume. And, in a manner similar to David Easton's eloquent 1969 presidential address, it is important to tune out Mr. Schubert's solipsisticOne Man's Familyand to discuss instead the real reasons for all the current fuss about postbehavioral options.My own view is that political science has achieved considerable maturity as a discipline in recognizing a fundamental symbiosis between three facets of science as the 1970's begin. At one level, a scientist may seek to describe an individual case, to calibrate measuring Instruments, and to engineer specific changes in the real world. At a second level a scientist can search for relationships between two or more variables across several cases in order to state generalizations that will serve as guides to the future and to cases as yet unexamined. Yet myriad generalizations do not cumulatively add up to higher and higher levels of scientific achievement until we consider a third facet of science, wherein one seeks analytical explanations for empirical findings and smooths out the idiosyncracies of particular research investigations into analytically parsimonious paradigms, models, and theories concerning how the world is put together. These three levels or types of science may be calledclinical, empirical, andtheoretical, respectively.

Current Issues: Evidence-Based Practice for the Real World: Thoughts on Clinical Education in Communication Disorders

2010 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 100-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne K. Bothe
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Education ◽  
Real World ◽  
Evidence Based Practice ◽  
Communication Disorders ◽  
University Faculty ◽  
Evidence Based ◽  
Speech Language Pathology ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
The Real ◽  
Language Pathology

This article presents some streamlined and intentionally oversimplified ideas about educating future communication disorders professionals to use some of the most basic principles of evidence-based practice. Working from a popular five-step approach, modifications are suggested that may make the ideas more accessible, and therefore more useful, for university faculty, other supervisors, and future professionals in speech-language pathology, audiology, and related fields.

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