Strange Bedfellows: Cooperative Policy Making in a Divided Government

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-46
Author(s):  
Jongkon Lee

It is widely believed that the lack of bipartisanship between the executive and legislative branches in the United States is deleterious to policy making. However, a divided government is perhaps more productive than a unified government because it can facilitate electoral gains for the minority party. Policy created by a divided government can be seen as the collaborative outcome of the majority and minority parties, but that of a unified government is perceived as the exclusive work of the majority party. Further, successful policy making on the part of the unified government could have the effect of compromising the minority party’s brand. Thus, the minority party has more incentive to negotiate with the majority party and participate in policy making in a divided government. To the extent that party brand name assumes greater importance in elections in a polarized political system, a divided government could be more conducive to policy making than a unified government.

1992 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Ansolabehere ◽  
David Brady ◽  
Morris Fiorina

Nearly two decades ago researchers pointed out the sharp decline in marginal districts in elections for the US House of Representatives. That observation led to an outpouring of research describing the electoral changes, explaining their bases and speculating about their consequences for the larger political system. Recently Gary Jacobson has offered a major corrective to that line of research, arguing that ‘House incumbents are no safer now than they were in the 1950s; the marginals, properly defined, have not vanished; the swing ratio has diminished little, if at all; and competition for House seats held by incumbents has not declined’. While Jacobson advances an extremely provocative argument, there are complicating patterns in his evidence that support additional and/or different interpretations. We argue that the marginals, ‘properly defined’ have diminished, the swing ratio has declined, and party competition for House seats held by incumbents has lessened. While fears that the vanishing marginals phenomenon would lead to lower responsiveness on the part of ‘safe’ House incumbents have proved groundless, the collective composition of Congress does appear to be less responsive to changes in popular sentiments. Thus, the vanishing marginals have contributed to the occurrence of divided government in the United States and in all likelihood do have the effects on congressional leadership and policy-making that many analysts have claimed.


2000 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAMES C. GARAND ◽  
MARCI GLASCOCK LICHTL

In recent years the study of divided government has been a growth industry. Numerous scholars have sought to explain patterns of divided government in the United States, while others have attempted to explore the consequences of the phenomenon. No doubt this scholarly interest in the subject is due in large part to the attention paid by the political media to divided control of the presidency and Congress during the 1980s, as well as the resulting ’gridlock‘ that dominated policy making in Washington during that time period.


1969 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-31
Author(s):  
John D. Lees

Political scientists in the United States have in recent years become concerned with analysis of the rights and responsibilities of political opposition. This interest was initially stimulated by the much-quoted, and much-maligned, report of the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association in 1950 entitled Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System. It has been supplemented by the volume edited by Robert Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. Academic rationale for this interest is reflected in the paradox posed by Dahl, who, having cited ‘ the right of an organized opposition to appeal for votes against the government in elections and parliament’ as being one of ‘the three great milestones in the development of democratic institutions’, is then obliged to admit that in the United States ‘it is never easy to distinguish “opposition” from “government”’, and that ‘it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to identify the opposition’. Opposition in the United States political system is nonstructural because of the multiple access points for influence, and opportunities for preventing or inhibiting governmental action are numerous. No single institution illustrates this fact better than Congress. In speaking of Congress, commentators do not talk about ‘the opposition’. They may refer to ‘the minority party’ (and ‘the majority party’), yet even these terms cannot be used at times when the Senate and House are not controlled by the same party. Moreover, internal organizational and procedural patterns in the contemporary Congress allow many opportunities for minority coalitions to check executive policies favoured by a majority coalition in Congress, and such coalitions are often bipartisan.


1968 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 481-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles O. Jones

Considerable attention has recently been focused on political oppositions in democracies. A recent book examines oppositions in various western countries and a journal called Government and Opposition was founded in 1965. The significance of the role of an opposition in democracies does not have to be stressed. It is generally accepted.What of the role of the opposition in the United States? Robert A. Dahl notes that one must use the plural when speaking of opposition in this country since, “a distinctive, persistent, unified structural opposition scarcely exists in the United States … it is nearly always impossible to refer precisely to “the” opposition, for the coalition that opposes the government on one matter may fall apart, or even govern, on another.”While it is true that “the” opposition is not institutionalized as a definite cohesive, persistent, distinctive group in American politics, it is also true that there has usually been an identifiable minority party in Congress. Though it does not always oppose the majority, and cannot be expected to be synonymous with “the” opposition very often, it does persist. Despite handsome invitations to disband—in the form of successive defeats at the polls—a sizeable number of congressmen, senators, and congressional candidates continue to call themselves Republicans and to organize as such in Congress.


1995 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Garner

AbstractThis article seeks to provide a research agenda for the study of animal protection politics. It looks firstly at the animal protection movement's organization and maintenance in the context of Olson's theory of collective action. While existing research suggests that activists tend to be recruited because of the purposive and expressive benefits they offer rather than the material ones emphasized by Olson, these alternative forms of selective incentives can hinder the achievement of the movement's goals. Secondly, the article outlines alternative models of policy-making and shows how they might be operationalized to explain the development of animal welfare policy-making in Britain and the United States. Preliminary observations suggest thatBritain's animal welfare record is more substantial because policy communities have been able to manage and limit change through concessions and cooptation. No such mechanism is available in the American political system where the greater openness and fragmentation often results in severe confrontation and ultimately, stalemate.


2018 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
pp. 256-265
Author(s):  
Konstantin V. Simonov ◽  
Stanislav P. Mitrakhovich

The article examines the possibility of transfer to bipartisan system in Russia. The authors assess the benefits of the two-party system that include first of all the ensuring of actual political competition and authority alternativeness with simultaneous separation of minute non-system forces that may contribute to the country destabilization. The authors analyze the accompanying risks and show that the concept of the two-party system as the catalyst of elite schism is mostly exaggerated. The authors pay separate attention to the experience of bipartisan system implementation in other countries, including the United States. They offer detailed analysis of the generated concept of the bipartisanship crisis and show that this point of view doesn’t quite agree with the current political practice. The authors also examine the foreign experience of the single-party system. They show that the success of the said system is mostly insubstantial, besides many of such systems have altered into more complex structures, while commentators very often use not the actual information but the established myths about this or that country. The authors also offer practical advice regarding the potential technologies of transition to the bipartisan system in Russia.


2003 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 525-542
Author(s):  
Merri C. Moken

The use of pharmaceutical products in the United States has increased more than the use of any other health resource from 1960 to 1990. In excess of 9,600 drugs were on the market in 1984, and the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approves approximately 30 new drugs and countless new applications for alterations of already existing drugs each year. In 2001, the $300 billion pharmaceutical industry sold $154 billion worth of prescription drugs in the United States alone, nearly doubling its $78.9 billion in sales in 1997. With such a rapid increase in market domination and expenditures, the U.S. government and many hospitals have focused their attention on the sales and pricing practices of pharmaceutical companies, as well as other potential factors contributing to these escalating prices. One such cause of the steadily increasing prices of brand name pharmaceuticals is the sale of fake or counterfeit pharmaceuticals (also called “look-alike” drugs).


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