The Epoch of Critique

2020 ◽  
pp. 33-35
Author(s):  
Willy Thayer
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
True Source ◽  
Points Of View

This chapter explains what delimits the epoch of critique that is inaugurated by Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy, the Critique of Pure Reason. It focuses on the epoch of critique that separates itself from dogmatism, that long epoch of many epochs and multiple schools whose natural disposition Kant referred to as “metaphysical.” Before even the arbitrary universalization of beliefs, values, actions, points of view, and particular judgments, dogmatism consists in the inadvertent setting in motion of the presuppositions, conditions, and limits of judgments, convictions, and values. This chapter points out that dogmatism does not lie so much in the intransigent affirmation of an opinion or doctrine as it does in the unsuspecting application of unforeseen conditions and circulates as a liberal or flexible disposition. It emphasizes that the true source of dogmatism is the result of an athematic, inertial use of the form, whatever the circumstances may be.

The Remarriage of Reason and Experience in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-69
Author(s):  
J. Colin McQuillan ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Distinctive Features ◽  
Intelligible World

This article argues that Immanuel Kant recreates in his critical philosophy one of the most distinctive features of Christian Wolff’s rationalism—the marriage of reason and experience (connubium rationis et experientiae). The article begins with an overview of Wolff’s connubium and then surveys the reasons some of his contemporaries opposed the marriage of reason and experience, paying special attention to the distinctions between phenomena and noumena, sensible and intellectual cognition, and empirical and pure cognition that Kant employs in his inaugural dissertation On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World (1770). The final section of the article argues that, in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), Kant rejects the anticonnubialist positions he defended in his inaugural dissertation and introduces a new account of the relation between reason and experience that recreates Wolff’s connubium within the context of his critical philosophy.

scholarly journals Darwinism as the Missing Link in Kant’s Critical Philosophy

2019 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 51-80
Author(s):  
Igor K. Kalinin
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Physical Nature ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Entire System ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Top Down ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Transcendental Deduction ◽  
Critical Attitude ◽  
Logical Functions

I proceed from the hypothesis that the difficulties in Kant’s presentation of his plan and, accordingly, the implicit reason for the critical attitude to this plan on the part of many contemporary philosophers stem from the fact that he had no theoretical link at his disposal which would offer a more solid scientific grounding for his entire system. I believe that Darwinism is such a link which bolsters the central but ungrounded thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason on the existence of a priori synthetic judgments. The synthesis of Darwinism and critical philosophy dictates, however, a substantial restructuring of the latter since some of its key elements prove to be weak in the light of modern studies and need to be revised or even reversed. The first reversal explored in this article determines the origin of the categories which are now revealed not “from the top down” where Kant sought them, i. e. not in logical functions in accordance with metaphysical deduction and not in self-consciousness as transcendental deduction claims, but “from the bottom up” if one considers things in the evolutionary dimension, i. e. in the instincts. The second reversal shifts the freedom of will which Kant placed in the same ontological basket with things in themselves at “the top,” to another level of the pyramid of ontologies, by changing dualism to pluralism because dualism is too narrow to accommodate all the autonomous components of critical philosophy. Thus spirit and freedom find a new place separate from the sphere of physical nature; the category of adaptation explains how different ontologies can coexist; while the problem of two interpretations of transcendental idealism (two-world vs. two-aspect interpretation) finds a solution through their reconciliation.

scholarly journals KANTAS IR DELEUZE’AS: KOKIA YRA GILIAUSIA VAIZDUOTĖS PASLAPTIS?

Problemos ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 84 ◽  
pp. 153-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jūratė Baranova
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Do So ◽  
Philosophical Understanding

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama Kanto nužymėtos ir Deleuze’o eksperimentiniame mąstyme rekonstruotos vaizduotės kaip vieno iš trijų proto gebėjimų raiškos lauko alternatyvos. Siekiama atsakyti į paties Deleuze’o išsikeltą kantišką klausimą: kokia yra giliausia paslaptis? Aptinkamos kelios atsakymo alternatyvos. Šiame tyrime paaiškėjo, kad Deleuze’o atsakymai į paties išsikeltą klausimą „kokia yra giliausia vaizduotės paslaptis?“ patiria metamorfozes, kurios apsuka ratą. Nuo pradinės pozicijos, kai vaizduotė veikia tik paklusdama intelektui ar protui, ji juda link laisvo trijų nepriklausomų sugebėjimų – intelekto, proto, vaizduotės atitikimo, paskui – link jų nedarnios dermės, jų kovos, kuri skatina kiekvienos naują atsiskleidimą, galiausiai – prie vaizduotės anihiliacijos, kuri leidžia užgimti naujai minčiai, taigi, ratas apsisuka ir grįžtama prie jų dermės naujame lygmenyje, moderuojant filosofiniam skoniui. Tačiau visas šias metaformorfozes jungia viena bendra Kanto suformuluota prielaida: vaizduotė niekada neišvengia triadinės priklausomybės, ji neveikia viena; ji galima tik santykyje su intelektu ir protu, t. y. kitais trimis jai paraleliais ir simultaniškais sugebėjimais.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Kantas, Deleuze’as, vaizduotėKant and Deleuze: What is the Deepest Secret of Imagination? Jūratė Baranova Abstract The paper discusses the problem of possible philosophical understanding of imagination from the Kantian-Deleuzean point of view. At the begining of his philosophical carreer, one can say, “early Deleuze” in 1963 published the book „Kant’s Critical Philosophy“ (La philosophie critique de Kant). The same year he wrote an essay “The Idea of Genesis in Kant’s Esthetics”. In both texts returning to Kant’s book Critique of Pure Reason, Deleuze notices, that it is widely acknowledged that schematizing is an original and irreducible act of imagination: only imagination can and knows how to schematize. Nevertheless, the imagination does not schematize of its own accord, simply because it is free to do so. It schematizes only for a speculative purpose, in accordance with the determinate concepts of the understanding; when the understanding itself plays the role of legislator. This is why it would be misguided to search the mistery of schematizing for the last word on the imagination in its essence or in its free spontaneity. “Schematizing is indeed a secret, but not the deepest secret of imagination,” – writes Deleuze. Some questions arise at this point. The first one – who speaks here: Kant or Deleuze? The second one – what is this deepest secret of imagination, as an intrigue of this kantian-deleuzean voice? How many possible answers to this question one can discern passing from “early Deleuze” to “late Deleuze”? In this article the author discoved some possible metamorphosis or twists of imagination in the experimental reading of Deleuze. It starts from the submissive position being directed by Understanding or Reason, to the free accord of three independent faculties, towards their discord, even fight, even death of the imagination for the sake of the thought and at least – the whirl closes and comes to the same point but from a different point of view: imagination, together with understanding and reason participate as an integral part of philosophical taste in later Deleuze. But one point united all these different adventures of imagination. Imagination always acts only in relation to the understanding and reason, it never plays free. It could never be able to play alone. Keywords: Kant, Deleuze, imagination.

For the Love of Metaphysics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karin Nisenbaum
Keyword(s):  
German Idealism ◽  
Natural World ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Human Reason ◽  
The Third ◽  
Irreducible Elements ◽  
Temporal Dimensions

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argued that human reason is inherently conflicted, because it demands a form of unconditioned knowledge that transcends its capacity; his solution to this conflict of reason relies on the idea that reason’s quest for the unconditioned can only be realized practically. This book proposes to view the conflict of reason, and Kant’s solution to this conflict, as the central problem shaping the contours of post-Kantian German Idealism. I contend that the rise and fall of German Idealism is to be told as a story about the different interpretations, appropriations, and radicalization of Kant’s prioritizing of the practical. The first part of the book explains why Kant’s critics and followers came to understand the aim of Kant’s critical philosophy in light of the conflict of reason. I argue that F. H. Jacobi and Salomon Maimon set the stage for the reception of Kant’s critical philosophy by conceiving its aim in terms of meeting reason’s demand for unconditioned knowledge, and by understanding the conflict of reason as a conflict between thinking and acting, or knowing and willing. The manner in which the post-Kantian German Idealists radicalized Kant’s prioritizing of the practical is the central topic of the second part of the book, which focuses on works by J. G. Fichte and F. W. J. Schelling. The third part of the book clarifies why, in order to solve the conflict of reason, Schelling and Rosenzweig developed the view that human experience is grounded in three irreducible elements—God, the natural world, and human beings—which relate in three temporal dimensions: Creation, Revelation, and Redemption.

Kant’s Critical Argument(s) for Immortality Reassessed

Kant Yearbook ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andree Hahmann
Keyword(s):  
Critical Period ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Critical Argument ◽  
Apparent Change ◽  
The One ◽  
Immortality Of The Soul

AbstractKant’s postulate of the immortality of the soul has received strikingly little attention among Kant scholars, and only very few have regarded it positively. This is not surprising given the numerous problems associated with his argument. However, it is not the only argument for immortality that Kant offers in his critical philosophy. There is also a second argument that differs from the one furnished in the Second Critique and can be found both in the Critique of Pure Reason and later texts from the 1790s. Kant also addresses here many of the problems that interpreters have found with his postulate of immortality in both earlier and later texts. This paper considers the main difficulties associated with the postulate and proposes a coherent interpretation of Kant’s argument. I show that despite the apparent change in his approach to immortality Kant did not in fact substantially alter his position during his critical period.

The Role of Magnitude in Kant's Critical Philosophy

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-441 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Sutherland
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Cognition ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
The Real

In theCritique of Pure Reason,Kant argues for two principles that concern magnitudes. The first is the principle that ‘All intuitions are extensive magnitudes,’ which appears in the Axioms of Intuition (B202); the second is the principle that ‘In all appearances the real, which is an object of sensation, has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree,’ which appears in the Anticipations of Perception (B207). A circle drawn in geometry and the space occupied by an object such as a book are paradigm examples of extensive magnitudes, while the intensity of a light is a paradigm example of an intensive magnitude. These principles justify and explain the possibility of applying mathematics to objects of experience. The Axioms principle also explains the possibility of any mathematical cognition at all.

Identity, Appearances, and Things in Themselves

Dialogue ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 421-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ermanno Bencivenga
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

In his lucid and perceptive essay, “Recent Work on Kant's Theoretical Philosophy”, Karl Ameriks signals Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves as one of the (two) “central issues” of the Critique of Pure Reason. The reason why the issue is central (and complicated) is that Kant appears to say contradictory things on the matter. At times he says (or implies) that appearances are the same as things in themselves, and at other times he says (or implies) that they are different. Some interpreters have tried to make sense of these contradictions by claiming that “although for Kant there are not two objects involved, there are still two transcendental and intelligible aspects or points of view that are called for by his doctrine of things in themselves and appearances”. However, it is not immediately clear what kind of an animal an aspect or a point of view is, what kind of operation it is to “look at” an object from such different points of view, and what kind of results this operation is supposed to give. In the present paper, I make a fresh proposal. I propose to interpret Kant's conflicting claims on the relation between things in themselves and appearances in terms of the contemporary framework of possible-world semantics.

Beck, Jacob Sigismund (1761–1840)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eckart Forster
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
The Third ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
Kantian Philosophy ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

Beck played a brief but important role in the development of post-Kantian philosophy. A former student of Kant, he published at his teacher’s instigation three volumes of ‘Explanatory Abstracts’ of Kant’s major writings. In the third volume Beck presented what he regarded as the ‘Only Possible Standpoint’ from which Critical Philosophy had to be judged if misunderstandings of Kant’s work were to be avoided. His ‘Doctrine of the Standpoint’ involved a ‘reversal’ of the method of the Critique of Pure Reason and the elimination of the ‘thing-in-itself’ from Kant’s theoretical philosophy.

Hegel's Pragmatic Critique and Reconstruction of Kant's System of Principles in the 1807Phenomenology of Spirit.

2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-183
Author(s):  
Kenneth R. Westphal
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Social Philosophy ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
Transcendental Logic ◽  
Key Steps ◽  
Related Paper

Peirce's study of Kant, and later of Hegel, and Dewey's (1930) retention of much of Hegel's social philosophy are recognised idealist sources of pragmatism. Here I argue that the transition from idealism to pragmatic realism was already achieved by Hegel. Hegel's ‘Objective Logic’ corresponds in part to Kant's ‘Transcendental Logic’ (WdL,GW21:47.1-3). Hegel faults Kant for relegating concepts of reflection to an Appendix to his Transcendental Logic (WdL,GW12:19.34-38), and for treating reason as ‘only dialectical’ and as ‘merely regulative’ (WdL,GW12:23.12, .16-17). I present three important yet neglected features of Kant'sCritique of Pure Reasonwhich are key enthymemes undergirding Hegel's critical reconstruction of Kant's Critical philosophy (§2). I then summarise some features of the philosophical context within which Hegel begins to re-assess and reconstruct Kant's Transcendental Logic (§3), and review several key steps in this direction Hegel undertook in the 1807Phenomenology(§4). (A related paper extends these results to Hegel'sLogicandEncyclopaedia.) These points show that Hegel's reanalysis of Kant's Critical philosophy is the first and still one of the most sophisticated and adequate pragmatic — specifically pragmatic realist — accounts of thea priori.

Kant’s Dialectic

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 595-614
Author(s):  
Allen W. Wood
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Formal Organization ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
The Aesthetic

The bulk of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is divided, in its philosophical content if not its formal organization, into two parts. The first, encompassing the Introduction, the Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic, presents a theory of metaphysical knowledge; its source and nature, its proper objects, and its fundamental principles. The second part, contained in the Transcendental Dialectic, is a theory of metaphysical error, illusion, or pseudoknowledge. For various reasons, students of the Critique have tended to neglect the second part of Kant's project in favor of the first, though there is no evidence that Kant himself regarded it as less important or less essential to the critical philosophy.

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