scholarly journals On Protection of Rights and Interests of Minority Shareholders in Listed Company

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Cheng
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-32
Author(s):  
Louise Ruselis Sitorus

A public-listed company essentially is required to be aware of all of its consequences and obligations inter alia protecting the interests of minority shareholders, conducting information disclosure and acting in accordance with relevant national laws and regulations. If such obligations are neglected, the company may jeopardize its existence in the stock exchange listing. It may be delisted. A delisted company has obligations to convey delisting decision to their investors as information disclosure and acting in accordance with relevant national laws and regulations. However, a delisted company does not automatically turn its status from public-listed company to Private Company. As long as the company runs with fulfilled requirements to become a public-listed company, it still bears the aforementioned obligations. There is a wrong assumption that a delisted company will be harm the shareholders. delisting company prevents an even greater loss of investors from letting investors invest in unprofitable companies. Whereas investors invest their shares with the aim to gain profits. Investors can also make various efforts to get protection. Keywords: Capital Market, Delisting, Public-Listed Company


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Simphiwe S Bidie

The remedies in favour of minority shareholders that have developed over the years have been informed by the discriminatory manner in which the proper-plaintiff rule has been applied within the management of companies, in disregard of the rights and interests of minority shareholders. Broadly, section 163(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 accords shareholders or directors of a company three circumstances in which they have rights to apply to court for relief. One ground for application is that an act or omission of a company, or a related person, has had a result that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the applicant. From the contemporary debates and court decisions consulted, it is clear that the criterion that complainants must satisfy under section 163(1) – “any act or omission of the company, or a related person, has had a result”, – and the manner in which parties must go about meeting such criterion, is not yet settled. The intention of this paper is to analyse and examine this criterion. The paper seeks to contribute to the debate by using the case of Peel v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd as the point of reference. The case is pertinent because it touches on all the elements that must be satisfied under section 163(1). Secondly, much as the decision is supported, it seems an error of law was made in one aspect of the decision.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Heorhii Smirnov

Background: Some jurisdictions provide for the right of members of a corporation to sue on its behalf and in its interests. This remedy is called ‘a derivative action’ (derivative lawsuit), and the right to file such a lawsuit is granted to a company’s members in case the wrongdoers are in its control, preventing the company from taking actions to protect its rights and interests – which is detrimental to the interests and rights of minority shareholders. However, derivative lawsuit’s regulation differs in each jurisdiction despite sharing common features, raising a variety of issues to be resolved. Methods: In this article, the author points out several issues and their possible solutions, which could be implemented in Ukrainian legislation: property qualification by itself cannot prevent abuse in filing a derivative lawsuit – extended ‘locus standi’ has to be implemented; holders of preferred shares have to be granted the right to file a derivative lawsuit; property qualification has to be substituted with a representation quota for members of non-entrepreneurial corporations; the circle of defendants should include major members (majority of members) and third parties, etc. Results and Conclusions: The concepts of a preventive derivative lawsuit and a derivative lawsuit for the invalidation of a company’s transaction and possible issues regarding them are analysed. Additionally, the necessity for implementing a ‘business judgement rule’ is emphasised.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno-Laurent Moschetto ◽  
Frédéric Teulon

This study develops a new trade-off view of corporate governance from an examination of rules that limit voting rights as a defensive measure against a hostile takeover attempt. The theoretical framework concerns a listed company, the capital of which is mainly detained by atomistic shareholders and the power of which is in the hands of a minority shareholders, the hard core. The latter wants to block any hostile takeover and constructs a device based on two parameters allowing it to act on the limitation of the voting rights: a threshold and a scale-down coefficient.


2019 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-86
Author(s):  
L.I. Adashys ◽  
◽  
A.A. Levdyk ◽  
S.I. Levytska ◽  
◽  
...  

Think India ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-23
Author(s):  
Hitesh Shukla ◽  
Nailesh Limbasiya

Growth, progress, and prosperity of any country depend highly on the corporate governance mechanism of that country. Good governance of a country helps it to sustainable growth and consistency in progress. The good governance should contribute towards the improvement in transparency, ethics, morality, and disclosure. The principles of good governance stand on honesty, trust, integrity, openness, and performance orientation. Our honorable Prime Minister Narendra bhai Modi had given the three E for good governance during his speech on Independence Day i.e. Effective Governance, Electronic Governance, and Ethical Governance. The fundamental concern of corporate governance mechanism is to ensure the protection of minority shareholders/owners of specific firms. Mechanism of a corporate governance specifies the relations among the shareholders, board of directors, and managers. The present paper is an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the board by calculating the corporate governance score. The mandatory and non-mandatory guidelines have been considered while assigning points to specific parameters of the corporate governance.


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