Issues in the Protection of Minority Shareholders’ Rights and Interests under China’s Company Law

2008 ◽  
pp. 52-62
Author(s):  
Shuliang Wang
Keyword(s):  
Company Law ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Rights And Interests

Public Enforcement

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda M. Rose
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Broad Spectrum ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Internal Governance ◽  
Governance Framework ◽  
Ex Post

This chapter examines issues relating to corporate governance in closely held corporations. It begins by describing the typical characteristics of closely held corporations, with particular emphasis on shareholder involvement in management, number of shareholders, share transfers, market for shares, and the broad spectrum of shareholders and applications. It then considers common governance issues and conflicts in closely held corporations and proceeds with a discussion of the governance framework for such corporations consisting of company law, model articles, articles of association, shareholder agreements, and corporate governance guidelines. It also explores the internal governance and management of closely held corporations, the governance of share transfer restrictions, and provisions for shareholder withdrawal and expulsion. The chapter concludes with an analysis of shareholder conflicts, especially oppression by majority shareholders and ex-post opportunism by minority shareholders, and how they are governed in closely held corporations.

Majority and Minority Shareholders

2020 ◽  
pp. 119-174
Author(s):  
Paul Davies
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
High Risk ◽  
Small Group ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
The Third ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
A Company

Where a company has a controlling or a small group of controlling shareholders, the non-controlling shareholders are at risk that the controllers will extract private benefits of control at the expense of the non-controllers. UK company law contains a wide range of techniques for addressing this issue, some more effective than others. This chapter begins by examining the various ways in which well-advised investors can contract for protection before they enter the company and how the law protects the agreements reached. The second part discusses rights to exit the company upon the occurrence of certain events. The third part discusses disclosure rights, designed to bring self-dealing transactions into the open. The fourth focuses on ways of structuring the board or shareholder body when the decision before it carries a high risk of self-dealing. The final part considers cases where the courts review the substantive fairness of the controllers’ conduct, notably, but not only, the provisions on ‘unfair prejudice.

5. Majority and Minority Shareholders

2020 ◽  
pp. 119-174
Author(s):  
Paul Davies
Keyword(s):  
At Risk ◽  
High Risk ◽  
Small Group ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
The Third ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
A Company

Where a company has a controlling or a small group of controlling shareholders, the non-controlling shareholders are at risk that the controllers will extract private benefits of control at the expense of the non-controllers. UK company law contains a wide range of techniques for addressing this issue, some more effective than others. This chapter begins by examining the various ways in which well-advised investors can contract for protection before they enter the company and how the law protects the agreements reached. The second part discusses rights to exit the company upon the occurrence of certain events. The third part discusses disclosure rights, designed to bring self-dealing transactions into the open. The fourth focuses on ways of structuring the board or shareholder body when the decision before it carries a high risk of self-dealing. The final part considers cases where the courts review the substantive fairness of the controllers’ conduct, notably, but not only, the provisions on ‘unfair prejudice.

Independent Directors: Decision-Makers in the us, Powerless Advisers in China

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-111
Author(s):  
Wenjia Yan
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Governance Model ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
Independent Decision ◽  
Corporate Governance Model

As a global popular corporate governance system developed in the us, independent directors were officially adopted by China through ‘Guiding Opinions on the Establishment of Systems of Independent Directors by Listed Companies’ (hereinafter Independent Directors Opinion) in 2001 and through Article 123 of Company Law when it was amended in 2005. The emphasis on minority shareholders’ protection by adopting independent directors in China can be attributed to the global influence of the American corporate governance model, which depends on disinterested directors as independent decision-makers. However, with more than 10 years having passed, independent directors serve as powerless advisers rather than decision-makers in China. Accordingly, this paper aims to ascertain some profound reasons for powerless advisers in China and provide recommendations to address this problem by comparing the role of independent directors in China and the us.

scholarly journals New Hope for Corporate Governance in China?

2007 ◽  
Vol 191 ◽  
pp. 590-612 ◽  
Author(s):  
James V. Feinerman
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Capital Markets ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Financial Disclosure ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Securities Law ◽  
Chinese Law

AbstractChina's recent revisions to its Company Law and Securities Law have brought new attention to issues of corporate governance in Chinese companies and financial markets. Among the chief criticisms of the earlier laws – in both their provisions and application – were the lack of protection for minority shareholders, the paucity of independent directors, the absence of transparency and inadequate financial disclosure. The acknowledged need for greater congruence between Chinese law and practice and that of countries with more developed capital markets led to the proposal of amendments to China's legislation during the first half of this decade. This article highlights several improvements resulting from the revisions as well as remaining weaknesses in the regulatory framework for corporate enterprises in China.

scholarly journals Abuse of Rights by Majority Shareholders in Indonesian Family-Owned Company: Is It Likely?

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Fiona Priscilia Kohar ◽  
Yetty Komalasari Dewi
Keyword(s):  
Legal Protection ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Legal Research ◽  
Private Company ◽  
Familial Relations ◽  
Owned Company ◽  
Significant Opportunity

The familial relations entwining the ownership and management of a family-owned company creates a significant opportunity for majority shareholders to exercise their rights to others' detriment. Various jurisdictions have addressed such issue by projecting the concept of abuse of rights by majority shareholders (abus de majorité). The concept aims to detect which behaviour could be considered an abuse and provide legal protection for minority shareholders and companies. In Indonesia, however, such a concept has not been explicitly adopted nor discussed at length.  This work examines what behaviour which could be considered as a form of abuse of rights by majority shareholders under the Indonesian company law, and how the protection and practice of Indonesian private company law against such behaviour. This work is a normative legal research using conceptual, comparison, statutory, and case-law approaches. The comparison and case-law approaches will be utilized to examine the universal concept of majority shareholders abuse of rights by examining the adoption of the concept in various jurisdictions and examine several relevant cases brought to the Indonesian court. As a result, it concludes that there are still problems surrounding the legal measures available, as this behaviour is still prevalent, especially in Indonesia's family-owned companies. Hence, more stringent rules are needed to protect minority shareholders and the Indonesian Company's interests effectively.

scholarly journals Protection of minority shareholders’ rights in group of companies: Lithuania and EU company law perspectives

2020 ◽  
pp. 7-17
Author(s):  
Edvinas Bakanauskas
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Present Article ◽  
National Level ◽  
Company Law ◽  
Economic Indicators ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Business World ◽  
Business Regulation ◽  
Modern Business

Just as in the entire European Union, in Lithuania company groups are an integral part of the modern business world. It is the companies that are part of company groups are leading both in Lithuania and in the European Union in terms of a number of economic indicators: revenues, number of employees, amounts of taxes paid and other contributions. Despite being an integral part of modern business, regulation of company groups has not yet attracted sufficient attention both at the European Union or the national level. Such absence of a consistent regulation may lead to or cause, inter alia, infringements of rights of minority shareholders. Accordingly, the purpose of the present article is to assess whether the effective Lithuanian or European Union regulation is sufficient to protect minority shareholders’ rights in group of companies.

18. Company Law III Company Meetings, Shareholder Protection, and Liquidation of Companies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucy Jones
Keyword(s):  
Company Law ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Market Abuse ◽  
Shareholder Protection ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Insider Dealing ◽  
The Difference ◽  
A Company

This chapter discusses the different types of company meetings and how meetings are convened and managed. It examines the different types of resolutions that may be made by shareholders both at meetings and outside meetings, and the rights of shareholders to propose their own resolutions. It explains the difference between voting by a show of hands and voting by poll. It considers the protection given by law to minority shareholders. It discusses the meaning of insider dealing and market abuse and the penalties they attract. The chapter concludes with a discussion of methods by which a company can be wound up and the meaning of wrongful and fraudulent trading.

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