scholarly journals Mixed Ownership Structures and Firm Performance in China Listed Firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 80
Author(s):  
Xiaolou Yang

China has achieved impressive economic growth since market reforms. The design of appropriate compensation structures is imperative so as to incentivize top managers, but little research has been done to examine the top management compensation structure in China. This study investigates how listed firms in China relate executive compensation to their firm performance and how such relationships are influenced by firm ownership structure. The results provide evidence showing strong link between compensation and performance varies across firms with different ownership structure. Private ownership enhances the link between firm performance and top CEOs compensation, while government ownership weakens executive pay-performance relation and thus makes the firms less effective in solving the agency problem between shareholders and management. It suggests enterprise reform in China will need to be supplemented by change in ownership structure in order to ensure fully success by transforming its State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to corporations in the direction of converting state shares to public shares.

2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 45-50
Author(s):  
Fredrick Onyango Odhiambo ◽  
Nixon Oduor Omindi

This study examines the relationship between government ownership and performance of listed firms on the Nairobi Securities Exchange. The quadratic term of government ownership is included in the model to test for the effect of increasing government ownership levels on performance. We use panel data techniques on 102 firm-year observations between 2003 and 2013 for all the listed firms in which the government directly owns some shares. We find no relationship between government ownership and performance at lower levels of government ownership. We find a negative relationship between government ownership and performance at higher levels of government ownership. We estimate, through differentiation of the Tobin’s Q model, that government ownership has a negative effect on performance when government ownership exceeds 41%. The study concludes that lower government ownership levels do not affect firm performance but as the ownership rises, government ownership has a detrimental effect on firm performance. We provide implications of these results for policy and practice. JEL Classifications Code: G34


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (4, Special Issue) ◽  
pp. 308-318
Author(s):  
Stefan Lutz ◽  
Karim Hegazy ◽  
Ehab K. A. Mohamed ◽  
Mohamed A. K. Basuony

This paper aims at filling existing research by examining the impact of corporate governance and ownership structure on firm performance using cross-sectional data from companies in the MENA region for the years 2009-2013. The results indicate that higher ownership concentration is associated with higher returns. Furthermore, firms with higher international ownership share tend to perform better than those with only local private and/or state ownership. The results suggest some prevalent features with respect to ownership and performance of firms in the MENA region. Due to the volatile social and business environment, these firms operate in, they may be particularly dependent on effective ownership structures and support which may be provided by international, institutional, and large shareholders.


2014 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 464 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ebrahim Mohammed Al-Matari ◽  
Abdullah Kaid Al-Swidi ◽  
Faudziah Hanim Fadzil

<h1>Abstract</h1><p>This study aims to offer a comprehensive description of the relevant literature that related to the association between the ownership structures namely, ownership concentration, managerial ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership and institutional ownership and firm performance. Ownership structure is among the corporate governance primary mechanisms. Ownership structure has been a target of many analysts and scholars alike for few decades but there is a lack of prior studies that examined these relationships in the developing countries. Additionally, there is few studies were trying to examine these factors together with firm performance in the developed countries but there is a rare research to test this association in the developing countries. So, the main objective of this study is to bridge this gap and try to enrich existing literature review. As we know, the ownership is to play a significant role to enhance performance through offer encouragement both in public and foreign investors to invest without concern on future risk. Moreover, it provides investors’ confidence to continue for achieving their target. Finally, this study offers many future recommendations as explained.</p>


2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 89-95
Author(s):  
Huson Joher Ali Ahmed ◽  
IKM Mokhtarul Wadud

This study examines whether the structure of share ownership or firm’s dividend and debt policies provide explanation for firm performances in Malaysia. Firm performance, measured as Tobin’s Q is modelled in a dynamic panel framework to estimate effects of director ownership, family ownership, foreign ownership, and firm’s dividend and debt policy. The generalised methods of moments (GMM) method is used to estimated the models for 80 CI components companies listed on Main Board of Malaysia observed from 1999 to 2002. The findings reveal strong evidence of positive impact of firm’s dividend and debt policy on firm performance. However, ownership structure seems to be less important for market based performance of Malaysian firms. These results are expected to provide guidelines to the investors regarding the significance of firm dividend policy, leverage policy and market to book value ratio as some of the key sources of value creation for Malaysian listed firms.


GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.


2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 465-472
Author(s):  
Benjamin Ehikioya ◽  
Yuanjin Qin ◽  
Keifa Xie ◽  
Chen ru Yun

This study investigates how ownership structure impacts on the corporate performance of listed firms in China. The study uses sample data of firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the five year fiscal period that ended 2005. The results of the panel data regression analysis suggests firm performance to have positive and significant relation with the proportion of shares held by the institution, through the legal person holding companies. In addition, while state ownership indicates negative influence on performance, individual and foreign investors are found to have positive effect on performance, though at a minimal levels. Interestingly, the effect of ownership structure is stronger in firms experiencing the dominance of legal person share holdings over state shares. Further, firm size and ratio of debt to equity are also observed to have influence on the performance of Chinese listed firms. These findings are of great significant to policymakers, academics, shareholders and other stakeholders.


2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 296-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Poh-Ling Ho ◽  
Gregory Tower

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on the voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of Malaysian listed firms. The result shows that there is an increase in the extent of voluntary disclosure in Malaysian listed firms over the eleven-year period from 1996 to 2006. Ownership concentration consistently shows positive association with voluntary disclosure. Firms with higher foreign and institutional ownership have a significantly positive association with voluntary disclosure levels while firms with family ownership exhibit lower voluntary disclosure. Consistent with agency theory, different ownership structures have varied monitoring effects on agency costs and clearly influence firm’s disclosure practices. The findings provide insights to policy makers and regulators in their desire to increase transparency and accountability amidst the continual enhancement of corporate governance. The findings provide evidence that optimized ownership structure in any jurisdiction should be considered in any regulatory process that seeks to improve transparency.


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