Introduction to the Special Research Forum— Public Policy and Management Research: Finding the Common Ground

2009 ◽  
Vol 52 (6) ◽  
pp. 1088-1100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas A. Kochan ◽  
Mauro F. Guillen ◽  
Larry W. Hunter ◽  
Siobhan O'Mahony
Author(s):  
Michael B. Bakan

In the concluding chapter, it is proposed that while dialogue, music, poetry, and storytelling—collectively the lifeblood of this work—should by no means be regarded as substitutes for progressive public policy or impactful legislation in the ongoing struggle for autistic rights, they are nevertheless valuable in their own right and can pave the way toward new policies and laws that make a real, positive difference. Conversation, in particular, is singled out for its capacity to help us “find common ground from which to move forward in common purpose toward the common good” while distancing us from “the tragic patterns of divisiveness, prejudice, intolerance, and denial of the humanity of others that darken the record of human history at every turn.” For conversation to foster such gains, however, our discourses must be approached with a commitment to really listening to what other people have to say. The greatest hope that the author and his collaborators have for this book, it is stated, is that its conversations and stories will ultimately “contribute in some meaningful way to making a future world that not only accepts neurodiversity but celebrates it as a hallmark of our shared humanity.” The work concludes with, first, a quotation from Hans Asperger emphasizing the importance of deeply engaged, compassionate conversation in his work with autistic children and, second, a closing poem from Mara Chasar, who suggests that however grave the challenges faced by autistic people may be, to be accepted, inspired, and loved by others will go a long way toward meeting them.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 875-888 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henrik von Wehrden ◽  
Maria Helena Guimarães ◽  
Olivia Bina ◽  
Marta Varanda ◽  
Daniel J. Lang ◽  
...  

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (02) ◽  
pp. 321-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Ping Li

I welcome any well-informed debate over the unique value of Yin-Yang as a cognitive frame in the development of Chinese indigenous management research. The commentary by Xin Li to engage in a debate is timely. Xin Li and I share the same premise that ‘we need indigenous Chinese management research to offer new insights and contribute to the development of truly universal theories’ (Li, X., 2014: 8). That is the common ground upon which we can debate over how best to engage in indigenous research with confidence in balance so as to avoid both overconfidence and under-confidence.Where we depart from the above common ground is our different perspectives about the value of the Yin-Yang frame. Xin Li challenges my positive perspective on the unique value of the Yin-Yang frame on several dimensions. First, he characterizes my perspective as ‘both/and’ in sharp contrast to Aristotle’s ‘either/or’ logic. Second, he characterizes my perspective as arguing that ‘Yin-Yang thinking is superior to other logical systems and philosophies’ (Li, X., 2014: 8). Third, he implies that my perspective on the Yin-Yang frame is essentially a claim that ‘Westerners cannot think in a non-either/or way’ (Li, X., 2014: 8). Fourth, the above challenges are based upon his basic claim that the Yin-Yang frame is just one form of dialectical framing (Li, X., 2014). Based on these claims, Xin Li warns against the ‘danger of overconfidence’ among Chinese management scholars (Li, X., 2014: 8).


2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 337-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leslie Zines

This article originally was published as a Law and Policy Paper. The Law and Policy Papers series was established in 1994 by the Centre for International and Public Law in the Faculty of Law, the Australian National University. The series publishes papers contributing to understanding and discussion on matters relating to law and public policy, especially those that are the subject of contemporary debate. In 1999 the papers were published jointly by the Centre for International and Public Law and The Federation Press. This article is reproduced in the Federal Law Review with the permission of the original publishers.


Author(s):  
Sarah E. Murray

This book gives a compositional, truth‐conditional, crosslinguistic semantics for evidentials set in a theory of the semantics for sentential mood. Central to this semantics is a proposal about a distinction between what propositional content is at‐issue, roughly primary or proffered, and what content is not‐at‐issue. Evidentials contribute not‐at‐issue content, more specifically what I will call a not‐at‐issue restriction. In addition, evidentials can affect the level of commitment a sentence makes to the main proposition, contributed by sentential mood. Building on recent work in the formal semantics of evidentials and related phenomena, the proposed semantics does not appeal to separate dimensions of illocutionary meaning. Instead, I argue that all sentences make three contributions: at‐issue content, not‐at‐issue content, and an illocutionary relation. At‐issue content is presented, made available for subsequent anaphora, but is not directly added to the common ground. Not‐at‐issue content directly updates the common ground. The illocutionary relation uses the at‐issue content to impose structure on the common ground, which, depending on the clause type (e.g., declarative, interrogative), can trigger further updates. Empirical support for this proposal comes from Cheyenne (Algonquian, primary data from the author’s fieldwork), English, and a wide variety of languages that have been discussed in the literature on evidentials.


Author(s):  
Deborah Tollefsen

When a group or institution issues a declarative statement, what sort of speech act is this? Is it the assertion of a single individual (perhaps the group’s spokesperson or leader) or the assertion of all or most of the group members? Or is there a sense in which the group itself asserts that p? If assertion is a speech act, then who is the actor in the case of group assertion? These are the questions this chapter aims to address. Whether groups themselves can make assertions or whether a group of individuals can jointly assert that p depends, in part, on what sort of speech act assertion is. The literature on assertion has burgeoned over the past few years, and there is a great deal of debate regarding the nature of assertion. John MacFarlane has helpfully identified four theories of assertion. Following Sandy Goldberg, we can call these the attitudinal account, the constitutive rule account, the common-ground account, and the commitment account. I shall consider what group assertion might look like under each of these accounts and doing so will help us to examine some of the accounts of group assertion (often presented as theories of group testimony) on offer. I shall argue that, of the four accounts, the commitment account can best be extended to make sense of group assertion in all its various forms.


1983 ◽  
Vol 37 ◽  
pp. 13-13
Author(s):  
Avery Leiserson

This essay addresses the problem of teachers and students who have reached the point of trying to find a common ground for perceiving (seeing) politics. This may occur almost any time during any social science course, but it cannot be assumed to happen automatically the first day of class in government, citizenship, or public affairs. Hopefully, the signal is some variant of the question: “What do we mean by politics, or the political aspect of human affairs?” A parade of definitions — taking controversial positions on public policy issues; running for elective office; who gets what, when and how; and manipulating people—is not a mutually-satisfying answer if it produces the Queen of Hearts’ attitude in students that the word politics means what they choose it to mean and nothing more.


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